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SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate experimentally the 
ability of observers to make predictions of the future relative 
posItions of aircraft on simulated radar displays, and to observe 
how this ability was affected by differences in the situation or 
in the types of simulation or observer. 
Two experiments are described, in which a carefully selected 
set of simulations was shown to groups of observers of differing 
experience. The first experiment used an elaborate radar simulator, 
in as close an approximation to normal operation as possible, the 
second used a simple paper simulation technique. 
A number of different types of decision were recorded, classified 
and analysed. It was found that there were few differences in the 
accuracy with which decisions were made, except those due to the 
nature of the situation. There were considerable differences in 
the times at which decisions were made. These depended on the 
individual observer, and on the simulation technique employed. 
There were also differences in the average times over all simulations 
displayed by different means. Differences between individuals 
tended to' be greater among unskilled observers, while skilled 
observers showed speeds comparable with the better unskilled 
observers. 
The conclusions to be drawn from these experiments about the 
use of simpler simulation techniques or less skilled observers are 
summarised in Chapter IX (Sections 3 or 4). In general, they 
suggest that Simpler simulation techniques are unreliable as far 
as timing of Judgement is concerned, but may be acceptable if one 
is concerned with accuracy only. Unskilled observers are as 
accurate, but slower than skilled observers, and show more within-
group variation. 
(iv) 
In addition to the differences between observers, the differences 
between simulations have been investigated. An investigation of 
the mathematical and statistical relationships between certain 
aspects of conflict situations leads to a series of multiple regression 
analyses describing the behaviour of skilled observers watching 
electronic simulations. A choice of variates is made, the time to go 
to the time of closest approach being found most sui table. 
It is found that the time of first decision can be predicted 
from an equation containing the speed of closing, the angle of 
approach and the order in which the aircraft reach the point of 
cross-over. Expressions are foth,d for the accuracy of this decision 
in various respects, and these are combined to predict mean times 
and frequencies of correct decisions. 
(v) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The origins of Air Traffic Control. 
Traffic in the air is.a recent phenomenom. Congestion 
in the air is even more recent •. It might be expected that 
the authori tie.s would be as unprepared for air traffic 
chaos as they are for ground traffic chaos. In fact this 
is not the case. The problem~ of the. control of air 
traffic were recognised early; in fact regulations for 
the conduct of aircraft were made within a few years of 
the first flights being made. Within two years of the 
crossing of the channel by Bleriot, regulations had been. 
made about the entry of aircraft into the United Kingdom. 
These were.~rimarily intended to frustrate ,the smuggler 
and the spy, specifying custcms procedu:r'es, areas of the 
country whioh Were not to be flown over, and stretches of 
coast by which entry to the country could be made. 
These regulations were, at the time, virtually 
unenforcable. In the absence of rapid wireless 
communication and sure means of detection, aircraft 
could go more or less where they liked and when they 
liked. 
The importance of wireless equipment was early 
appreciated by military air authorities, and the ability 
of aircraft to communicate with the ground by this method 
soon led to the tntroduction of more formal procedures. 
By the middle of the inter-war period, a system of 
air traffic control had been adopted for civil airfields 
and for the control in the air of military aircraft. 
At this stage, in the absence of radar, the only information 
available was that from the aircraft, which could only be 
2. 
as gooo ae the navigator supplying it. At this time, 
the system of reporting points came into use. This 
system required aircraft to report when they passed over 
fixed points on their journeys. This made it possibl~ 
to check that they were not· deviating from their expec.ted 
times of arrival, and to check that the~ had not come to 
grief in the interval. If they were in fact ahead of or 
behind schedule, or did not report, appropriate action 
could be taken. At this time, it also became neaessary 
to provide some form of organised procedure for deciding 
who was to take off or land next when several aircraft 
were in the air at the same time. Regulations were 
adapted from the rules for the prevention of collision at 
sea to avoid the collision of aircraft. In practice, the 
avoidance of collision could be left to the discretion of 
the pilot, who in those days was able to maintain an 
adequate search of his surrounding air space. 
Immediatel~ before and during the war, the use of 
radar for military purposes made it possible for ground-
based controllers to ascertain precisely where aircraft 
were, and what they were doing. This made it possible to 
guide intercepting fighters towards bomber formations, and 
to locate aircraft at their request, so that a constant 
stream of information, advice and orders flowed through 
the communication channels. 
As the war ended, it was soon obvious that the techni~ues 
originated for military use would be equally useful in the 
field of civil aviation. The priorities might be different, 
and the aim might be to guide aircraft away from each other 
rather then into each other, but the principles were the 
same. The equipment adopted at the time was the existing 
.3. 
Illili tar,. equipment, often not fully sUi t~ble tor its new 
tasks. Subsequently newequ~pment replaced obso+ete 
war-time equipment, and new systems were adopted. 
Certain airways were adopted for the flight of commercial 
aircraft, and restrictions were placed on the flight of 
light "uncontrolled" aircraft. The services co-operated 
in the organisation of air traffic control, and the 
connection between civil and service air traffic control 
in the United Kingdom remains intimate. 
Although the radar systems provide much of the 
information required for air traffic control, they are 
not the sole channels of communication, and older 
techniques remain in use. 
It may be instructive to consider the flight of an 
aircraft under normal civil procedures from, say, 
Kennedy Airport in New York to London (Heathrow) airport. 
The flight, we will assu~e, is a scheduled one, part 
of a regular service. Long before the aircraft leaves 
its service area, the preparations for the flight will 
have been made. The Flight Plan will have been filed, 
specifying when the aircraft will take off, to what height 
it will climb, when and where it will report, what radio 
frequency it will use, and what call-sign it will employ, 
to name only some of the items involved. Some of this 
information will go to the control tower, some to the air 
traffic control centre, which may be some distance away, 
and will probably serve a number of airfields. 
The aircraft, as soon as it is ready to depart, 
will be given permission to procede to the appropriate 
end of the appropriate runway by the control tower. 
Nowadays it may well find itself part of a queue of aircraft 
· 4 • 
.... ~iti.,.,o: perUl1sBion to take off. Ae 1::Ioon as its 
predecessors have.gone it will be instructed to take 
off at the next available opportunity. This may be 
considerably later than the planned time of take off. 
During t~e aircraft's take off and climb away frcm the 
airfield, it will be.watched by an air traffic controller 
using radar, to ensure that it is on course and that no 
other aircraft is in danger of colliding with it. 
After it has passed out of the immediate area of 
the airport, it will be handed over to an area air 
traffic controller, who will supervise its flight until 
it is out of the more congested area surrounding the 
airport. This controller is particularly concerned to 
see that the aircraft remains on its planned flight path, 
and to avoid the possibility of collisions with other 
aircraft entering the area, or taking off or landing on 
other adjacent airports. As the aircraft heads out over 
the Atlantic, the number of other aircraft will decrease, 
and the aircraft will pass out of the range of local radar 
eQuipment. 
From this point until the aircraft re-enters radar 
range on the other side of the Atlantic, it will be 
responsible for its own safety. Since in practice it is 
impossible to see other aircraft in time to take avoiding 
action, the usual procedure is to aSSign an area of airspace 
to each aircraft, and not to allow other aircraft to enter 
this area. The size of the area will depend on the 
navigational accuracy that can be expected in the long run. 
The aircraft is traced by its reports during the course 
of its journey, and is advised of adverse weather conditions 
and other dangers. 
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WhGn ~ho ei~craft epvro~ohQe the oppool~o ohor~ of 
the Atlantic, it will be picked up by the radar equipment 
of the United Kingdom, and given any necessary course 
corrections •. It will then ent'er what is known as 
'controlled air space', within which it will be under 
the control of an area air traffic controller. The 
aircraft will then fly along a specified corridor, 
taking its place in a atrea~ of aircraft proceeding to 
various airports in the United Kingdom. If it is going 
to London Airport, it will almost certainly not be able 
to oome in to land immediately. It will be directed to 
a 'stack'. It will fly to a predesignated area, such as 
that over Epsom, where it will be instructed to circle. 
As other aircraft below it are landed, it will be allowed 
to descend until it is at a suitable height to leave the 
stack and join the stream of aircraft preparing to land. 
At this point it will be handed over to an Approach 
Controller, whose task is to get the aircraft in line 
with the right runway, at the right height and speed, and 
not too close to the other aircraft. 
The final landing may be made under a variety of 
different systems, depending on weather conditions, the 
equipment available and other factors. 
This account is deliberately simplified, and 
differences in detail would occur on almost every flight. 
Some air traffic control organisations employ different 
divisions of responsibility, and at small airports it 
may not be necessary to operate a stack, for example. 
The processes used are under continuous review. Changes 
in procedure are made to adapt to different conditions, 
to different aircraft capabilities and to improved 
6. 
surveillanoe equipment. At the time of writing for example, 
the supersonic airliner is approaching service, and new 
high-speed radar equipments giving improved radar pictures 
are being introduced. The southern air traffic control 
centre is being moved away from London(Heathrow) Airport, 
and plans are being made for a third major airport~in 
the London area. 
One of the tasks of air traffic control which will 
remain, and must grow more important as traffic increases, 
is that of collision avoidance. This problem is discussed 
in more detail in the next section, where the different 
approaches to collision avoidance are discussed. 
2. The problem of collision avoidance in the air. 
Certain characteristics are required in any system 
for collision avoidance. The system must be physically 
feasible, comprehensible to its users, effective in 
avoiding colliSions, not excessively costly, and it 
must be accepted by the user. 
Most systems for collision avoidance represent 
compromises in terms of these requirements. The 
simplest system is to have no system.. In some 
circumstances this is a perfectly satisfactory sjstem. 
The pedestrian and the astronaut both use systems of this 
type. 
The next most simple system reqUires the adoption 
of a convention, such as that implied by the "Keep Left" 
rule on the roads, or by the rules for avoiding collision 
at sea. These conventions tend to be arbitrary in nature, 
incorporating traditional features simply because they are 
generally accepted. 
"7. 
Where in~ormal sYBteme are found to be inadequate, 
either because they are found to contain i~erent flaws, 
or because they are taking up too much time, space or 
effort, they are often replaced by regulations. The 
history of the Road Traffic Acts in almost any developed 
country will show a pattern of adaption to increasing 
traffic flow, with acts becoming more restrictive or 
more permissive to meet changing conditions. 
Such conventions, whether laid down by regulations 
or by tradition, have in common that they are applied 
by the ~ndividuals concerned in the regulation and 
navigation of the vehicles concerned. This can, and 
does, lead to misunderstandings, misinterpretation 
of the situation,and sometimes to catastrophe. 
Technical changes may make regulations unworkable, 
or even physically impossible. Rules easy to apply 
for visual sightings may be completely inapposite to 
radar sightings, for example. The speed of aircraft 
is now such that visual collision avoidance is virtually 
impossible. The aircrew cannot carry out continuous 
all round observation, nor could they carry oat, 
appropriate course corrections in time to avoid collisions. 
There simply is not enough time available between 
sighting and impact. The situation that would exist 
under purelY crew-organised collision avoidance in the 
region of major airports does not bear thinking about. 
Four main approaches have been made to the problems 
of collision avoidance in the air. Although they are 
not mutually exclusive, they may be discussed separately. 
The most straightforward approach to collision 
avoidance is to make the aircraft more visible. Accordingly 
8. 
aircraft may qe equipped with special colour schemes, 
often involving the use of fluorescent paint, or with 
special lighting systems. An extensive experimental 
programme was carried out in the United States by the 
Applied Psychology Corporation of.Arlingto~ (Virginia) 
(Applied Psychology Corporation 1961 a - f, 
1962 a - j, 1963 a - b, summarised in Cooke, Beasley 
and Robinson, 1962) and a number of other papers 
reviewed experience of various painting systems (Lazo 
and Bosee, 1961). 
This approach is limited by the inherent difficulties. 
of seeing through rain, cloud, fog and in darkness, 
and by the range at which detection must take place if 
adequate avoiding action is to be taken. Collision 
avoidance lights are fitted to aircraft, on the principle 
that they cost little, and might save a lot, but cannot 
by themselves provide adequate protection. 
The second approach, again attempting to extend 
the range at which dangerous situations could be 
perceived by aircrew, was to consider the adoption of 
airborne radar deVices, similar to those used for weather 
detection. This approach foundered on considerations of 
the size of the necessary radar deVices, and their 
requirements in terms of bandwidth allocations. 
Ratcliffe (1961) estimates that a beam width of 
100 wavelengths would be required in a primary radar 
system (one in which the detected aircraft is detected 
purely by reflection, without providing any active 
assistance to the radar equipped airuraft). Such a 
radar would require an aerial system capable of looking 
all around the aircraft, Ratcliffe estimates an effective 
9. 
'l'er'iruro ot' 40cm, ana a oonoc<;J.uent wavelength of 4mm. 
Such a radar beam would not have a range of ten miles 
in rain. In addition, there would be problems of 
detect~ng targets at ranges greater than the aircraft 
height, and problems of "Glint" - changes in reflected 
signal due to target movements - which make primary 
radar systems of this type nearly impossible in the 
present state of the art. 
Power, range and space requirements are less 
restrictive for secondary radar systems, where the air-
craft detected carry devices to transmit back information 
to the detecting aircraft. Such systems are useful only 
when a reasonable proportion of aircraf~ are equipped 
with them. Even the most basic systems cost a sizeable 
fraction of the cost of a light private aircraft, so 
that the prospect of their being made standard fittings 
for all aircraft is remote. Technical difficulties exist 
in the design of satisfactory devices for measuring 
relative heights, and systems which report the measured 
height of each aircraft can be seriously affected by 
inaccuracies in altimeters, such as often exist in practice. 
Secondary radar height finding devices are also liable 
to saturation. Ratcliffe (1961) points out that users 
are not likely to fit such costly equipment unless at 
least half the other users of the same airspace do so too. 
The organisational problems of adopting a system suitable 
for all shapes, Sizes, types and nationalities of airc~aft 
are such as to render the future of any such systems 
problematical at the best. 
The third approach is radically different and is 
essentially procedural in nature. It involves reserving 
1 e. 
b1.<>ol\::", .,£ "i:t'"cvscG 1:0>: oaoh ni.'rt:ra1:t. The block must 
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be large enough to allow for errors of timing and 
positioning, so that aircraft do not stray into other 
aircraft's blocks often enough to involve major risks 
of collision. This policy, which resembles the practice 
of railway companies of reserving lengths of track for 
each train, (although a system of reporting points is 
usually used in air traffic control) is effective. It 
has a number of disadvantages, of which the most important 
is that it greatly restricts the number of aircraft which 
can use a given route, and becomes more restrictive when 
the relative speeds of aircraft differ considerably. It 
is also dependent on the accuracy with which aircraft 
can report their positions, so that it is possible for 
blunders to occur, and for disputes as to the responsibility 
for accidents to lead to a breakdown of confidence. (In 
practice this has not occurred). 
The fourth approach, which is employed in crowded 
areas, such as the approaches to major airports, is that 
of radar air traffic control. 
Aircraft of certain categories, flying within certain 
height limits, are controlled by ground Air Traffic Control 
centres. These centres, which may be civilian or military 
in origin, (in the United Kingdom both civil and military 
controllers operate in the same centres, although there 
are additional purely military centres) can observe the 
overall situation by using radar installations located on 
the ground. These radars are large, powerful, and accurate. 
The aerials may be many tons in weight, and tens of feet 
wide. They may be remotely sited, and may be 'ganged' so 
that the pictures presented are made up from signals from 
11. 
oever ... \ d:i-f':1',,:ren't reds).' eqUipmen"to. Extensive filtering 
. . . . . 
and other aids are provided, including spec~al height-
finding radar equipments. It is, of course, quite out 
of the question to fit such equipment to any aircraft. 
The air traffic controller, on the ground, can observe on 
a radar Plan Position Indicator that an aircraft is 
heading for a position which threatens one of the aircraft 
for which he is responsible. He can call up the heights 
of one or both aircraft, and can decide what to do about 
the situation. The official requirement is that aircraft 
ought not to pass within five miles of each other at any 
time. Such a situation is called a 'conflict'. The 
Air Traffic Controller is not technically able to give 
orders to the pilots of aircraft, who are free to ignore 
his advice if they choose to do so, or to take action on 
their own initiative if they feel it is warranted. This 
does not often happen. 
In the immediate neighbourhood of airports the role 
of the Radar Air Traffic Controller in collision avoidance 
is decisive. The ability of aircrew to detect and resolve 
conflicts visually is lessened by other tasks. On the 
procedural side, separation standards may have to be 
reduced to allow aircraft to land or take off in rapid 
sequence. The consequences of mistaken avoiding action 
are much more likely to lead to "chain-reactions" of 
disasters than in less crowded areas. The air traffic 
controller alone has an overall picture of what is 
happening and is the only agency in a position to detect 
all potentially dangerous situations and to advise 
aircrew when and what action is necessary. 
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Unfortunat~ly, the Air Traffic Contr011er has to 
look after a number of aircraft and has many other duties 
to handle at the same time. 
The overall aim of this study was to obtain 
quantitative measurements of the Air Traffic Controllers' 
ability to predict quickly and accurately whether aircraft 
were likely to pass dangerously close to each other. 
Before experimental work was started a survey of 
the relevant literature was carried out.. This is 
summarised in the next chapter. 
1:5. 
Il. LITERATURE SURVEY 
1. Preliminary remarks on the organisation of the survey. 
The eXisting l~terature on collision avoidance by 
radar is for the most part in the form of papers in 
scientific and technical journals, and research reports. 
There are few general reviews of the field. 
Very little of the work carried out on the human 
aspects of radar operation has concerned the quantitative 
interpretation of radar traces, such as is required in 
the avoidance of collisions. Perhaps for historical 
reasons, most work on radar observation has concerned 
the detection of targets, often fleeting or intermittent 
ones. The specific problem of watching for targets which 
may appear unexpectedly is known as "vigilance", and an 
extensive literature exists on the human factors aspects 
of this subject. Unfortunately the literature on 
vigilance is of little use in the study of collision 
avoidance. In the study of vigilance the problem is one 
of attention, errors being made when the signal is in 
some way not perceived. In conflict avoidance, the 
attention of the subject is not a major factor, since 
the situation may be detected at any time and action 
taken subsequently. 
The decision processes involved are applied 
consciously, although they need not be consciously 
formulated. The judgement required is quantitative, not 
qualitative, and the signals are not fleeting. Unlike 
the usual run of vigilance tasks, the signal does not 
appear suddenly and disappear equally suddenly, but grows 
from a low level to a level sufficiently high to be 
virtually unambiguous. 
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Si~ce the topic of vigilance may be of interest 
to some 'readers, four relevant bibliographies (Warren 
Spring 1961, 1966 a - c) are included in the reference 
list at the end of this thesis. 
Another possible source of relevant information is 
the literature of experimental psychology on the subject 
of the perc'eption of motion. In practice, however, 
this is not much use, since it does not deal in ,any 
detail with the type of perception of motion here 
discussed. It is usually couched in terms of gestalt 
psychology, which are complex and daunting to the 
uninitiated, and tend not to repay study. Such relevant 
information as can be identified is included in Appendix 
1, which lists the more important work in this field itl{ 
chronological order, from 1759. 
Such relevant literature as exists may be divided 
into a number of separate streams of research effort. 
Five of these streams are described in this chapter. 
These are:-
General surveys, mentioning collision avoidance. 
Studies of visual collision avoidance. 
Studies of radar collision avoidance, using static 
simulations. 
Studies of radar collision avoidance, using dynamic 
simulations. 
Other studies providing information relevant to 
collision avoidance. 
Work in each of these streams will be taken as far 
as possible in chronological order, to illustrate the 
development of techniques. 
15. 
z. General studies of collision avoidance. 
Perhaps the best review of the problem of the 
avoidance of collision in the air is the January 1958 
issue of the Journal of the Institute of Navigation 
(Volume XI, No.1) which contains a selection of papers 
covering the basic features of collision avoidance, from 
the mathematical (Mcrrel) , physiological (Perdreil), 
psychological (Missenard) and historical (Roessger) aspects. 
Baker (1962) presents a good general introduction to 
the problems of human factors in radar operation, but 
does not deal with collision avoidance in any detail. 
Morris and Horne (1958) provide a useful survey of the 
field of visual search techniques, but again there is 
little direct reference to collision avoidance. Baker 
and Grether (1954) provide some details of accuracies 
of estimation to be expected with the types of radar 
display then available. Owing to subsequent technical 
development, this research is no longer relevant, as is 
the classical work of Fitts (1947, 1949, 1951). 
Although the general principles expressed in these works 
are acceptable, specific findings must be taken with some 
reserve as a consequence of the vast increases in the 
speed and density of air traffic in the past decades. 
Hollingdale (1961), Morrel (1958) and Crofton (1962) 
discuss the mathematics of collision avoidance, but do 
not deal with human performance. 
A very ~seful, but inaccessible paper is that by Hopkin 
(1966), which discusses, in the light of practical 
experience, the techniques and trends in the use of visual 
display equipment in air traffic control: The companion 
paper by Rolfe (1966) on the assessment of airborne 
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vieua1 dieplaya oontains some valuable discussion of the 
more common faults of experimental studies in this field. 
The Journal of the Institute of Navigation is 
primarily concerned with practical and administrative 
approaches to collision avoidance, and contains many 
proposals for the modification of the current rules for 
the avoidance of collision in the air and at sea. The 
bulk of the work reported refers to the avoidance of 
collision at sea, and almost all of it is mathematical 
in approach. An extended and occasionally heated 
argument has been sporadically in progress for the 
last ten years about the merits of various types of 
collision avoidance systems. These have been mainly 
concerned with the problems of ships employing the 
rules in conditions of no mutual communication, where 
both vessels manoeuvre independently. The arguments 
have contained little or no experimental information, 
and many of the assumptions made in the mathematical 
models presented contain unrealistic assumptions about 
human performance. 
3. Studies of visual collision avoidance. 
The study of schemes for visual collision avoidance 
will be discussed briefly to provide some background. 
Gibson (1947) describes an estimation of velocity 
test used by the United States Air Force in aircrew 
selection. The subject was shown a motion picture of 
an aircraft flying into a cloud, followed by a shell-
burst within the cloud. The subject had then to say 
whether the shell had burst ahead of, or behind the now 
invisible aircraft. Gibson did not quote any performance 
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figures, being primar1ly concernea with constructing 
a selection test. 
Warner and Blaisdell (1948) reported on a number 
of colouring schemes for aluminium coloured aircraft. 
They operated by testing proposed paint schemes applied 
to models of aircraft then in service. These models were 
viewed by a large number cf observers. The study ante-
dated the use of fluorescent paints, and suggested that 
a colour scheme using white paint overall, with glossy 
blue trailing halves of wings and tail surfaces was more 
visible than any other pattern. Lazo and Bozee (1961) 
discuss these results in the light of atmospheric 
dilution of colours, showing that at the theoretical 
limit of detection of aircraft - about 20 miles in 
clear visibility - the "blueing" of objects by the 
atmosphere would remove the effects of any colour scheme. 
In practice, however, this effect does not occur, 
because the aircraft are not detected until they are at 
one-quarter to one-fifth of the theoretical distance 
(4 to 5 miles) (Howell 1947) at which distance colours 
have a marked effect. 
Following these initial explorations, a detailed and 
extensive research programme was undertaken by the 
Applied Psychologt Research Corporation, whose reports 
are listed in the reference list by title (Applied 
Psychology Research Corporation 1961 a - f, 1962 a-g. 
1963 a - c). These studies covered all aspects of paint 
and flashing light visibility aids, and established 
that the fluorescent paints now used on military aircraft 
were the most effective, and that it was brightness rather 
than colour which was ~hat mattered. The actual colour 
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schemes did not appear to be important, and paint gave. 
little indication of the relative attitude of aircraft. 
A summary of the work of the Applied Psychology Research 
Corporation on paint is given in Cook, Breasley and 
Robinson (1962). 
The works of Skeen (1959) on fluorescent paint, 
which antedated those of the Applied Psychology Research 
Corporation and of Marshall and Fisher (1959) on 
practical measurements of daytime conspicuity of aircraft 
have proved unobtainable to the present author. 
4. Studies of radar collision avoidance uSing static 
simulations. 
Experimental studies of collision avoidance may be 
divided into two types. These are "static" simulations 
in which no actual movement of targets takes place from 
moment to moment, and "dynamic" simulations in which 
movement occurs. In static simulations, the speeds and 
directions of motion of aircraft must be indicated by 
some more or less arbitrary convention. The dynamic 
simulation, while more naturalistic, requires more 
elaborate apparatus, and more effective recording 
techniques. 
A special class of dynamic simulation is what may 
be called "close simulation". This type of simulation 
is that in which every effort is made to approximate to 
the operational situation, in the hope that the observers' 
behaviour will be as little disturbed as possible. The 
ultimate in close simulation would be to actually carry 
out experiments in the real situation. Where conflict 
avoidance is concerned such simulation is liable to be 
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Qioproportionate1y e~pensive and, on occasion, dangerous. 
The earliest static simulation investigations 
recorded are those of Bowen and Woodhead (1953, 1955). 
In the first of these studies the observer was shown 
a number of dots, forming a portion of a straight or 
curved track, and was asked to estimate where the track 
would hit a distant line, and to estimate the length 
of extension required. It was found that the length 
of the extension was underestimated, and that the 
length of track, in terms of the number of dots presented, 
did not affect the accuracy of prediction of direction. 
In fact, the only result of increasing the length of track 
was to decrease the variability of errors in direction 
estimates. The second study is primarily concerned with 
estimation of the relative ease of use of a number of 
displays using different co-ordinate systems. 
Manglesdorf (1955a) summarises two unpublished 
reports (Manglesdorf and Fitts, 1954 a and b). In the 
first of these,subjects were required to adjust a 
simulated set of blips, which were presented on a screen, 
so that they were on a collision course compared with 
another set of blips, which were varied in position. 
Extrapolated time to arrive was of the order of eight 
minutes, and measurements were taken of deviations from 
the correct setting and of variability from position to 
position for each observer. It was found that there were 
differences due to speeds and courses of aircraft, but 
these are not described in detail, as the experimenters 
were primarily interested in display parameters, such as 
the length of trail visible. (It is likely that the task 
of adjusting trails to ensure collision is considerably 
I 
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diff' .. ren1r i'rom eatr:lmattng whether a oourse is in fact 
a collision course.) 
The second study reported in,Manglesdorf (1955a) 
involved judgements of oollisions, and was primarily 
concerned with the type of trail used to indicate motion. 
The alternatives were a simple standard fading trail, 
and a storage-tube type of trail; providing constant 
brightness. Both types were simulated photographically. 
Important effects were observed for relative speed and 
for time-to-go, but the two types of trail did not 
differ significantly. Manglesdorf then describes a 
further experiment in which distances to go and target 
angles were varied, and subjects again moved a trail of 
points forward or back to cause the two aircraft to collide. 
Manglesdorf found that the variability of judgements 
of collision increased systematical11 as the angle of 
intersection of the two trails became more obtuse, and 
as the speeds involved became larger. He suggested that 
under the conditions of this experiment, two different 
methods of adjustment were employed by the observers. 
Where angles were small, and speeds relatively Similar, 
the two trails were adjusted to be equidistant from the 
point of intersection, which had to be estimated by the 
observer. There also appeared to be minimum error when 
the angle of intersection was 90 degrees. This was 
ascribed to a differential effect of the ratio of speeds 
involved. Where speeds of aircraft were discrepant, there 
was a greater error at smaller angles. Where speeds were 
more nearly the same, the error tended to be greatest at 
large angles. 
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Mangl .. "dor£ aorivod a mathematical model to explain 
. , 
hi~ observed results, on the basis of which he predicted 
a) at target d~stances of 20 miles and sweep rates 
of 10 r.p.m. variations of trail length and 
target speed in the region of 100-400 knots 
should have relatively little effect on 
variable error. 
b) the slower the sweep rate, the greater the error. 
c) o,lose to intersection, high speed targets will 
contribute most of the error. 
d) Distance to intersection is the greatest single 
source of variance in predicting simultaneity 
of arrival. 
Schipper and Versace (1956) studied the effects of 
scope size, blip size and blip sharpness on judgements 
of relative arrival times. In this case the .judgement 
required of the observer was which of two aircraft would 
reach a line first. Although Schipper and Versace were 
primarily interested in display variables, they did 
observe significant effects of time to go and of relative 
aircraft speeds. 
Mcguire (1957) studied three traffic configurations 
using a method of adjustment technique, similar to that 
of Manglesdorf. He studied (a) targets approaching a 
marked point at the apex of a 45 degree angle, (b) targets 
approaching a line from the same direction, (c) targets 
approaching a line from opposite directions. The task 
was to estimate which aircraft would arrive first. In 
a first experiment, using only three skilled observers, 
configuration (a) resulted in greater errors than Cb) or 
• 
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(c). In a second experiment, in which a stcrage tube type 
display was also employed, no significant differences 
between configurations was observed, although the 
storage tube display gave better performance. The latter 
study used six highly skilled U.S.A.F. radar controllers 
as subjects. 
From here on reference will need to be made to different 
types of situation, and a useful convention of Buckley 
(1962) (reported in an undated experiment credited to 
Buckley, Maclaughlin, and Benson - called CODE) will now 
be introduced. This experiment was a pilot study for a 
conflict detection and prediction system evaluation, 
and it was necessary to refer to three types of event 
within the situations. These were actual conflicts 
which were detected, actual conflicts which were not 
detected, and non-conflict situations which were reported 
incorrectly to be conflicts. Buckley assigns appropriate 
animal names to these. For completeness a further case 
is needed in the discussion of experimental studies in 
general, the situation when a situation is not a conflict, 
and is correctly reported as not being a conflict. (This 
did not occur in Buckley's example.) 
The following names will be adopted for discussion 
purposes:-
Actual Conflict - Correctly Detected 
Actual Conflict - Not Detected 
No Conflict - Called Conflict 
No Conflict - Called No Conflict 
BLOODHOUND 
or HAWK 
OSTRICH 
WOLF 
DORMOUSE 
The first three names are due to Buckley, the last 
to the present author. Buckley in fact used the descriptions 
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to ~roviae ~erformance scores for observers, using an 
arbitrary scale of preferences. (Bloodhounds were 
desirable, wolves mildly undesirable, and ostviches very 
undesirable.) 
Hopkin (1963a, 1963b, 1965) reports three interesting 
experiments using paper simulation in which widely different 
groups of observers were used. These varied from Institute 
of Aviation Medicine staff, through radar trackers 
inexperienced in conflict detection, to air traffic 
controllers skilled in the field. The first study dealt 
with the detection of conflicts between aircraft flying 
steady courses at uniform speeds and heights, where the 
number of conflicts actually present varied from 3 to 9, 
and the number of trails present varied from 15 to 30. 
The task was to detect conflicts, defined as actual 
collisions, and performance was measured in terms of the 
percentage of conflicts detected, (BLOODHOUNDS) this 
averaged 70%. In addition about 30% of conflicts 
observed were in fact not conflicts (WOLVES). Observers 
were allowed as much time as they desired. The amount 
of time required seemed to be proportional to skill, 
although there were wide individual variations between 
observers. 
Hopkin's second study (1963b) concerned only two 
aircraft per trial, both aircraft flying straight line 
courses, and at constant speeds. Factors varied were 
track velocity, angle of approach, and distance between 
tracks. Hopkin found a significantly larger number of 
errors (both WOLVES and OSTRICHES) at large angles of 
approach, but only when indirect distance between the 
aircraft (via the point of track intersection) was held 
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constant, ~rrors were not affected by 1he angle of 
approach, and Hopkin concluded that the angle of approach 
did not affect the number of errors, except in so far 
as it increased the distance between the aircraft. 
Hopkin also found that the number of actual collisions 
missed (OSTRICHES) was not affected by the direct 
distance between the aircraft, while the number of 
false collisions reported (WOLVES) was increased, with 
increases in the direct distance between aircraft. In 
this experiment, Hopkin used a total of 24 subjects in 
each experiment, twelve being I.A.M. staff, and t@elve 
being R.A.F. radar trackers. I.A.M. subjects were 
slower, but more accurate. Hopkin attributes the 
differences to the greater age, motivation and 
intelligence of the I.A.M. subjects. 
Hopkin (1965) reports an experiment in which the 
effects of curvature of track were introduced. Twenty-
four observers, half being from the I.A.M. and half from 
R.R.E. Malvern, were shown 108 situations drawn on cards. 
Performance was measured in terms of the errors made by 
observers, these errors being subdivided into "No" -
conflict missed (OSTRICH), and "Yes" - conflict imagined 
(WOLF). It was found that these errors differed 
significantly in their distributions, OSTRIOH errors 
were affected both by the relative velocity of the two 
aircraft displayed and by the curvature of their tracks. 
WOLF errors were not affected by these, but were affected 
by miss distance, and by the groups. More WOLF errors 
occurred with smaller miss distance, and more WOLF errors 
were made by R.R.E. observers, although they were the more 
experienced group. It appears that more errors were made 
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where the tracks differed in curvature, although the 
significance of the effects observed were relatively low. 
Hopkin's work is the only study reviewed so far which 
cannot be faulted on the lack of or quality of 
experimental observer. 
Two other studies may be dealt with at th~point. 
Although primarily designed for other ends they provide 
some evidence for the general picture of conflict avoidance. 
The first of these is Howell and Tate (1964). They 
studied the differences in performance due to two main 
types of display, one spatial, like a PPI, the other 
tabular, like a list. The displays used were symbolic, 
and the factors varied in the course of the experiments 
were constructed on principles not directly relevant to 
air traffic control. Their conclusion was that the 
performance of observers could be described by two methods 
of information storage within the observer. The first 
was a temporary peripheral storage, which was particularly 
adapted to accessibility, the second was a central 
associative memory, which was more retentive, but less 
accessible. In the experiments relevant to these findings 
some 40 observers were employed. 
The second research study reported was by Moss, Kraft 
and Howell (1961) on the effect of overlay configurations 
on estimations of speed and heading. Four overlays were 
studied, using every combination of range rings and angle 
marks. They found that the range errors approached 4% 
as the interval between range rings was decreased, 
(going down in error). Angle marks reduced error in 
heading estimation by about .5 degrees, but increased 
errors in range. Range rings seemed to have little effect 
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on either judgement. Tracks were coded either by 
providing a lead line, or by providing a trail line. 
The former produced quicker, the latter more accurate 
judgements. 
5. Studies of radar collision avoidance USing dynamic 
simulations. 
There have been relatively few studies of the 
dynamic type, probablY on account of the difficulties 
of devising simple but adequate equipment, and of 
recording and analysing responses. 
The earliest study of this type was that of 
Gottsdanker and Edwards (1957) which arose naturally 
from the previous work of Gottsdanker (1952, 1955). 
In this work, two slits were used, and two moving 
point targets were shown. The slits were angled at 
90 degrees, and the moving pOints were seen to move 
towards each other. The apparent speed of one target 
was held constant, at ab~ut 15.5mm/sec., while the 
speed of the other varied. In two cases the other 
target appeared to accelerate, having been drawn as a 
parabolic line. Ten observers (mostly college students) 
were employed, six of whom appeared to judge the events 
from the final relative position, rather than the relative 
speed. The smoothing reported in other experiments where 
accelerating targets were employed did not seem to happen 
here. Subjects tended to decide that the variable target 
would not reach the cross-over point first. This type 
of experiment appears to suffer rather from lack of 
realism. 
Gerhard (1958) describes a series of experiments 
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under~aken a~ Readlng University on the judgement of 
velocities, and motion prediction using two back projected 
point targets approaching at right angles. Gerhard 
used an interception situation, varying the amount of 
time for which the oberserver could see the target to 
be intercepted. Gerhard first blocked off the descending 
target for different parts of its travel, and found that 
subjects tended to use only the first and last parts of 
the trail, taking little account of intermediate sightings. 
In another experiment, in which the velocity of the 
target was also varied, as well as the proportion of 
track obscured, the variability of miss distances rose 
with speed, and with the proportion of the track which 
was obscured. 
It appears that Gerhard's subjects qcquired a rather 
different type of skilled behaviour than intended, so 
that very little can be deduced from his observations. 
Gerhard used a track motion of 19Omm, and a velocity 
of approximately 36mm/sec. This would be the equivalent 
of some 10,000m.p.h. on a standard 10" PPI at a scale 
of 20 miles per inch. 
Brown and Brown (1955) reported that there were 
apparently three types of motion perception. These were -
in ascending order of speed: 
1. For very low speeds, subject used changes in 
position to deduce the existence of motion, which 
was not perceived dir.ectly, (e.g. Olock Hands). 
2. Medium speeds - which were directly sensed -
(Birds flying, cars passing). 
3. Very fast motion - object seen as blur - other 
clues used to estimate speeds - (Fan blades, 
propellor blades). 
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It ~eemo possible that Gerhard was getting a mixture 
of types 1 and 2, whereas in radar surveillance type 1 
is probably predominant. The type of simulation used by 
Gerhard was continuous, so that the intermittent advance 
characteristic of the Radar PPI did not occur. 
Alexander and Cooperband (1965) describe an experiment 
which was deSigned to test the hypothesis that the rate 
of rotation of the line of sight was a sufficient clue for 
collision prediction. Subjects used were four male senior 
or graduate students from an American university. Stimuli 
presented were presented on a P.P.I. type display screen, 
which had no remanence, so that the observer saw only 
points of light 3/16th inch in diameter. One point 
moved steadily at 1 inch/sec. for a distance of 1.2 
inches, while the other target rotated about it at a 
constant angular velocity. The subjects employed showed 
a threshold of about .5 to .7 degrees per second. The 
authors demonstrate that the effect observed must be 
primarily due to the rotational component, by eliminating 
the effect of the relative motion in the direction of 
of translation. It should be noted however, that the 
situation employed was an abstraction - deliberately made -
and that the two points of light used did not behave like 
radar "blips", having no "tails" and being continuously 
visible. The absolute speed, considered in terms of a 
ten-inch P.P.I. at 20 miles per inch, would be of the 
order of 70,000 miles per hour. If allowance is made for 
the distance at which the situation was viewed, this might 
be reduced by a factor of 10, but the speed of travel 
would still be large compared with that normally to be 
expected in radar surveillance. 
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6. Other studies. 
Four studies closely related to the actual radar 
situation will be discussed, in view of the incidental 
information relevant to the conflict situation contained 
therein. 
Bassett, Kahn, La May, Levy, and Page (1965), 
discuss the evaluation of a three dimensional display. 
They found, using the display that the errors in super-
position were increased when there were targets in the 
line of sight, and that location errors were of the order 
of one half to one inch, they were correlated to the 
position on the scope, but differed significantly from 
person to person. The threshold for perception of 
m9tion was affected by ambient illumination, and the 
assessment of relative motion was most accurate in the 
middle ranges. The method of rate estimation had little 
effect on the results, whether it was by active control, 
method of adjustment, or the method of constant stimuli. 
The speeds used were around .1 to .7 inches per second, 
corresponding to 15-90 minutes of arc. 
These results cannot be transferred to the two-
dimensional screen but they do furnish some general 
corroborative ideas. 
LaForge and Kennedy (1959) studied the effect of 
different glide path display configurations on the 
accuracy of control, measured in terms of path deviations. 
They found that a display presenting both azimuth and 
elevation was much more efficient than one presenting 
azimuth and elevation separately. 
Paul and Buckley (1967) describe an assessment of a 
proposed large common screen for radar air traffic 
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oontrollers, to replace the present individual screens. 
Their results include the finding that the percentage 
of conflicts correctly detected (Now called HAWK - not 
BLOODHOUND) was about 70%, while the number of WOLF 
reports was about 3%. The sixteen observers were 
skilled, practicing, controllers, so that these results 
may be compared with those observed in the present 
investigations. It is also interesting to note that 
error scores were found to be independent of the type 
of display employed. 
Finally, Morin, Grant and Nystrom (1956) used a 
specially devised apparatus employing a series of lamps 
illuminated in succession to simulate the pips on a 
radar screen. They used twenty two students as observers, 
with ten lights at 16 feet away from the observer. The 
observer recorded his response by pushing a button when 
he thought the target had reached an 'object' lamp. 
By cleverly selecting the number and order of bulbs 
to be lit up by a pre-set timer, the apparent velocity 
of the objeut could be varied, the speed of the sweep 
line could be increased, the number of sweeps could be 
altered, and the distance from the last point to the 
target could be changed. The results observed were that 
times taken were much underestimated especially when the 
speed of movement was slow, so that the planned time was 
large. The longer the distance of travel, the greater 
was the error. In general the errors were proportional 
to time, and were reduced if more sweeps were given, 
or at larger intervals. The results observed are 
consistent with the general expecrtation, and the technique 
employed is remarkably ingenious. It is not clear however 
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why a standard PPI with some simple electrical control 
circuit could not have been used. 
This concludes the survey of methods employed and 
results obtained by previous investigators. In spite 
of considerable effort, it has not been possible to find 
any record of a fully organised simulation using skilled 
observers and adequate measurement techniques for the 
assessment of conflict detection. 
Exactly why this gap should exist is not really 
clear. It may be that the few simulators available are 
in general too urgently employed, in the training of air 
traffic controllers and the assessment of modified 
techniques, to be available for such experiments. The 
continuation of paper and pencil simulation inclines one 
to this opinion. The setting up of radar simulation 
experiments is a major operation, so that such experiments 
cannot be undertaken lightly. 
In order, therefore, to obtain quantitative 
measurements of the ability of the Air Traffic Controller 
to predict quickly and accurately whether aircraft Vlere 
likely to pass dangerously close to each other the present 
investigations were undertaken. There were other, subsidiary, 
aims - which are described in detail in the next section. 
32. 
Ill. PURPOSE OF PRESENT INVESTIGATIONS 
This research had three objectives. These were:-
1. To describe in quantitative terms the ability 
of observers to form judgements of the future relative 
positions of aircraft presented on a Plan Position 
Indicator type display. 
2. To investigate the effects of reducing the 
degree of verisimilitude of the simulation technique 
employed. 
3. To investigate the differences in performance 
occurring between skilled and unskilled observers. 
The first of these objectives is justified by the 
observation that there e~ists at present no quantitative 
information of this type. Such information as is 
available is derived from simplified simulations, often 
employing individuals far different frcm those who 
carry out the task in practice. 
There are a number of possible approaches to the 
problem of gathering such quantitative information. 
Chapanis (1959) presents an excellent review of these 
approaches. 
The most direct way of gathering information is by 
observation. An experimenter might record the performance 
of air traffic controllers in an actual air traffic 
control centre. He might do this by sitting behind a 
controller and noting the behaviour of the controller. 
This method has a number of drawbacks. Some of these are 
that it would require many hours of observation to 
accumulate sufficient data, incidents being rare on the 
whole and that it would require the experimenter to be 
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an infinitely better and more patient observer than the 
controller. What may be more important is that it would 
require the experimenter, having seen a potential 
collision in the course of developing, to remain silent 
and wait to see if the controller noticed it. This 
would amount to risking the lives of aircrew and 
passengers and would be unethical. 
Alternatively, the experimenter might have access 
to records of aircraft movement - such as are now obtained 
as a routine precaution in some areas, and of corres-
ponding recordings of radio traffic. Although such 
methods might be less distracting for the controller, 
the sheer volume of analYSis required to isolate 
potentially dangerous situations, particularly those 
not noticed by the controller would be prohibitive. 
(At the initiation of this study, air traffic control 
data was not recorded as a routine in the United Kingdom: 
so that this alternative was not then available). 
The next most direct method would be that of direct 
experimentation in an actual Air Traffic Control Centre. 
This would involve the setting up of situations in which 
aircraft approached others dangerously closely in accor-
dance with pre-arranged plans while observers judged what 
was about to happen. This would be expensive, difficult 
to arrange and dangerous. It would require the taking 
of unnecessary risks and would therefore be unethical. 
A third approach would be to carry out a critical 
incidents survey. In this type of survey persons 
skilled in the field are asked to relate incidents in 
which dangerous situations have come about (Chapanis,1959, 
Fitts and Jones, 1947, reprinted in Siniako 1961). 
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This type of ~urvey i~ particularly useful for determining 
what are the most common types of mistake or error, but 
is not suitable for the production of precise quantitative 
information. It is subject to subjective distortion of 
several types. People may forget episodes of which they 
are ashamed, or they may form their own ideas of the 
types of errors and mistakes which would not interest 
the observer and fail to report these. (Signal noise 
in radio equipment may not be reported because it may be 
considered unavoidable by the user.) 
A fourth approach is to use simUlation (Meister 
and Rabideau 1965, Chapanis 1959). This method is often 
expensive, may not represent adequately the true 
situation, and may provide misleading results owing to 
the knowledge that it is not the real thing distorting 
the performance of experimental subjects. In this case, 
it was possible to use elaborate simulation equipment 
operated by the Air Traffic Control Evaluation unit at 
Bournemouth (Hurn) Airport. The Ministry of Transport 
and Civil Aviation made available a number of civil air 
traffic controllers to act as observers, and arranged 
for service air traffic controllers to be made available. 
It was therefore possible to use a relatively realistic 
simulation situation, with subjects of an appropriate 
background. 
A final approach, often adopted 'faute de mieux' 
by the experimental psychologist is to abstract the 
relevant features of a situation and present these in a 
diagrammatic form. This approach requires that the 
relevant features of the situation are known and are 
removeable from their normal context without perceptual 
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diatortion. It is by no means obvious that this is 
always the case, and an act of faith in the judgement 
of the experimenter is often re~uired if the results 
are to be applied in the real world. This is always 
undesirable and may on occasion be dangerous. The 
method has certain advantages. It is usually cheap, 
flexible and easy to arrange. It allows preliminary 
trials to be carried out ~uickly and large or ~ualitative 
differences to be detected. These virtues must be 
balanced against their occasionally dangerous unreliability 
in absolute terms. 
With these alternatives in mind, it was decided to 
investigate the problem by setting up a large number 
of situations for close simulation on a radar simulator, 
~hich provided the closest possible resemblance to the 
real situation. The situations selected for study were 
chosen to allow as many features of the real situation as 
possible to be isolated for statistical analysis, so that 
the first aim of the investigation might be achieved. 
A selection of these simulations was then abstracted 
into the form of a simpler paper simulation model. The 
performance of observers on these simpler simulations 
was then compared with the performance of observers on 
the more elaborate simulation, so that the second aim of 
the research might be achieved. The third aim of the 
research was met by having groups of unskilled observers 
complementing the groups of skilled observers. (The 
difficulty of obtaining sufficient skilled observers led 
to the employment of two groups of skilled obServers, one 
drawn from civilian sources, the other being composed of 
service air traffic controllers.) 
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ConBiderations of fatigue, learning and subject 
availability made it advisable to limit the number of 
possible simulations to between forty and seventy, 
each consisting of about four minutes running time, 
providing four sessions of approximately one and a half 
hours, resembling a normal radar air traffic controller's 
operational shift. CA normal shift would not consist 
entirely of collision avoidance operations.) 
In fact, the choice of the exact number of 
simulations was determined by the experimental design 
used. This was a 'Hyper-greco-latin Cube'. This enables 
six factors to be tested at each of four levels in sixty 
four simulations in such a way that the effects of anw 
factor can be isolated and assessed separately for 
significance. In practiue, sixty four simulations 
each lasting two hundred seconds were used. The length 
of each experimental session was therefore about seventy 
minutes, including starting, ending and delays between 
simulations. 
In order to reduce the number of possible factors 
to as few as six, the situation chosen for experimental 
study was that in which two aircraft approach each other 
on straight courses at steady speeds. The height levels 
of the two aircraft were not displayed, but were assumed 
to be the same. In practice, such conflicts are much the 
most common, although Hopkin and Ledwith (1953), mention 
that multiple conflicts are particularly difficult to 
resolve. Conflicts involving more than two aircraft give 
rise to so many possibilities that many more than sixty-
four simulations would be required to cover the 
possibilities adequately. 
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The factors chosen, in consultation with experienced 
controllers, to be varied in this experiment were the 
following:-
1. The heading of the controlled aircraft. 
2. The angle at which the aircraft approached 
each other. 
3. The speed at which the aircraft approached 
each other. 
4. The direction of rotation of the line joining 
the aircraft (the 'line of sight') together 
with the passing of the rogue aircraft in 
front of or behind the controlled aircraft. 
5. Tue dLstance by which the rogue aircraft missed 
the control, measured along the tracks of the 
aircraft. 
6. The position on the Plan Position Indicator 
at which the encounter took place. 
The parameters measured were the speed with which 
the judgement could be made, together with the accuracy 
of the judgement in terms of a number of possibly 
important criteria. The speed was measured in terms of 
the time which elapsed between the observer making a 
judgement and the aircraft reaching their closest point. 
In the paper simulation experiment, the sixteen 
simulations selected formed a 'latin square', so that the 
effects of the first four variables could be measured 
independently. 
In the following chapters the experimental design, 
apparatus and methods employed in the electronic simulation 
are discussed in more detail. The choice of an appropriate 
variate is discussed, and performance is described in 
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detail. Tho paper simulation experiment is then treated 
similarly, and finally the information obtained from 
the two experiments is used to satisfy the original aims 
of this investigation. 
39. 
IV. THE ELECTRONIC SIMULATION EXPERIMENT. 
DESIGN! APPARATUS AND METHOD. 
1. Experimental design. 
The factors selected for testing in this experiment 
were:-
1. The direction in which the controlled aircraft 
was flying. 
2. The angle at which the aircraft approached each 
other. 
3. The speed at which the two aircraft approached 
each other. 
4. The direction of rotation of the line joining 
the two aircraft, with the passage of the 
rogue aircraft ahead of, or behind the 
controlled aircraft. 
5. The distance separating the two aircraft when 
the tracks intersect. 
6. The pOSition of the encounter on the radar 
screen. 
These factQrs were chosen, in consultation with 
experienced air traffic control personnel, as representing 
the possible factors that might influence the behaviour 
of observers, and providing as great a variety of possible 
conditions as was feasible. Certain modifications to the 
situations were made so that the decisions made should be 
realistic, neither too easy nor to hard. Some practical 
difficulties were encountered in filming some of the 
simulations, which had to be moved from areas of the 
radar screen which could not be reproduced by the 
simulator. (The nature of the film recording is described 
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in detail later in this chapter.) 
The experimental design adopted is what is known 
as a "Hyper-greco-latin cube". This is a design similar 
to the well-known "Latin Square", and is analysed in a 
similar manner. Sixty-four simulations were designed in 
such a way that each of four levels of the six factors 
selected occurred sixteen times in all, accompanied in 
each case by four examples of each of the four levels of 
the other five factors. The design may be represented 
by a cube, using three factors as the three axes, and 
representing the other three factors by numbers, latin, 
letters and greek letters. The design is sometimes known 
as a "Sino-greco-latin cube" in which case the levels of 
one of the factors are represented by Chinese letters. 
This procedure has not been adopted here. The nature 
of the design is such that it is not possible to analyse 
the data for the significance of interactions between 
the main factors. 
For the reasons mentioned in the previolls chapter, 
it was considered necessary that each observer should 
exposed to all the sixty-four experimental conditions. 
In order to obtain results suitable for generalisation 
be 
to the population of air traffic controllers, a sufficiently 
large number of observers must be employed. Considerations 
of cost and the availability of equipment and skilled 
observers require that this number should be kept small. 
In the event, it was found possible to obtain twenty 
skilled Air Traffic Controllers, ten being civil air 
traffic controllers from the London Air Traffic Oontrol 
Centre, and ten being Royal Navy and Royal Air Force air 
traffic controllers. In addition twenty-one unskilleO 
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ob8erver8 were employed, selected as representative of the 
type of experimental subject used in experimental 
psyphology - students and technicians. 
For various reasons, the responses of certain 
subjects were not decipherable from the tape recordings 
made, and in certain experimental runs the simulator 
suffered from technical malfunctions which made the 
recorded simulations indecipherable. In these cases, 
the experimental observers were completely discarded. 
Analyses were finally based on the performance of eight 
civil air traffic controllers, five service air traffic 
controllers and fourteen unskilled subjects. 
Factors varied between simulations. 
Four levels were chosen of the six factors varied 
which it was hoped would cover the normal range of air 
traffic control operation. 
(1) The first faator varied was the heading of the Control 
Aircraft, and the four levels employed were 090 degrees, 
150 degrees, 225 degrees, and 350 degrees (standard 
compass degrees). 
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(2) The second factor was the type of conflict, or, in 
other words, the angle between the tracks of the two 
aircraft. The levels employed were 45 degrees, 90 
degrees, 135 degrees and 170 degrees. 
(3) fhe third factor employed was the speed of closing. 
This factor was employed at 240, 360, 480 and 600 
;':1.0'~S. This speed is the vector difference of the 
'd.Tc:('aft speeds. In fact, it is assumed that the 
aircraft are at infinite distance when this closing 
speed is measured, so that the component of e 
velocity is nil. 
(4) The fourth fac.tor employed was the nature of the miss 
of the two aircraft. Because there were no cases 
in which the two aircraft collided, it was possible 
to clasuify the situations into those in which the 
Rogue Aircraft passed ahead of the Control, and 
those in which it passed behind the Control. In 
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each of these cases it was possible to arrange the 
aircraft so that the line of sightrrotated clockwise 
or anticlockwise. In doing so we ensure that the 
Rogue is initially on the right or left of the 
Control, as shown in the accompanying diagram. 
(5) The fifth factor was the track intersection distance, 
measured as the distance of the Rogue from the point 
of cross-over when the Control reaches that point. 
This definition was chosen in preference to the 
distance at the point of closest approach for ease 
of the initial calculation. Distances chosen were 
2,4,6·, and 8 miles. 
(6) The sixth and final factor varied was the position 
on the PPI at which the incident occurred. Four 
levels were used, defined according to the position 
with respect to the centre of the PPI. These 
levels were outer edge of PPI, with the control 
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heading inwards, outer edge of PPI, with control 
heading outwards, median, (which is to say not on 
the edge and not at the centre), and central. 
These levels relate only to radial distance, and 
do not contain any restraint on angular positions. 
~"\ /--', 
Table 1 provides a summary of these levels, and Table 2 
states which levels were applied in each simulation. 
Figures 1 - 4 show the 64 simulations employed. Full 
tracks are shown, although only about a quarter of the 
trail shown would be visible at any given time, and 
only one simulation would be visible at any time. 
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TA1lLE 1 
Levels Used of Factors Examined (Summar;d 
Factor Level Value Unit 
1. Track of Control 1 090 Degrees 
2 150 (Compass) 
3 225 
4 350 
2. Type of Conflict 1 45 Degrees 
2 90 (Angular) 
3 135 
4 170 
3. Speed of Closing 1 240 Knots 
2 360 (Nautical Miles per hour) 
3 480 
4 600 
4. Nature of Miss 1 Rogue Ahead/Clockwise/ 
Rogue on Right 
2 Rogue Behind/Olockwise/ 
Rogue on Left 
3 Rogue Ahead/Anti-
clockwise/Rogue on Left 
4 Rogue Behin"Anti-
clockwise Rogue on 
Right 
5. Track Intersection 1 2 Miles 
2 4 
3 6 
4 8 
6. Position on P.P.I. 1 Outer, control heading 
inward 
2 Outer, control heading 
outward 
3 Median 
4 Oentral 
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TA13LE 2 
Levels of Factors Employed in Each Simulation 
Simulation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Factor 
1 234 5 6 
334211 
142 1 3 2 
134124 
133331 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 4 334 2 
4 1 1 332 
1 4 4 441 
433 1 1 2 
4 1 2 1 2 3 
423324 
4 3 2 2 3 4 
3 1 1 224 
13124 2 
3 4 4 3 3 4 
321341 
2 1 3 1 3 4 
1 432 1 4 
4 4 4 2 2 2 
223411 
3 1 4 1 4 2 
1 222 2 1 
3 1 331 3 
22424 4 
2 3 3 2 2 3 
42121 3 
2 2 2 3 3 3 
241 231 
324 4 2 3 
2 1 144 3 
3 4 224 3 
1 1 3 4 2 2 
Simulation 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
Factor 
1 234 5 6 
4 4 2 3 1 1 
123 1 4 3 
331 133 
2 1 4 3 2 1 
312431 
3 3 2 3 2 2 
1 2 1 434 
221 122 
3 3 3 4 4 4 
4 144 1 4 
1 4 1 323 
4 224 4 2 
341412 
4 1 324 1 
43434 3 
2 1 221 2 
232 1 4 1 
12431 2 
242424 
4 3 1 4 2 1 
1 142 3 3 
441 144 
322 1 1 4 
234 4 3 2 
343 1 2 1 
1 123 4 4 
244113 
424131 
1 324 1 3 
32323 2 
2 3 1 3 1 4 
4 4 3 4 3 3 
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Simulations 1 - 16 
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Controlled aircra~t indicated by solid lines 
Rogue aircraft are indicated by dotted lines 
Tracks indicate the entire flight path of the 
aircraft, of which only 25% would be visible 
at any one time. 
( ......... .. 
SCALE 
20 miles (silllUla,ted) 
a 1 inch on displa,y 
a 17 mm in this figure 
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Simulationa 17 - 32 
Controlled aircra.ft indicated by solid lines 
Rogue aircraft are indicated by dotted lines 
Tracks indicate the entire flight path of the 
aircraft, of which only 25% would be visible 
at any one time. 
SCALE 
20 miles (simulated) 
a 1 inch on display 
_ 17 IIlID in this figure 
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Simulations 33 - 48 
Controlled aircraft indica,ted by solid lines 
Rogue aircraft Bre indicated by dotted lines 
Tracks indicate the entire flight path of the 
aircraft, of which only 25% would be visible 
at any one time. 
SCALE 
20 miles (simulated) 
a 1 inch on displ~ 
D 17 mm in this figure 
50 
Fl&~!.!!._i 
Slmulatlons 49 - 64 
, 
" 
* , , 
0
,' \ 
, ' 
, ' 
" . ", 
;,' :.w 
, 
, 
, 
, 
60 
controlled aircraft indicated by solid lines 
Rogue aircraft are indicated by dotted lines 
Tracks indicate the entire flight path of the 
aircraft, of which only 25% would be visible 
at ~ one time. 
SCALE 
20 miles (simulated) 
a 1 inch on displ~ 
a 17 mm in this figure 
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2. Preparation of experimental material and apparatus. 
The preparation of the experimental material for the 
electronic simulation experiment was performed by the 
A.T.C.E.U. at Hurn, using the Simulator, and the 
Metrovick film recorder. 
The A.T.C.E.U. simulator, now being replaced by a 
more precise machine, is an electro-meohanical analogue 
computer type of radar simulator. The blips simulating 
aircraft are controlled by separate individual control 
~-----1uni-ts, whtch-are-run-b:y--separate-operatiJrs,-called---------
"Blip-drivers". While a simulation is being oo.rried out, 
it may be recorced on film, which is then processed, and 
may be re-run using the Metrovick film recorder, to 
provide a picture simulating the running of a radar on 
one or more standard consoles. 
The sixty-four experimental combinations of factors 
were made up into film scripts, each simulation being 
equivalent to an elapsed time of 200 seconds, during 
which the aircraft passed from fairly distant positions 
to somewhere in the region of the point of closest 
approach, and occasionally beyond this point. No effort 
was made to begin the films at exactly the same point for 
each shot, since this might have caused spurious learning 
of times. 
Four "scripts", each consisting of sixteen "shots" 
were compiled. Each "shot" consisted of a simulation 
run of about four minutes duration. Allowing for blank 
frames and starting, each script took about 70 minutes 
to run. 
The production of the film called for considerable 
expertise and patience on the part of the A.T.C.E.U.'s 
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staff. The limiting factor was the accuracy of the 
simulator, which was old, and suffered from a certain 
degree of mechanical "play". The film was recorded 
in reverse, to ensure that the blips would finish in 
the right place as closely as possible. During recording. 
the operational sequence was as follows. First the blip 
drivers positioned their blips in accordance with the 
instructions of the supervisor, the blips were then 
started on reversed courses, while the film was recorded. 
After about twenty sweeps the rogue was turned off, 
and the control alone ran for a few (2 - 4) more sweeps. 
A few blank sweeps were left, the recorder was stopped, 
and the blips positioned for the end of the previous shot. 
In order to make it possible to join the film without 
losing the orientation, a North Marker was incorporated 
in all shots. This served as a reference point in the 
subsequent joining of film, the Metrovick film being 
continuous - not by frame. 
The degree to which the images of aircraft jumped 
varied conSiderably, and there was not necessarily 
a close correspondence between the jumping of blips 
observed on the monitor during the filming of shots and 
the jumping of blips observed on the film after processing. 
Where it was judged that a shot was not satisfactory, 
the shot was repeated again, and if necessary, a third 
time. Certain shots were found to cause the blips to 
vanish, either close to the centre or near the edge, and 
these shots were re-positioned before the repeat filming. 
A total of about one-third of the shots had to be repeated. 
When satisfactory shots had been prcduced, they were 
spliced into the original film in their correct positions. 
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The splicing of film was carried out by the technical 
staff of the A.T.C.E.U. so that the resultant shifts 
of orientation rarely reached 10 degrees. (This was 
easily remedied by manual corrections during running). 
It should be noted that to record a film backwards, 
not only must the shots be filmed in. reverse order, but 
the aircraft must be placed in the mirror images of 
their final positions, and "flown" in the reverse of the 
mirror image of their courses. When in addition a film 
-------recorder-must-be-Started and stopped at precise times 
at short intervals, the operation is difficult. 
In order to check that the final scripts were 
correctly assembled, photographs were taken of the 
final stages of each shot. These were then oompared 
with the initial positions specified. Figure 5 shows 
the end of a typical "shot". 
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End of a typical simulation 
(Cro'll1l Copyright Reserved) 
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Figure 6 shows the general layout of the 
experimental area, and the apparatus used during the 
running of the experiment. The experimental area was 
divided into two parts, the Equipment Room, and the 
Simulated Control Room. 
The Equipment Room contained the Metrovick film 
recorder, now used only to display the previously 
recorded film, the tape recorders used for the recording 
of the observer's responses, and the special apparatus 
designed to inject a t second audio-frequency "pipit 
onto the tape recordings as the sweep of the radar 
passed through the North Marker position. 
The Metrovick Film Radar Recorder has the peculiarity 
that the information recorded on the film is given by 
the position of dark points across the film, which runs 
continuously over a sensing head, and is used to control 
the brightness of the radar sweep. This has the 
consequence that the size of the blip, and the accuracy 
with which its position can be determined will be 
proportional to its distance from the centre of the display. 
Thus an error of, say, one degree in the bearing of a 
blip from the centre, co~ld cause a positioning error of 
about one-sixtieth of an inch at one inch from the centre, 
or of about one-twelfth of an inch at the periphery of the 
screen, fi~e inches from the centre. This corresponds 
to the type of errors observed on radar Plan Position 
Indicators of the vintage here simulated. The presence 
of a certain amount of 'play' in the film transport 
system can lead to an irritating tendency to raggedness 
in the resultant 'trails'. The Metrovick recorder operator 
was provided with a monitor screen, on which he could observe 
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the picture produced, and - where necessary - check 
that the manual corrections to display orientation had 
produced the desired results. A telephone link was 
provided between the experimenter and the Metrovick 
recorder operator. (Figure 7). 
The Simulated Control Room (Figure 8) was equipped 
to allow five observers (S1-35) to view the experimental 
film at the same time on separate consoles. In addition, 
a sixth console was provided for the experimenter (X). 
In order to provide a fair compromise between the 
requirements of experimental efficiency and of maintaining 
an approximation to the normal environment, observers were 
not completely isolated. The consoles were arranged 
around the experimental area in such a way that no 
observer was in the normal field of vision of another. 
Observers wore standard headsets, which tended to 
reduce their awareness of extraneous stimuli. In general, 
observers did not, when questioned, express awareness of 
the comments given by other observers. When both skilled 
and unskilled subjects were employed at the same time, 
they were allocated consoles in such a way that there 
was no grouping of skilled or unskilled observers. 
The lighting of the area was maintained at a low 
level, to simulate the lighting of a normal air traffic 
control room - it was in fact rather dim for this purpose. 
This provided the maximum persistence of the traces on 
the PPI's and had the advantage of reducing visual 
communication between observers. 
The consoles used are shown in Figures 8 and 9. 
(The two closed circuit TV display screens mounted above 
the displays, and the construction observable to the far 
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right in Figure 8 were used in another experiment, and 
were not involved in the present experiment. The TV 
displays were not illuminated.) 
The PPI display is mounted at an angle of twenty 
degrees to the vertical, so that it is approximately 
normal to the line of sight of the observer. The 
horizontal ledge in front of the observer contains a 
trans-illuminated map, not used in this experiment. 
The controls for the radar display are grouped around 
the screen. Most of these controls were inoperative 
for this experiment. 
Looking more closely at the screen itself, we note 
that the actual diameter of the radar tube is ten inches, 
and that this is surrounded by a dark ring marked in 
degrees from 0 to 360 in the standard navigational 
manner. A good idea of the picture presented can be 
obtained from Figure 5. In this photograph, the ,degree 
markings appear brighter in some areas than in others. 
This is solely due to the difficulty of photographing 
luminous objects. In practice the scale was clearly 
visible and evenly illuminated. The concentric circles 
visible on the screen are the range rings. These consist 
of a fairly heavy ring at a distance of 2! inches 
(50 miles) from the centre, and lighter rings at t inch 
intervals, corresponding to ten mile intervals. There 
are fainter rings at two mile intervals, although these 
do not appear on the photograph. The brightness with 
which these rings are shown can be adjusted by the 
observer, who can remove them completely if he so desires. 
In practice almost all observers chose to employ range 
rings at approximately the level of this photograph. 
58~ 
The cursor is a sheet of perspex, mounted in front 
of the radar display tube. It is ruled with parallel 
lines 1t inch (25 miles) distance. This sheet may be 
rotated by hand to provide a reference for direction. 
It can be seen faintly in Figure 5, and is clearly 
visible in Figure 9 running in a diagonal direction on 
the left-hand, and nearly vertically on the right-hand 
console. The perspex sheet is edge-illuminatea, ana the 
brightness of the illumination is adjustable by the 
operator. It can be adjusted to be nearly invisible, 
or to be very marked. In practice most observers used 
this cursor to remina themselves of the heaaing of the 
controlled aircraft. Only on two occasions dia any 
observer attempt to use the cursor to register the 
rotation of the line of sight - on both occasions the 
observer abandoned the attempt after two or three 
simulations. 
Chinagraph pencil is designed to allow the user to 
write on glass or perspex materials. The observers 
sometimes attempted to plot the positions of the aircraft 
by marking in each point as it occurred, but could not 
achieve sufficient precision, owing to the coarseness 
of the resultant marks, and the parallax between the 
front surface of the perspex ana the rear surface of the 
PP! tube. On other occasions observers contented them-
selves with identifying which trace was which by 
chinagraph notes. 
The "press-to-talk" switch was necessary in order 
to provide electronic balanoe within the circuits. A 
similar switch, mounted in the same place, is used in 
the normal operation of the equipment simulated in this 
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experiment. In practice, the skilled observers experienced 
no difficulty with this switch, although some inexperienced 
observers had to be reminded repeatedly to use it. 
The headsets used were of the standard pattern. 
This has two earphones, and a microphone mounted on 
a wire boom extending from the left earpiece, to which 
goes the connecting cable. The microphone can be moved 
to a comfortable position by hand and is held in position 
by a friction clamp. 
The chairs used are of the type provided in Radar 
Air Traffic Control centres, and are adjustable in 
height, although the back-rest is fixed. They are 
mounted on castors, and can be moved forwards or 
swivelled with ease. No complaints or evidence of 
seating discomfort was encountered at any time, 
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Metrovick Film Recorder 
Note:- Telephone to Experimenter, 
MO!litor Console 
Check list of Orientation Errors. 
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Simulated Control Room 
Experimenter's console is at extreme left. 
(The level of illumination has been raised for 
photographic reasons.) 
(Crown Copyright Reserved) 
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Experimenter's and observer's consoles 
(crown Copyright Reserved) 
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3. Experimental procedure. 
Observers were used in groups of five. Each observer 
took part in four experimental sessions, during each of 
which he saw a complete I1scriptl1 consisting of 16 
I1simulationsl1. 
Subjects usually arrived at mid-day. A prepared 
brief was read to them (Appendix 4) and they were allowed 
to ask questions about it before starting. The forms 
of briefing differed slightly between skilled and un-
skilled observers, the latter form containing more 
elementary explanation of how the radar operated. When 
the experimenter was satisfied that the observers had 
grasped what was expected of them, the observers were 
seated at the radar consoles and the working of the 
brightness control, the range rings control, and the 
cursor explained. They were also shown the operation 
of the I1press to talk" switch. They were given a sheet 
showing the meaning of the clock face code used for 
indicating control aircraft position, the four possible 
headings of the control aircraft, and the size of a 
5-mile circle drawn to scale. In addition they were 
provided with the initial information about the controlled 
aircraft in duplicated form for each script. 
At the start of each script, observers were asked 
to record verbally their names, the number of the console 
at which they were Bitting, and the date. At the start 
of script one, a short additional sequence - showing 
two simulations - was added, to serve as a practice 
session. From then on, the procedure shown in Table 3 
was followed. Table 3 showsmt only what responses the 
observers were expected to make, but also the additional 
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information provided by the North Marker pip, and by the 
experimenter. The items underlined in Table 3 are these 
which were transcribed and timed when the tape recordings 
were analysed. At the end of each script the observers 
again recorded their names, the date, and the number of 
the console at which they were sitting. 
It was usual for observers to view two scripts in 
the first afternoon, with a fifteen minute break between 
them, and to view a further two on the following morning, 
again with a fifteen minute break between them. It was 
necessary in some cases to vary this procedure slightly, 
so that observers saw scripts 3 and 4 in the morning, 
then scripts 1 and 2 in the afternoon. 
A few observers, mostly unskilled, complained of 
eyestrain, and one was overcome by nausea. This was 
attributed by his fellows to factors other than the radar 
observation situation. Some subjects became slightly 
bored during the later stages, and some skilled subjects 
complained of the "jumping" of the blips on the screen. 
At the time of the experiment the responses of each 
observer were tape recorded individually in the manner 
described in this section. The analysis of the data is 
described in the next chapter, chapter 5, which also 
describes the findings of this experiment. 
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TABLE 3 
Recordins Seguence Followed For 
Each Shot by Each Observer 
Not directli! recorded Items recorded bi! observer's taEe 
Time Simulated Event North Observer's EXEerimenter's 
(Secs) Marker Comment Comment 
10 2 - 4 pip "Shot 16-
20 blank pip Controlled Air-sweeps craft is COMET, 
30 pip SPEED 400 kts. 
40 pip HEADING 090 deg. Control appears "CONTROL ON" Initial Position 
50 Control alone m 10 O'CLOCK 
60 on screen for pip CENTRAL" 2-3 sweeps 
70 Rogue appears pip "ROGUE ON" 
80 m 
90 pip 
100 Control and pip 
"C ONF LI CT" 
110 Roa:ue now pip fly on steady 
120 courses at 'pip "R0f]5e Eassin~ 
130 constant speed pip AHE -3 miles' 
140 pip 
150 pip "Turn LEFT 
160 pip 30 desrees* 
170 pip 
180 pip "Correction-
190 pip rogue Eassin€.\ AS~RN - 1 mile" 
200 pip 
210 pip 
220 Both Ale did pip 
230 not appear pip "END OF SHOT 16 11 
* This comment is not required for unskilled observers. 
Items underlined are transcribed and timed. 
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V. THE ELECTRONIC SIMULATION EXPERIMENT FINDINGS 
1. Transcription of data. 
The experimental data left the Air Traffic Control 
Evaluation Unit in the form of one seven-inch reel of 
double-play magnetic tape for each observer. This reel 
carried four tracks of 90 minutes duration, each recording 
in full the traffic to and from the head-set of the 
observer. 
These reels were played through and timed by a 
technician at Loughborough University, a small sample 
being independently checked by the experimenter. In 
fact, no significant errors or omissions by the technician 
were found. The comments of the observer were recorded 
on separate forms, and the relevant comments and times 
were transcribed into a standard form. The data initially 
recorded included a considerable amount of redundant 
information, as shown in Table 3. (Previous chapter page 
66.) 
The following items, underlined in Table 3, were 
transcribed and timed. 
1. 'Control ON' comment. 
2. Pip following. 
3. 'Rogue ON' comment. 
4. Pip following. 
5. 'Confliot' • 
6. 'Rogue passing ahead - 3 miles '. 
7. 'Turn left 30 degrees' 
8. 'Correction - Rogue passing astern - 1 mile'. 
9. 'End of shot 16'. 
Of these comments, only 5, 6, 7 and 8 contain 
information unique to the observer, the other elements 
68, 
be:!.ng (lubotant1ally the same for all observers. 
Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 were used to standardise 
the time-scale of the tape, using a detailed record of 
the number of sweeps occurring in each simulation, 
together with the number of blank sweeps between 
simulations. 
It was thus possible to eliminate the effects of 
different starting times for the tape recorders, and of 
tape stretching and slipping. (All tapes were new when 
used to record.) In the process a considerable number 
of transcription errors were found and rectified. These 
errors were for the most part transcription errors, or 
blunders - such as the transposition of digits. 
After all necessary checks and adjustments were 
made, the times within the sessions were converted to 
times from the time of closest approach, times before 
this being considered positive, times after this negative. 
In addition to this coding of times, the comments 
themselves were coded as Safe or Conflict, and according 
to the separation predicted, to the nearest mile, with a 
positive sign if the rogue was predicted to pass ahead of 
the control and a negative sign if the rogue was predicted 
to pass behind the controlled aircraft. (The advice given 
about manoeuvres was also coded, but is not relevant to 
this thesis.) 
2. Classification of decisions. 
If an assessment is to be made of the accuracy of.a 
decision made by an observer, some criterion of accuracy 
must be established, and operational rules must be 
stated so that decisions can be classified. 
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For the purpoc6e of this experiment.an observer 
" 
was considered to make a decision when he made a 
recognisable verbal comment on what he observed. 
Four main types of decision were recorded in this 
experiment, and analyses of variance have been carried 
out to separate the effects of the six factors varied 
within the experiment. 
The four types of decision were:-
(a) The 'first decision' is simply the first 
recognisable verbal decision made by the observer, 
regardless of whether or not it is correct. 
(b) The 'first correct Conflict/Safe decision' 
is the first decision which states correctly whether the 
situation is safe or a conflict. The definition of safety 
employed was that:- "A situation is safe if at no time 
the two aircraft pass each other closer than five miles". 
(c) The 'first correct Ahead/Behind decision' is 
the first decision which states correctly which aircraft 
will pass ahead of the other. The observers were 
instructed to state this as 'Rogue passing ahead of 
control' or 'Rogue passing behind control'. In many 
cases the observer stated this in terms of the passing 
of the control behind the rogue. This was accepted as a 
valid comment, mutatis mutandis. In some cases the 
observer was not able to make any comment other than 
'collision', implying that the observer could not detect 
any rotation of the line of sight under these circumstances. 
(The idea of the 'rotation of the line of sight' was not 
mentioned to the subject at any time.) 
(d) The first correct judgement of separation is 
the first decision which states correctly what the 
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separation of the aircraft will be when they are at 
their closest (the time of closest approach). This 
judgement is considered to be positive if the rogue is 
predicted to pass ahead of the controlled aircraft, 
negative if it is predicted to pass behind the control. 
If the judgement was 'collision' this is considered as 
an estimated separation of zero at closest approach. 
A judgement is considered to be correct if it is 
within three miles of the planned value. (This definition 
of correctness had no operational significance. It was 
chosen to provide a suitable division into correct and 
incorrect judgements.) 
For the last three of these judgements we may 
define a 'correct' judgement as a judgement that 
satisfies the criterion of accuracy relevant to the 
decision. For the first decision we can construct 
three measures of accuracy, in terms of the three 
criteria. Each simulation watched by each observer can 
be scored as accurate or not accurate in terms of the 
accuracy of the first decision in terms of the three 
separate criteria, and in terms of the presence of the 
three possible types of correct decisions. There are 
thus six possible measures of accuracy present, as 
against the four possible time measures, making a total 
of ten analyses of variance based on 64 readings for each 
of 27 observers, 17,280 readings in all. 
It may help to consider an example, made up to show 
how the ten readings are obtained. We will consider a 
situation in which the rogue aircraft will in fact pass 
three miles ahead of the controlled aircraft, so that the 
situation is a conflict. Let us suppose we have the 
71. 
following comments made by one observer. 
Time of comment Literal Transcri~tion Coded as:-
seconds before from ta:Ee. 
closest a~proach. 
320 Urn-er Not coded 
305 Safe - Rogue ahead, 
305/S/+7 7 miles apart 
281 Safe - Rogue ahead, 
5 miles 281/S/+5 
207 Correotion-Conflict 
3 miles 207/C/+3 
180 Rogue passing ahead 
4 miles 180/C/+4 
These would produce the following scores for use in the 
separate analyses of variance, 
1. Time of first decision 305 
2. Accuracy of first decision (Conflict/Safe) 0 
3. Accuracy of first decision (Ahead/Behind) 100 
4. Accuracy of first decision (Separation) 0 
5. Time of first correct conflict/safe decision 207 
6. Accuracy of conflict/safe decision 100 
7. Time of first correct Ahead/Behind decision 320 
8. Accuracy of Ahead/Behind decision 100 
9. Time of first correct judgement of separation 281 
10. Accuracy of judgement of separation 100 
The 'accuracy' measures given as 6, 8 and 10 are in 
fact the percentages of trials in which a correct deoision 
is ultimately achieved. If one of these had been 0 in 
this example, there would have been a missing value in the 
corresponding time of first correct decision. 
In addition to these analyses based on the performance 
of individuals, we may t3.onsider the performances of the 
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groups of skilled and unskilled observers for each 
simulation. (The groups of civil and service observers 
were too small to provide meaningful statistics in 
individual simulations.) 
For each simulation we may calculate the 5th and 
95th percentiles of the time to go to Tca, the~e being 
the times when an estimated 5 percent and 95 percent 
of the observers will have made their decisions. We 
may, in addition, calculate a measure of performance 
for each type of decision by multiplying the time 
before Tca of the first decision by the percentage of 
correct first decisions for each simulation. We may 
caloulate such a performance measure for each of the 
three types of decision. 
In an attempt to measure the effects of early errors 
in assessment, a measure of bias was obtained by sub-
tracting the mean time of the first decisions that were 
correct from the mean time of all first decisions in 
each situation. It was hoped that this would provide 
an index of situations which were particularly liable 
to error in their early stages, or in their later stages. 
Unfortunately, any such systematic effects were not 
large enough to be separable from differences between 
individuals and from random error. 
Table 4 lists the analyses of variance used in the 
investigation of the four types of decision·~ 
The remainder of this chapter describes the 
findings of this experiment in terms of the four types 
of decision. The first decision is treated in considerable 
detail, the other types of decision with more brevity. 
Analysis of variance tables are given for the first 
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decision but not for the remaining decisions, in order 
to avoid unnecessary repetition of similar tables. 
For similar reasons, tables of mean values are provided 
only where means are significantly different. (Each 
analysis of variance involves the calculation of 294 mean 
values, mostly not significantly different.) 
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TABLE 4. 
Analyses of Variance Employed 
First Decision 
Individual Data 
Time to go to Time of Closest Approach 
Percentage of Correct (Conflict!Safe) First 
Decisions 
Percentage of Correct (Ahead/Behind) First 
Decisions 
Percentage of Correct Judgements of Separations 
at First Decision 
Group Data 
95th Percentile of Time to Tea 
5th Percentile of Time to Tea 
First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision 
Individual Data 
Time to go to Time of Closest Approach 
Accuracy 
Group Data 
95th Percentile of Time to Tea 
5th Percentile of Time to Tea 
Performance 
Bias 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Individual Data. 
Time to go to Time of Closest Approach 
Accuracy 
Group Data 
95th Percentile of Time to Tea 
5th Percentile of Time to Tea 
Performance 
Bias 
First Correct Judgement of Separation 
Individual Data 
Time to go to Time of Closest Approach 
Accuracy 
Group Data 
95th Peroentile of Time to Tea 
5th Percentile of Time to Tea 
Performance 
Bias 
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3. First decision; 
The first decision is the first recognisable decision 
made by the vontroller, regardless of whether it is 
correct or not. The three measures of accuracy refer 
to the percentages of these decisions which are correct 
in terms of the definitions of correctness given above. 
Table 13 is an analysis of variance for thet1me 
at which the first decision is made •. Tables "14, 15 and 
16 are analyses of variance for the accuracy of this 
" " decision in terms of the three criteria of, whether the 
decision is correct~ These were whether the observer 
correctly stated that the situation was safe or a 
conflict, whether the observer judged correctly which 
aircraft was passing ahead, and whether the observer 
correctly judged what the separation will be at the 
closest. The significant effects observable are 
summarised in Table 5. 
Considering the differences between group means 
(Table 6, Figure 10), we note that the mean time to go to 
Tca for skilled observers is 17 seconds more than that 
for unskilled observers, while the mean 95th percentile 
is 27 seconds earlier for skilled observers than for 
unskilled observers~ The 5th percentile is only six 
seconds earlier - a non-significant difference. These 
results mean that skilled observers make their first 
decisions earlier than unskilled observers, on the whole, 
although some unskilled observers make their decisions 
just as early as the skilled observers. Unskilled 
observers start making their decisions at about the same 
time before Tca, but are more spread out, so that their 
mean and 5th percentiles are correspondingly later than 
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those of skilled observers. 
It is also noticeable that the mean time to Tca 
for Service observers is earlier than that for Civil 
observers by 15 seconds. No corresponding figures for 
percentiles are available owing to the smaller size of 
these groups. 
The within group variability of unskilled observers 
is significantly greater than that of skilled observers 
for the mean time to Tca at which the first decision is 
made. The difference is reflected in the larger difference 
between 5th and 95th percentiles for unskilled observers 
(109 sec.) than for skilled observers (88 sec.) This 
difference is masked in part by the large difference now 
eXisting between individual simulations. Because there 
is a statistically significant difference between the 
variabilities of these two groups of observers, it is 
necessary to use a t* test in place of a t or F test to 
assess the significance of the difference between group 
means for skilled and unskilled observers. The test is 
rather less sensitive than a t test, so that the larger 
difference between skilled and unskilled observers is not 
significant, while the smaller difference between Civil 
and Service observers, which may be tested with an F test, 
is considered significant. 
The first significant factor is the angle of approach. 
Table 7 and Figure 11 show the effects of this factor on 
the 95th, 50th and 5th percentiles of the time to go to 
the time of closest approach, and Table 8 and Figure 12 
show the effects of the angle of approach on the accuracy 
of the first decision in terms of the decision which 
aircraft is passing ahead of the other. Because there 
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are significant differences between the mean times for 
different groups of observers, means for each level of each 
factor have been plotted for skilled and unskilled 
observers, as well as for the combined group of all 
observers. 
Examination of these tables and diagrams will show 
that the first three levels of the angle of approach are 
more or less similar, but that the fourth level, 170 
degrees, is decided earlier by about 42 seconds, and has 
a much lower initial accuracy. Differences in the final 
accuracy of this decision, including later corrections, 
are significant, although less so. It appears that 
observers realise that the situation is a dangerous one, 
and make a comment to that effect well before they can 
determine which aircraft will pass ahead of the other. 
The second significant factor is the speed of closing. 
This affects only the 50th and 5th percentiles of the time 
to go to Tca, but all three measures of time to Tca are 
included in Figure 13 and Table 9. These show that for 
the slowest speed of closing (240 knots) the mean overall 
time to go to Tca is 2 minutes 54 seconds, while for all 
situations it is 2 minutes 28 seconds. The spread of 
values is again greater for unskilled observers, resulting 
in a non-significant difference at the 5th percentile. 
The third and final significant effect is that of the 
passage of the rogue ahead of or behind the controlled 
aircraft on the 5th percentile of the time to Tca. 
Overall, the difference is 32 seconds, the decision 
being made earlier when the rogue is passing ahead of 
the controlled aircraft. This may be because the other 
decisions required were also easier to take in this case. 
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Although this argument could well apply to skilled 
observers, who would find it easier to decide what 
manoeuvre to adopt to rectify the situation, it would 
not explain the similar though less marked effect 
observable for unskilled observers. 
Table 11 lists the mean time to Tca and accuracy 
in terms of the three criteria for the first decision 
for each simulation, averaging over all observers. 
Figure 15 plots time to Tca versus the accuracy of 
the first decision, in terms of the Conflict/Safe 
criterion for all 64 situations. 
Table 12 presents the mean times to Tca and 
accuracies for all 27 observers. Figure 16 plots time 
to Tca versus the accuracy of the Conflict/Safe decision 
for all 27 observers, skilled observers being represented 
by black stars, unskilled observers by white ones. 
TABLE 5 
First Decision -Significant Effects 
TIME ACCURACY 
Type of Effect 95th.%ile Time to·Tca 
Mean (50%) 
5th.%ile Conflict/ Accuracy Within 
Safe Ahead/Behind 3 Miles 
Differences 
between groups 
1. Group Means Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
2. Within Group 
Variability 
Effects of 
factors varied 
1. Overall 
2. Between 
Groups 
Angle of 
Approach 
Service/ 
Civil 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
CloSing 
Rogue Ahead/ 
Behind 
Angle of 
Approach 
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TABLE 6. 
First Decision - Mean Overall Performance within Groups 
Time to Tea Accuracy 
95th %ile ~ 5th %ile Conflict! Ahead! Within Safe Behind 3 miles 
All Observers 
102 sec 148 sec 200 sec 73 % 59%1 57% 
Skilled 
Observers 
116 sec 157 sec 204 sec 75% ' I 60% 61% 
Unskilled 
Observers 
89 sec 140 sec 198 sec 72% 58% 54% 
Civil 
Controllers 
.. 
76% 65% 58% 151 sec 
Service 
Controllers 
166 sec 73% 53% 50% 
TABLE 7. 
First Decision - Effects of Angle of Approach an·'! Time to Tca 
Level 1 Level 2 L3vel 3 Level 4 (45 deg) (90 deg) (135 deg) (170 deg) 
Time to Tca 95th 95th 95th 95th (percentiles) 50th 50th 50th 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
Overall 92 99 90 129 
137 141 136 180 (» .... 
• 189 190 188 236 
Skilled Observers 106 110 101 146 
143 149 146 190 
186 194 196 239 
Unskilled Observers 77 89 79 112 
132 134 126 170 
192 187 180 232 
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TABLE 8 
First Decision - Effects of Angle of Approach on 
Accuracy of Initial Ahead/Behind Decision 
Accuracy Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (45 deg) (90 deg) (135 deg) (170 deg) 
Overall 74% 65% 59% 39% 
Skilled 
Observers 77% 68% 60% 37% 
Unskilled 
Observers 71% 63% 58% 40% 
TABIiE 9. 
First Decjsion - Effects of SP!ed of Closing on 'rime to Tca 
Level 1 Level 2 Le ;reI 3 Level 4 (240 kt) (360 kt) "(4:1O kt) (600 kii) 
Tims·to Tca 95th 95th 95th 95th 
(percentiles) 50th 50Jh 30th 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
Overall 126 102 95 87 (Xl 
174 147 140 13::: Vl .. 
228 200 195 179 
Skilled Observers 136 117 106 103 
184 156 148 140 
237 198 199 180 
Unskilled Observers 115 87 84 71 
165 140 133 124 
219 202 191 179 
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TABLE 10. 
First Decision - Effects of Rogue passin~ 
Ahead/Behind on Time to Tca 
Roa;ue Ahead Roa;ue Behind 
Time to Tca 95th 95th (percentiles) 50th 50th 
5th 5th 
Overall 112 92 
159 137 
217 185 
Skilled Observers 126 105 
170 145 
221 187 
Unskilled Observers 98 80 
150 130 
213 183 
TABLE 11. 
Mean Time of First Decision z and Accuracl of InititalDecisions for Individual Simulations 
Simulation Time Conflict Ahead Separation SimUlation Time Conflict Ahead Separation 
'Number t'O'rca /Safe. /Benind Number to·Tca /Safe .. /Behind 
1 112.0 96:3 2:2.2 55.6 33 141.5 88,9 25.9 55:6 
2 232:2 85,2 29.6 44.4 34 168.3 66.7 63.0 48.1 
3 127,0 74.0 81.4 44.4 35 206.3 92.6 37.0 51.9 
4 164.6 85,2 66:7 51.9 36 95.9 74;0 70,4 66;7 
5 199,2 77,8 85.2 70.4 37 119,4 55,6 66.7 59.3 
6 179,5 63,0 88.9 29.6 38 163.4 25.9 63-;-0 18.5 
7 204.2 66.7 88.9 63.0 39 137.0 48,1 85.2 74.0 
8 179;0 85.2 11.1 51.9 40 193.6 96,3 48.1 48.2 
9 116,7 96.3 59.3 70.4 41 114.5 96.3 44.4 59,3 ()) 
10 129.1 66,7 92.6 85.2 42 142.8 22.2 85,2 18.5 Vl 
11 103.0 92.6 88.8 70.4 43 187.8 96;3 44.4 74,1 • 
12 87,4 77.8 81.4 66.7 44 104.7 85.2 55.6 40.8 
13 112.5 92,6 40.7 70,4 45 240.1 63.0 37.0 48.2 
14 17 .1 '.10,4 66.7 63.,0 46 168.2 66.6 88.9 74.1 
15 146,7 81,5 59.3 40.7 47 176,2 37;0 77.8 37.0 
16 228.6 .55,6 85.2 81.5 48 131.1 77;8 74.1 63.0 
17 110;4 .22,9 85.2 66.7 49 203;i7 66~7 '81.5 66.7 
18 193 ;6 100.0 37.0 66.7 50 141.3 85~2 33.3 44;4 
19 84.1 100.0 18.5 77 ,8 51 131.1 96,3 25.9 70.4 
20 114.8 77~7 18.5 33.3 52 178.2 77.8 77.8 77,8 
21 120.5 37.0 74.1 29.7 53 132.5 63.0 88.9 81.5 
22 122.7 88.9 44.4 44.4 54 256.2 96;3 37.0 81.5 
23 127.7 85.2 44.4 55;-6 55 143.4 85~2 77.8 74.1 
24 138.3 81.5 81.5 62.9 56 105.1 100.0 40.8 59.3 
25 126;5 81;5 44.4 55.5 57 181. 7 96;3 40;8 77.8 
26 136.7 77 .8 85.:2 74.1 58 151.1 55.15 81.5 51.9 
27 186.4 7,4 74,0 29.6 59 142.3 96.3 55.6 70.4 
28 199;4 85.2 18.5 70.4 60 138.3 18;5 70.4 40.7 
29 142,8 14,8 85.2 40.7 61 1.33.9 100;0 25.9 85;2 
30 145.1 88.9 29.6 59,3 62 112.4 85;2 44.4 44.4 
31 2;3;0 48.1 77 .8 22.2 63 183.6 88;3 74; 1 40;8 
32 154.5 29.6 81.5 48.2 64 179.5 96.3 11.1 77.8 
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TABLE 12. 
Time Before Tca of First Decision and Initial 
Accuracies for Individua: Observers 
Observer Group Time to Accuracy of First Decisions 
Tca 
Conflict Ahead Separation 
/Safe /Behind 
1 Civil 148.0 71.9 68.7 67.2 
2 Civil 149.3 75.0 64.1 70.3 
3 Civil 142.7 76.6 70.3 70.3 
4 Civil 152.3 70.3 60.9 54.7 
5 Civil 156.3 73.4 71.9 59.4 
6 Civil 150.0 75.0 64.1 59.4 
7 Civil 163.1 81.3 65.6 84.4 
8 Civil 156.1 85.9 56.3 75.0 
9 Service 165.5 82.8 59.4 81.3 
10 Service 154.0 46.9 48.4 31.3 
11 Service 174.6 84.4 32.8 32.8 
12 Service 170.2 71. 9 54.7 54.7 
13 Service 164.5 78.1 67.2 50.0 
14 Unskilled 158.4 68.8 59.4 54.7 
15 Unskilled 158.5 79.8 68.8 57.8 
16 Unskilled 142.4 73.4 75.0 65.6 
17 Unskilled 118.0 84.4 71.9 75.0 
18 Unskilled 139.6 75.0 68.8 64.1 
19 Unskilled 153.0 73.4 67.2 57.8 20 Unskilled 149.8 53,1 51.6 51.6 
21 Unskilled 131.0· 67.2 59.4 56.3 22 Unskilled 147.4 76.6 46.8 57.8 
23 Unskilled 150.7 ~i~:' 81.3 28.1 32.8 
24 Umrkilled 129.0 59.4 51.6 46.8 
25 Unskilled 133.4 70.3 48.4 39.1 26 Unskilled 124.9 60.9 34.4 26.6 
27 Unskilled 129.5 82.8 79.7 75.0 
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TAJ3LE 13 
Analysis of Variance for 
First Decision Time to go to TCA 
Source of Variation Total Sum 
of Squares 
of Mean Sum' Var.Ratio w.r.t. 
of Squares 
Overall Performance 
Levels 
1 Heaoing of control 28 015.7 
2 Angle of approach 570 972.0 
3 Speeo of closing 428 742.0 
4 Nature of miss 252791.5 
5 Distance of miss 35 806.2 
6 Position on PPI 82 586.7 
Unassigneo variation 013 965.1 
Service v Civil 
controllers 
Difference in 
Performance 
1 Heaoing of control 
2 Angle of apr0ach 
3 Speeo of closing 
4 Nature of miss 
5 Distanccr of miss 
6 Position of miss 
Unassigneo variation 
Skilleo v Unskilleo 
Observers 
38 625.8 
6 429.2 
5 728.8 
1 111.5 
86.7 
1 755.9 
8 687.0 
46 580.5 
3 9:338.6 
3 190.324.0 
3 142 914~0 
3 
3 
3 
45 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
45 
84 263.8 
11 935.4 
27 528.9 
33 643.7 
38 625.8 
2 143.1 
1 909.6 
370.5 
28.9 
585.3 
2 895.7 
1 035.1 
NS 
5.7 ** 
4.3 ** 
2.5 NS 
NS 
NS 
36.2 *.** 
41.6 *** 
2.1 NS 
1.8 NS 
NS 
NS 
NS 
2.8 NS 
1.11 NS 
Difference in 
Performance 
1 Heaoing of control 
2 Angle of approach 
3 Speed of closing 
120 365.3 
4 731.2 
6 692.7 
1 434.4 
3 586.0 
3 747.0 
4 472.5 
1 120 365.3 129.5 *** 
3 1 577.1 NS 
3 2 230.9 1.1 NS 
3 478.1 NS 
4 Nature of miss 3 1 195.3 NS 
5 Distance of miss 3 1 249.0 NS 
6 Position on PPI 
Unassigned variation 
3 1 490.8 NS 
94 885.1 45 2 108.6 
Wi thin Groups 
Variation 
Civil controllers 19 458.5 7 
Service controllers 15 218.4 4 
Unskilled controllers139 887.2 13 
Residual 1 356 707.1 1460 
TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 4 793 070.0 1675 
Notes: NS = Not Significant 
2 779.8 
3 804.6 
10 760.5 
929.3 
* = Significant at 95% level 
** = Significant at 99% level 
'f* = Significant at 99.9% level 
3.0 
4.1 
11 .6 
*** 
*** 
*** 
UV = Unassigned variation for the relevant set of 
factors 
Res.= Residual Sum of squares 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
Res. 
Res. 
uv 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
Res. 
Res. 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
UV 
Sub 
Res. 
Res. 
Res. 
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Analysis of Variance 
First Decision 
Source of Variation Total sum 
of squares 
Overall Performance 
Levels 
1. Heading of control 
2 Angle of approach 
3 Speed of closing 
4 Nature of miss 
5 Distance of miss 
6Position on PPI 
Unassigned variation 
Service v Civil 
Controllers 
Difference in 
Performance 
1 Heading of control 
2 Angle of approach 
3 Speed of closing 
4 Nature of miss 
5 Distance of miss 
6 Position on PPI 
Unassigned variation 
Skilled v Unskilled 
Observers 
Difference in 
Performance 
1 Heading of control 
2Angle of approach 
3 Speed of closing 
4 Nature of miss 
5 Distance of miss 
6 Position on PPI 
Unassigned variation 
Within Groups 
Variation 
Civil controllers 
Service controllers 
Unskilled observers 
10 572.9 
161 637.7 
52 748.8 
38 258.1 
61 035.9 
9 647.0 
660 306.7 
2 222.4 
13 520.4 
455.5 
5 530.0 
6 832.6 
1 756.0 
6 167.1 
63 496.4 
3 895.1 
5 150.0 
877.7 
4 553.7 
11 798.6 
888.9 
4 942.6 
85 797.3 
11 852.8 
59 875.0 
71 819.0 
Conflict 
gement 
Mean Sum Var.Ratio w.r.t. 
dF of Squares 
3 3 524.31 NS DV 
3 53 879.24 3.672 * DV 
3 17 582.95 1.198 NS DV 
3 12 752.70 0.869 NS DV 
3 20 345.29 1.387 NS DV 
3 3 215.66 0.219 NS DV 
45 14 677.48 
1 2 222.36 Sk sub 
3 1 173.48 0.832 NS DV 
3 151.84 0.108 NS DV 
3 1 843.35 1.306 NS DV 
3 2 277.53 1.614 NS DV 
3 585.34 0.414 NS ·DV 
3 2 055.69 1.457 NS DV 
45 1 411.03 
1 3 895.1 NS All sub 
3 1 716.65 NS DV 
3 292.57 NS DV 
3 1 517.90 
-
NS DV 
3 3 932.85 2.063 NS DV 
3 296.30 - NS DV 
3 1 647.55 NS DV 
45 1 906.61 
7 1 693.2 - NS 
4 14 968.7 8.840 * Civ con 
13 5.524.5 1.001 NS All ski 
Residual 2 024 494.7 1512 1 338.9 
TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 3 380 133.1 1727 
Analysis 
First Decision 
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TABLE 15. 
of Variance for 
Accurac* of Ahead/ 
Behin Judgement 
Source of Variation Total sum dF Mean Sum Var.Ratio w.r.t. 
of Squares of Squares 
Overall Performance 
Levels 
1 Heading of control 22 656.2 3 7 552.1 NS DV 
2 Angle of approach 286 776.6 3 95 592.2 8.04 *** DV 3 Speed of closing 4 415.5 3 1 471.8 NS DV 
4 Nature of miss 80 758.1 3 26.919.4 2.265 NS DV 
5 Distance of miss 35 063.7 3 11 687.9 NS DV 
6 Position on PP! 36 452.5 3 12 150.9 1.022 NS DV 
Unassigned variation 534 936.3 45 11 887.5 
Service v Civil 
Controllers 
Difference in 
Performance 933.9 1 31 933.9 6.515 * ski obs 
1 Heading of control 2 058.9 3 686.3 NS DV 
2 Angle of approach 7 419.5 3 2 473.2 1.118 NS DV 
3 Speed of cloSing 6 544.5 3 2 181.5 NS DV 
4 Nature of miss 3 517.9 3 1 172.6 NS DV 
5 Distance of miss 14 522.8 3 4 841. 0 2. 188 NS DV 
6 Position on PPI 12 020.4 3 4 006.8 1.811 NS DV 
Unassigned variation 99 573.3 45 2 212.7 
Skilled v Unskilled 
Observers 
Difference in 
Performance 2 510.7 1 2 510.7 NS All obs 
1 Heading of control 8 771.5 3 2 923.8 1.112 NS DV 
2 Angle of approach 6 120.9 3 2 040.3 NS DV 
3 Speed of clOSing 5 089.1 3 1 696.4 NS DV 
4 Nature of miss 8 849.6 3 2 949.9 1.122 NS DV 
5 Distance of miss 4 949.2 3 1 649.7 NS DV 
6 Position on PPI 8 745.8 3 2 915.3 1.108 NS DV 
Unassigned variation 118 347.5 45 2 629.9 
Within GrouEs 
Variation 
Civil observers 1 1 801.9 7 1 685.9 
Service observers 43 000.0 4 10 750.0 8.376 Civ con 
Unskilled observers 193 265.1 13 14 866.5 2.984 Ski obs 
Residual 2 587 253.9 1512 1 711.1 
TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 4 177 355.3 1727 
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TABLE 16. 
Anal~sis of Variance for 
First Decision Accurac~ of Jud~ement 
01' SeEaraHon 
Source of Variation Total sum 
.91. Mean Sum Var.Ratio w.r.t. 
of Sg,uares of Sg,uares 
Overall Performance 
Levels 
1 Heading of control 30 063.7 3 10 021.2 "1-;'395 NS UV 
2 Angle of apprcach 13 998.8 3 4 666.3 NS UV 
3 Speed of closing 47 008.1 3 15 669.3 2.181 NS UV 
4 Nature of miss 33 628.5 3 11 209.5 1.560 NS UV 
5 Distance of miss 10 572.9 3 3 524.3 NS UV 
6 Position on PPI 36 961.8 3 12 320.6 1.715 NS UV 
Unassigned variation 323 316.0 45 7 184.8 
Service v Civil 
Contro'tIers 
Difference in 
Performance 60 847.4 ., 1 60 847.4 4.550 Ski obs 
1 Heading of control 2 203.1 3 734.4 NS UV 
2 Angle of approach 17 256.0 3 5 752.0 2.519 NS UV 
3 Speed of closing 3 732.0 3 1 244.0 NS UV 
4 Nature of miss 246.4 3 821.3 NS UV 
5 Distance of miss 7 780.0 3 2 593.4 1.136 NS UV 
6 Position on PPI 8 332.9 3 2 777.6 1.216 NS UV 
Unassigned variation 756.0 45 2 283.5 
Skilled v Unskilled 
Observers 
Difference in 
Performance 18 029.1 1 18 029.1 
1 Heading of control 3 094.8 3 1 031.6 NS UV 
2 Angle of approach 1 955.0 3 651.7 NS UV 
3 Speed of closing 264.4 3 88.1 NS UV 
4 Nature of miss 8 692.1 3 2 897.4 NS UV 
5 Distance of miss 8 437.2 3 2 812.4 NS UV 
6 Position on PPI 130695.9 45 2 904.4 
Within GrouEs 
Variation 
Civil Observers 41 798.6 7 5 971.2 
Service Observers 105 312.5 4 26 328.1 4.409 Civ con 
UnSdlled Observers 169 429.0 13 13 033.0 Ski obs 
Residual 3 018 602.8 1512 1 996.4 
TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 4 223 697.9 1727 
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4. First correct Conflict/Safe decision. 
The first correct conflict/safe decision is the 
first decision which states correctly whether the situation 
will be safe or a conflict. The standard of safety 
employed is the rule that: 
"A situation is a conflict if at anY time the two 
aircraft will be within five miles of each other" 
The measure of accuracy here employed is the number 
of occasions on which a correct judgement was expressed 
at some time during the trial, compared with the total 
number of occasions, as described above. 
Estimates of performance and bias were obtained as 
described in that section. The performance index is 
obtained by multiplying time to Tca by accuracy, and 
the bias index by subtracting the mean of the time of 
the first correct conflict/safe decision from the mean 
of the time of first decisions in each situation. 
(The bias index may be neglected, since it never 
exhibited any significant differences.) 
In general the effects present (Table 17) resemble 
those for the first decision. The differences between 
groups are primarily evident in time to Tca, accuracy 
being affected only (rather oddly) by the position of 
the simulation on the PPI. There are significant 
differences between groups in the performance index, but 
these may be attributed to the effects of differences 
in timing. 
Considering differences between group means 
(Table 18) we observe the mean time before Tca at which 
skilled observers make their first correct conflict/safe 
decision is 16 seconds more than that for unskilled 
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observers, the mean time of the 95th percentile being 
25 seconds earlier, and the mean time for the 5th 
percentile being, again, only six seconds earlier. 
Skilled observers tend to start making their correct 
decisiohs earlier than unskilled observers, but are 
more spread out, so that the finishing 5th percentiles 
are about the same. The mean time to Tca for Service 
controllers is about 9 seconds greater than that for 
Civil oontrollers, although this difference is not 
significant. 
There are no significant differences in variability 
within groups, although the pattern of variability is 
as before. For this type of decision the range from 
5th to 95th percentiles is 112 seconds for skilled 
Observers, and 131 seconds for unskilled observers. 
By Simple proportion, considering the times and 
percentage accuracies for the first decision and the 
first correct conflict/safe decision, one may calculate 
that the delay in correcting an initially wrong decision 
is 114 seconds for skilled observers and 80 seconds 
for unskilled observers. There is a mean difference 
in performance between skilled and unskilled observers, 
but this merely reflects the difference in timing. 
The first significant factor is the angle of 
approach, as before (Table 19). This affects the mean, 
95th and 5th percentiles of the time to Tca at which 
the first oorrect conflict/safe, decision is made. It 
should be noticed that the percentiles are more widely 
spaced for the more acute angles, implying that there 
is much greater agreement as to when decisions ought to 
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be made for aircraft approaching at obtuse (wide) 
angles than f0r aircraft approaching at acute angles. 
Mean levels have been plotted for each level of this 
factor, for all observers, for skilled and unskilled 
observers, and for Civil (C) and Service (M) controllers. 
The difference between skilled and unskilled observers 
is purely one of overall mean, both groups showing the 
same pattern of behaviour. The difference between 
Civil and Service controllers is more interesting. 
There is a significant difference between these groups 
in the way in which they are affected by alteration in 
the angle of approach of the aircraft, and it appears 
to lie in the greater urgency attached by service 
controllers to nearly head-on approaches. Civil 
controllers appear to be more willing to wait and see. 
The performance measure again differs significantly 
(Table 20) as a consequence of the difference in time, 
showing that the greater speed shown in dealing with 
head-on cases is not accompanied by a decrease in 
accuracy to any significant extent. 
The only other factor having a significant overall 
effect is speed of closing of the two aircraft (Table 21). 
This affects the 5th and 50th percentiles but not the 
95th. What happens may be expressed by saying that as 
the aircraft speeds get faster, so mean time at which 
the decision is taken decreases from 2 min. 49 seconds 
to 1 min. 56 seconds. The spread of readings in time 
remains more or less constant, however, and there are 
no differences between groups of observers in the way 
in which they are affected. The performance index also 
shows a significant drop; (Table 22) although the 
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effect does not appear to be simply linear, since mean 
times to Tca are shorter for skilled observers where the 
aircraft are closing at 360 knots than when they are 
closing at 480 knots. This is emphasised by the 
performance index, since the accuracy for 360 knots 
is also less than that for 480 knots, reversing the 
general trend. 
In addition to the overall effects of these two 
factors, two other factors exhibit significant 
interactions with groups of observers. This is to 
say that, while the overall aVerage effects of 
different levels of these factors are not significantly 
different, skilled observers are affected significantly 
differently from unskilled observers. The first of 
these minor factors is the passage of the Rogue, ahead 
of, or behind the Control (Table 23). This has a 
significant effect on the time at which the first 
(5th percentile) skilled observers make their decisions, 
but appears to affect unskilled observers not at all. 
This difference does not appear to be significant for 
the mean values of Tca, but is significant in terms 
of performance index (Table 24) situations where the 
rogue passes ahead being judged earlier and more 
accurately, although the difference in accuracy is not 
marked enough to be significant. 
Lastly, there appears to be an effect on the 
accuracy of judgements made by skilled or unskilled 
observers of the position on the PP! at which a 
particular simulation took place, (Table 25). For 
some reason, unskilled observers performed particularly 
poorly on targets in the median range of the screen, 
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from about 1.5 to 3.5 inches from the centre. This 
result is significant only at the 5% level (1 chance 
of 20) and may be a statistical artefact. 
Significant Effects 
Differences between groups 
1. Group Means 
TABLE 17. 
First Correct Conflict!Safe Decision 
95th.%ile Time toTca 5th.%ile 
Mean (5010) 
Skilled! Skilled! 
Unskilled Unskilled 
2. Within Group Variabilities 
Effects of Factors Varied 
1. Overall 
2. Between Groups 
Service v. Civil 
Controllers 
Skilled v. Unskilled 
Observers 
Angle of 
Approach 
Angle of Angle of 
Approach Approach 
Speed of Speed of 
CloSing CloSing 
Angle of 
Approach 
Rogue Ahead 
!Behind 
~ccuracy Performance Bias 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
Position Rogue Ahead 
on ppr !Behind 
..... 
0 
I\.l 
• 
103. 
TABLE 18. 
First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision 
Mean Overall Performance within Groups 
95th %ile ~ 5th %ile Accuracy Performance ~ 
All 
Observers 
80 sec. 138 sec. 200 sec. 82% '12 -.1 
Skilled 
Observers 
92 sec. 146 sec. 204 sec. 83% 119 0.0 
Unskilled 
Observers 
67 sec. 130 sec. 198 sec. 81% 105 -.3 
Civil 
Controllers 
142 sec. 83% 
Service 
C':mtrollers 
153 sec. 83% 
TABLE 19. 
First Correct',Conflict/Safe Decision 
Effects of Ans:le of AEEroach on Time to Tca 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
(4; oes:l (90 ile~l {~3; des:l 070 deg) 
Time'toTca 95th 95th 95th 95th 
(percentiles) 50th 50th 50th 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
Overall 48 72 78 122 
115 133 129 175 
189 190 183 236 
.... 
Skilled Observers 59 81 91 139 0 
-j::. 122 137 141 185 • 
190 195 19;) 243 
Unskilled Observers 37 62 65 105 
109 129 118 165 
185 175 n1- 233 
Service Controllers 
123 141 147 203 
Civil Controllers 
121 134 137 174 
105. 
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First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision 
Effects of Angle of Approach on Performance Index 
Performance 
Overall 
Skilled 
Observers 
Unskilled 
Observers 
Level 1 (45 deg) 
87 
92 
82 
Level 2 Level 3 
'90 des) (135 deg) 
95 108 
99 118 
91 99 
Level 4 
(170 deg) 
159 
167 
149 
TABLE 21 
First Correct ConflictLSafe Decision 
Effects of Speed of Closing on Time to Tca 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (240 kt) (3tia kt~ (48li kt) (boa kt} 
Time""to Tca 95th 95th 95th 95th (percentiles) 50th 50th 50th 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
Overall 115 71" 78 57 ... 0 169 135 132 116 0-
230 196 197 175 • 
Skilled Observers 127 86 91 66 
180 140 142 123 
240 205 201 181 
Unskilled Observers 103 55 64 47 
160 130 123 110 
220 186 193 168 
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TABLE 22. 
First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision 
Effects of Speed of Closing on Performance Index 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Performance Index (240 Kt} (;;0 !et} (480 !et} (bOO Kt} 
Overall 144 103 113 89 
Skilled Observers 151 106 124 95 
Unskilled Observers 138 99 102 82 
TABLE 23. 
First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision 
Effects of Passage of Rogue Ahead/Behind Control on Time 
to Tea. 
~1me to Tea (~ercentlles ) 
Overall 
Skilled Observers 
Unskilled Observers 
Rogue Passing 
Ahead 
95th 
50th 
5th 
86 
148 
213 
103 
159 
224 
69 
138 
201 
Rogue Passing 
Ahead 
95th (.; 
50th 
5th 
74 
128 
185 
82 
133 
189 
65 
122 
181 
108. 
TABLE 24. 
First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision 
Effects of Passage of Rogue Ahead/Behind Control on 
Performance Index 
Overall 
Skilled Observers 
Unskilled Observers 
Rogue Passing 
Ahead 
118 
130 
106 
TABLE 25. 
Rogue Passing 
Astern 
107 
109 
105 
First Correct ConflictLSafe Decision 
Effect of Position on PPI.on.Accuracy 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
(Outer outer) "(Median) (Central) 
Rogue Heading 
(inward Outward) 
Overall 82 85 75 85 
Skilled 
Observers 81 84 81 85 
Unskilled 
Observers 84 86 70 85 
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5. First correct Ahead/Behind decision. 
The first correct ahead/behind decisicn is defined 
as the first decision indicating correctly which air-
craft is about to pass ahead of the other. In practice, 
this decision was states as IIRogue passing ahead ll , or 
IIRogue passing behind ll , In a considerable number of 
trials the observer was not able to make any comment 
other than IICollisionll , implying that he was not able 
to judge which aircraft was passing in front of the 
other, (This is equivalent to saying that he could 
not perceive any rotation of the line of sight). 
Accuracy is defined in the manner laid down above. 
The time to go to Tca and the accuracy were 
measured for each observer for each simulation, and in 
addition the 5th and 95th percentiles , performance index 
and bias index were calculated for skilled and un-
skilled groups of observers for each simulation. 
In general the effects present (Table 26) resemble 
the effects observed for the first decision, although 
in this case the confidence limits are considerably 
wider. Timing differences account for most of the 
observe d variation, although there are some effects 
of factors on accuracy. There are no significant 
differences in terms of performance or bias indices. 
Considering first the differences between group 
means (Table 27) we observe that the group mean for 
skilled observers is in all cases significantly earlier 
than that for unskilled observers. The difference is 
of the order of 25 seconds for the 95th percentiles, 
and of 14 seconds for the 5th percentiles. This 
indicates that although the skilled subjects start to 
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make this judgement rather earlier than the unskilled, 
they finish considerably earlier, an effect similar 
to that observed for conflict/safe decisions. There 
are no significant differences in acouracy, performance 
index, or bias index. 
There are no significant differences between groups 
in the variability of individuals within groups. 
The first Significant factor is the angle of 
approach. This affects the mean and the 5th percentile 
of the time to Tca, and the accuracy. Table 28 shows 
that the nature of the effects on the time to Tca is to 
increase the time where the angle of approach is 170 
degrees by about 36 seconds. The effect is more marked 
for skilled observers, but not to a significant extent. 
The effect of angle of approach on accuracy 
(Table 29) is Simply described by saying that the 
accuracy of judgements of precendence for angles of 
approach of 170 degrees is. about 50%. In fact, a 
greater accuracy would be obtained by random guessing. 
This is in part accounted for by the reluctance of 
observers to make this type of judgement in this type 
of conflict. They tended to call the situation a 
"collision", order a course alteration and leave it 
at that. 
The second significant factor is the speed of 
closing. This affects the mean and 5th percentile of 
the time to Tca. (Table 30). The general effect is 
that the slower the aircraft are clOSing, the longer time 
there is to Tca. The difference between the 5th and 
95th percentiles is remarkably constant, both for 
skilled and unskilled observers. 
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The third significant effect is that of the 
passage of the rogue ahead of or behind the controlled 
aircraft. This has a significant effect on the 5th 
percentile (the time people start making judgements), 
(Table 31) and on the accuracy, (Table 32). First 
correct judgements are made 26 seconds earlier when 
the rogue is passing ahead, a difference which exactly 
parallels that observed for the first decision. In 
addition to being earlier, judgements of situations 
in which the rogue passes ahead are significantly more 
accurate, (78%) compared with those in which the 
rogue passes behind (65%). This can in part be 
accounted for by the greater difficulty of deciding 
what to do about the latter type of situation, but 
this explanation does not account for the similar 
magnitude of differences in speed and accuracy shown 
by unskilled observers, who were not required to make 
such decisions. 
There are no significant differences in the effects 
of factors between groups for the first correct decision 
whether the rogue is passing ahead or behind the 
control. 
Significant Effects 
Difference between groups 
1. Group means 
2. Within Group 
Variabilities 
Effects of Factors 
1 • Overall 
2. Between Groups 
Varied 
TABLE 26. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decisi~ 
95th %ile Time to Tca 
Mean( 50%) 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
5th %ile 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
Rog.ue Ahead 
/Behind 
Accuracy 
An,'Ile of 
Ap?roach 
Ro.1ue Ahead 
/3ehind 
Performance Bias 
... 
..... 
.1\} 
• 
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TABLE 27. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Mean Overall Performance with Groups. 
95th %ile Time to Tca 5th %i1e Accuracy Performance Bias 
lliIean{-I)(J~l 
'. 
All 
Observers 
72 sec. 133 sec. 194 seo. _. 71% 90 -1.7 
Skilled 
Observers 
85 sec. 142 sec. 201 sec. 70% 94 -2.0 
Unskilled 
Observers 
60 sec. 123 sec. 187 sec. 72% 87 -1.4 
Civil 
Controllers 
139 sec. 74% 
Service 
Controllers 
147 sec. 64% 
TABLE 28. 
First Correct AheadLBehind Decision 
:Effects of Angle of Approach on Time to Tca. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (45 deg) (90 deg) (135 deg) (170 deg) 
Time to Tea 95th 95th 95th 95th (percentiles) 50th 50th 50th 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
... 
Overall 60 69 60 101 ... \11 122 126 121 159 • 
186 186 183 221 
Skilled Observers 76 71 78 114 
129 132 135 172 
185 194 189 237 
Unskilled Observers 44 67 42 87 
116 120 107 148 
186 178 178 204 
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TABLE 29. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Effects of Angle of Approach on Accuracy. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (45 deg) (90 deg) (135 (jeg) (170 (jeg) 
Overall 88% 78% 71% 47% 
Skilled Observers 88% 79% 68% 46% 
Unskilled Observers 88% 78% 74% 47% 
TABLE 30. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Effects of Speed of Closing on Time to Tca. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (240 kt) (360 kt) (480 kt) (600 kt) 
Time to Tca 95th 95th 95th 95th 
(percentiles) 50th 50th 50th 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
.... 
..... 
Overall 96 77 59 57 -l • 156 136 123 114 
221 199 184 172 
Skilled Observers 104 96 69 70 
162 146 133 128 
229 196 199 180 
Unskilled Observers 88 59 50 44 
151 127 113 101 
213 201 169 163 
118. 
TABLE 31. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Effects of Rogue Passing Ahead or Behind on Time to Tca. 
Time to Tca 
(percentile) 
Overall 
Skilled Observers 
Unskilled Observers 
Rogue Ahead 
95th 
50th 
5th 
88 
145 
211 
94 
154 
217 
71 
136 
204 
TABLE 32. 
Rogue Behind 
95th 
50th 
5th 
62 
119 
177 
75 
129 
185 
49 
110 
168 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Effects of Rogue Passing Ahead or Behind on Accuracy. 
Accuracy 
Overall 
Skilled Observers 
Unskilled Observers 
Rogue Ahead 
78% 
76% 
79% 
Rogue Behind 
65% 
64% 
65% 
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6. First oorrect judgement of separation~ 
The first correct judgement of separation is 
defined as the first correct judgement of what the 
separation of the two aircraft will be at their closest 
(the time of closest approach). The judgement is 
considered to be positive if the rogue is predicted 
to pass in front of the control, negative if it is 
predicted to pass behind the control, and is considered 
to be zero if the judgement is "Collision". 
A judgement is considered to be correct if it is 
within three miles of the true value. (There is nothing 
special about this distance, it was chosen to provide 
a reasonable distribution of correct and incorrect 
judgements). 
Measures analysed for individuals were the time 
to go to Tca at which this judgement was made, and 
the accuracy of the judgement, as defined above. 
Measures defined for each simulation for each 
group of observers (skilled and unskilled) were the 5th 
and 95th percentiles of the time to Tca, and the 
performance and bias indices. 
In general, the effects present resemble those for 
the first deCision, although the range of values is 
greater, and there appear to be no significant effects 
of any of the factors on accuracy. The major factors 
are the angle of approach, and the speed of closing, 
although the performance index appears to be affected 
by the position of the conflict on the PP!. (Table 33). 
Considering differences between group means, 
(Table 34) we observe that the mean time for skilled 
observers is 24 seconds before that for unskilled 
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observers, and that the 95th percentile is 31 seconds 
before that for unskilled observers. The 5th 
percentile however is only eight seconds earlier. 
Thus we may observe that skilled observers start to 
make this judgement at the same time as unskilled 
observers, but finish earlier. This may be connected 
with the observation that 22% of unskilled observers 
make a subsequent correction to an initially wrong 
estimate, as against only 9% of skilled observers. 
There are no significant differences in individual 
variability between groups, although unskilled observers 
tend to exhibit more variation than skilled ones. The 
range from 5th to 95th percentile is 125 seconds for 
skilled observers, and 154 seconds for unskilled. 
The first significant factor is the angle of 
approach which is significant for all measures of 
time (Table 35) and for performance (Table 36). This 
can be ascribed to the difference between the 170 degree 
approaches and the rest, the nearly head-on cases 
being recognised about 48 seconds earlier than the rest. 
Skilled observers appear to show an increase in the 
speed with which they recognise the separation which is 
almost linearly proportional to the angle. Unskilled 
observers, however, do not appear to be affected by 
differences in angle between 45 degrees and 135 degrees. 
This difference between groups is not statistically 
significant. Performance follows closely the pattern 
for time. 
The second factor affecting the overall performance 
is the speed of closing (Table 37). Again we find that 
the slower the speed of closing, the longer there is to 
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go to Tca. The effect is more marked for unskilled 
than for skilled observers. The differenoe between 
5th and 95th percentile is more or less constant 
throughout. 
The performance index (Table 38) tends to follow 
much the same lines as before, except that level 2 
(360 kts) tends to overtake level 3 (480 kts), contrary 
to expectation, but in agreement with its previous 
behaviour. 
The only other significant effect is that of the 
position in the PPI on the performance index. This 
appears to be due to a relatively low level of 
performance for unskilled observers for level 2 -
conflicts taking place in the outer part of the screen, 
in which the controlled aircraft is heading outwards. 
The level of significance is not high, and the reason 
for this effect is obscure. It may be a statistical 
artefact. (Table 39). 
Significant Effects 
Differences. between Groups 
1. Group Means 
2. Within Group 
Variabilities 
Effect of Factors 
1. Overall 
2. Between Groups 
TABLE 33. 
First Correct Judgement of Separation. 
95th %ile 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Angle 9f 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
Mean (=50%) 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
5th %ile 
Angle of 
Approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
Accuracy Performance 
Angle of 
approach 
Speed of 
Closing 
Position 
on PP! 
Bias 
..... 
f\) 
.:..& 
• 
TABLE 34. 
First Correct Judgement of Separation. 
Mean Overall Performance within Groups. 
95th %ile 
All Observers. 65 sec 
Skilled Observers 80 sec 
Unskilled Observers 49 sec 
Civil Controllers 
Service Controllers 
Time to Tca 
Mean (=50%) 
130 sec 
142 sec 
118 sec 
138 sec 
148 sec 
5th %ile 
199 sec 
205 sec 
193 sec 
,iccuracy Performance Bies 
741 88 -1.4 .... 
t-J 
721· 96 
.1\) 
-1.7 • 
76'/0 80 -1.2 
78'/0 
62'/0 
TABLE 35. 
First Carrect Jua~ement of Sel2aration at Tea. 
Effects or Angle on Al2l2roach to Tca. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 (45 deg) 190 cleg) (135 deg) (1'70 cleg) 
Time to Tca 95th 95th 95th 95th (percentiles) 50th 50th 50tb. 50th 
5th 5th 5th 5th 
-' 
'" Overall 47 56 52 103 VI 
• 114 120 121 166 
184 186 192- 234 
Skilled Observers 61 68 68 125 
120 131 139 178 
187 192 205 234 
Unskillecl Observers 32 44 37 82 
107 110 104 152 
181 180 178 235 
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TAllLE 36. 
First Correot Judgement of Separation at Tca. 
Effects of Angle of Approach on Performance Index. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
(45 deg) (90 deg) (135 deg) (170 deg) 
Overall 85 80 77 111 
Skilled 
Observers 89 89 87 122 
Unskilled 
Observers 81 72 67 101 
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TABLE 38. 
First Correct Judgement of Separation at Tca 
Effects of Speed of Closing on Performance Index. 
Performance Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Index U,40 kt) (360 kt) (480 kt) T660 kt) 
Overall 119 81 85 69 
Skilled 
Observers 128 89 94 76 
Unskilled 
Observers 110 73 77 62 
TABLE 39. 
First Correct Juds;ement of Separation. 
Effects of Position on P.P.I. on Performance Index. 
Performance Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Index 
Control (Hdg in) (Hdg out) 
Position of 
Conflict Outer Outer Median Central 
Overall 101 71 95 87 
Skilled 
Observers 102 81 105 98 
Unskilled 
Observers 101 61 85 75 
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VI. THE PAPER SIMULATION EXPERIMENT. 
DESIGN! APPARATUS AND METHOD 
1. Experimental design. 
The factors selected for testing in this experiment 
were:-
1. The heading of the controlled aircraft. 
2. The angle 0f approach of the two aircraft. 
3. The speed of closing of the two aircraft. 
4. The nature of the miss. 
These four factors are the first four used in the 
electronic simulation experiment. In view of the 
relatively simple techniques of this experiment, and 
the necessity of working with single subjects, the number 
of simulations was reduced from sixty-four to sixteen. 
This was done by selecting the sixteen situations for 
which the miss distance (factor 5 in the previous 
experiment) was at its greatest level. These sixteen 
situations formed a greco-Iatin square with respect 
to the four levels of each factor employed. Table 40 
lists the f0ur levels of each factor employed. 
Table 41 lists (for each of the sixteen situaticns 
employed) its vpmber in the original electronic 
simulati0n experiment, the levels of the fcur factors 
employed, the separation of the two aircraft at their 
point of closest approach, and whether the rogue passed 
ahead of or behind the controlled aircraft. 
Figure 17 represents the sixteen situations 
employed, solid lines representing controlled aircraft, 
dotted lines representing rogues. It should be 
remembered that these lines represent the entire tracks 
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of the aircraft in question, only one quarter of which 
would be visible at any given time. 
It will be re~e~bered that it had originally 
been intended to use two eroups of twenty observers 
in the electronic simulation experiment, although 
the groups were ultimately redUced to thirteen and 
fourteen subjects. Two similar groups were used for 
the paper simulation experiment. One was of unskilled 
experimental observers, such as might normally be used 
in experimental psychological research, consisting 
of junior technicians and undergraduates, twenty in all. 
The other group - of skilled observers - was composed 
of two sub-groups, each of ten observers. The first 
sub-group ~onsisted of ten military observers, all 
practiciig air traffic controllers at R.A.F. Sopley, 
and the second of ten civil air traffic controllers 
all practicing at London (Heathrow) Air Traffic 
Control Centre. It was not found necessary to discard 
any of these subjects, so that all forty appear in 
the analyses described in Chapter VII. 
TABLE 40. 
Levels of Factors Employed. 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
1 • Heading of 
controlled aircraft Ogo 150 225 350 degrees 
(Compass) 
2. Angle of approach 45 go 135 170 degrees 
(Angular) 
3. Speed of closing 240 360 480 600 !mots -.> (Nautical miles f\) I.D per hour) • 
4. Nature of Miss 
a) Rogue passing Ahead Behind Ahead Behind 
b) Line of sight 
rotating C-wise C-wise Anti-Cw Anti-Cw 
c) Rogue initially on Right Left Left Right 
TABLE 41. 
Combinations of Factors EmEloyed 
Simn. No. in Levels of Factors Separation Sriitl ROfiue Ahead! NO:" Elect. at Tca Co ict Behind 
Simn. 1 2 1 i (miles) 
1 6 2 4 3 3 +0.52 Conflict Ahead 
2 8 1 4 4 4 -0.35 Conflict Behinu 
3 16 3 2 1 3 +5.56 Safe Ahead 
4 19 1 3 1 2 -3.27 Conflict Behind 
5 21 3 1 4 1 +6.79 Safe 7 Ahead 
6 24 2 2 4 2 -7.02 Safe Behind ... 
7 30 2 1 1 4 -1.89 Conflict Behind 
\>1 
0 
• 
8 31 3 4 2 2 -0.93 Conflict Behind 
9 34 1 2 3 1 +4.50 Conflict Ahead 
10 41 3 3 3 4 -2.26 Conflict Behind 
11 44 4 2 2 4 -4.15 Conflict Behind 
12 46 4 1 3 2 -7.49 Safe Behind 
13 47 4 3 4 3 +2.72 Conflict Ahead 
14 49 2 3 2 1 +3.01 Conflict Ahead 
15 54 4 4 1 1 +0.69 Conflict Ahead 
16 58 1 1 2 3 +7.59 Safe Ahead 
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Figur!!._!7. 
Simulatione employed for Paper Simulation experiment 
--
Controlled aircraft indica.ted by solid lines 
Rogue aircraft are indicated by dotted lines 
Tracks indicate the entire flight path of the 
aircraft, of which only 25% would be visible 
at any one time. 
1 
.. , 
, 
SCALE 
20 miles (simulated)' 
_ 1 inch on displ~ 
. _ 17 mm in this figure 
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2. Experimental apparatus and material. 
a) Preparation of experimental material. 
The preparation of the experimental material 
for this experiment was undertaken at Loughborough 
University of Technology. The aim was to produce 
a radar simulation which would be reasonably similar 
to the electronic simulation methods available, but 
which would be within the reach of any experimenter 
equipped only with normal office equipment. The 
aim was to avoid any unnecessary complications, 
such as unorthodox electronic eqUipment, or automatic 
recording devices, while maintaining an adequate 
record of events. 
Simple presentation methods, such as those 
employed by Hopkin (1963, 1965), Manglesdorf (1955a) 
and Schipper and Versace (1956), were considered. 
These methods however have certain basic limitations. 
They represent the situation in a static form, so 
that the judgement is one of implied motion, rather 
than actual motion. They produce data in a 
"Yes/No" form (Hopkin), or by adjusting the situation 
to provide a conflict (Manglesdorf). The former, 
although valid as a data measurement method, provides 
too little information. The latter type of 
measurement is subject to so many possible disturbing 
influences that results so obtained must be treated 
with a certain reserve. 
It was decided (on 'a priori' grounds) to develop 
a method of paper simulation that would permit the 
presentation of events to the observer on a "Real Time" 
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basis •• This is to say a method of simulation in which 
the events occur at the rate in which they occur in 
practice. 
Some method had thernfore to be found to present 
a chang±ng picture to the observer. In the 
conventional radar simulator, a motion picture 
camera records a detailed picture, either in the 
conventional frame-by-frame methcd used in normal 
cine-cameras, or by recording the signals delivered 
to the "sweep" of the radar display, and using special 
apparatus to interpret this to a radar console when 
display is required. In either case, all the elaborate 
and costly equipment involved in photographY, with 
its consequent faults, delays and planning requirements 
is introduced into the simulation system. 
A number of possible methods for the simulation 
of a radar sweep were considered, involving such 
expedients as automatic slide changers equipped with 
rotating filters to simulate a radar sweep, or cathode 
ray oscilloscope controlled by pinholes in paper tape. 
Such devices can be constructed, with a little 
ingenuity, from the normal range of equipment to be 
found in ergonomic laboratcr.ies. 
Expensive and careful preparations are required for 
even the shortest simulation runs using such techniques, 
because the positions of pinholes or other position 
indications must be calculated precisely and transferred 
exactly to the recording medium. The resultant 
simulation matenials are delicate, and liable to 
substantial damage if used repeatedly. 
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A close study of the re~uirements of radar 
surveillance shows that radar observers are usually 
concerned with aircraft in one particular area of 
the screen. The radar sl.eep updates these trails 
at approximately the same time. It is therefore 
reasonable to dispense with the rotary sweep, and to 
present a complete new picture at an interval corres-
ponding to the sweep rate. 
To present these successive pictures, one possible 
method is to use a slide projector equipped to change 
slides at fixed intervals. These are commercially 
available and can hold up to 200 slides, which would 
be sufficient for about half an hour of simulation 
at a sweep rate of ten seconds per sweep (6 rpm). 
The problems of photography can be avoided by the use of 
opa~ue film, or smoked glass slides, inscribed with 
pin-holes to indicate positions and trails of aircraft. 
The labour of constructing such slides to any degree 
of accuracy is considerable, because very slight errors 
in locating pOints on the slide are greatly magnified 
by the process of projection. A further defect is that 
it is not easy to ensure that the slides appear in 
exactly the same place on the screen when projected, 
or when mounted. Possibly permanent features such as 
range rings and north markers could be incorporated 
in an initial slide, drawn on a large scale, then 
photographed. The cost of construction of many copies 
of one negative would be nearly the same as that of a 
film. 
There seems however to be no real objection to 
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presenting the radar trails as black marks on a white 
background. It is in this manner that previous 
experimenters have approached the problem, where cathode 
ray tubes were not used. 
In this event there is na need to use slide 
projection. The required images may be drawn full 
size on sheets of paper of appropriate size. These 
may be pre-printed with the necessary background 
details, which may be used as reference points when 
the variable features are added. At a time 
corresponding to the sweep interval a new sheet 
may be placed over the previous one, showing the 
moving points in their new positions. 
An initial approach was made using sheets of 
translucent paper, successive positions being 
marked on these, and a common background. It was 
hoped that the adding of extra layers would provide 
an effect analogous to the fading of the successive 
paints af a radar trail. 
Unfortunately it was found that when a sheet of 
tracing paper is placed on top of another sheet, 
small packets of air become trapped between the 
sheets, and hald the sheets apart in places. The 
degree to which a point is visible through a sheet 
af tracing paper is critically dependent on its 
claseness ta the paper. In consequence, where the 
sheets tauched, the previous points were nearly as 
visible as the most recent; where they did not, the 
previous points were invisible. 
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A further disadvantage was that it was not 
possible to present successive sheets in exactly 
the same registration. Trails therefore appeared 
unacceptably "jumpy". In this particular study, such 
error was not acceptable. 
The idea of using transparent paper was therefore 
abandoned. The effect of a trail was obtained by 
marking a small circle at the point where the aircraft 
was, and leading a triangular tail back to the point 
at which the aircraft had been five sweeps before. 
This corresponded to a time of fifty seconds at 6 rpm. 
Since opaque paper was now being used, the accuracy 
of placing of successive sheets was of no great 
importance, provided that the points were correctly 
positioned with respect to the background and to each 
other. The successive sheets could then be stapled 
together, with the first to be shown at the bottom 
of the stack. The stack was slightly out of the 
vertical when stapled together, so that individual 
sheets could be released in succession without the 
risk of releasing two at one time. 
A simple expedient was adopted to ensure that 
accurate directions and positions were produced for 
each aircraft, without putting any sort of construction 
lines on the final sheet. A common background was 
carefully drawn, and reproduced by offset. lithography, 
enough copies being made to provide one for each sweep 
of the radar screen. 
The standard shee t was 10··;inches by fifteen inches 
in size, this being the largest sheet which could be 
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reprnduced by offset lithography with the resources 
available. On the sheet were reproduced a diagrammatic 
Plan Position Indica~or. This took the form of 
a heavy ten-inch circle ll'.arked with degrees at ten-
degree intervals. On the screen were range rings 
at half inch intervals, with a heavier ring at 2t 
inches. A north marker line ran from the centre to 
the upper edge. The upper and lower ends of the north 
marker area were used as reference points. 
The initial and final positions of the two 
aircraft were plotted on a transparent sheet, oh 
which the two reference points were marked. The 
trails were then divided into twenty equal sections, 
using a nomogram. (Figure 18). Two springbow 
dividers were set to intervals of five sections, one 
corresponding to the rogue, the other to the controlled 
aircraft. 
The transparent overlay was then placed on one of 
the opaque sheets obtained by offset lithography. It 
was carefully lined up by means of the reference points. 
The diViders were used to prick through the transparent 
overlay, the initial positions and the ends of the trails. 
The circle surrounding the present position was then 
drawn. The trails were then shaded in freehand using 
red coloured pencil for the rogue, and blue for the 
controlled aircraft. 
This process was repeated for each of the 20 
sheets of the siMulation. The sheets were then stacked, 
with the initial position at the bottom. The stack 
was carefully aligned, then repeatedly flexed so that 
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successive sheets overlapped by about one-tenth of 
an inch. They were then stapled together in three 
places at the top. The number of the simulation was 
marked clearly on the back. (Figure 19 shows a 
typical simulation set). 
It was found in practice that these sets of 
sheets could be handled easily after a little practice, 
and that other tasks could be carried out at the same 
time. Figure 20 shows the experimental material in 
use. 
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Figur!U.!:! 
Method employed for the production of 
accurate paper simulations 
20 
Wlits 
5 
Wlits 
NCr.lOGRAM 
Transparent Overlay 
1. Draw initial and final 
positions of both 
aircraft on overlay. 
Join these and extend 
one quarter backwards 
-
4. Remove overlay. Draw 
small circles around 
heads of trails. Draw 
tangents from tail. 
Colour appropriately. 
Background Sheet 
2. Position nomogram under '--____________ --.l 
each trail. Prick through 
with fine point at each 
of 20 points on trail. 
Set spring-bow dividers 
to 5 Wlit length. (Set 
X for control, Y for 
rogue aircraft) 
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 
for remaining nineteen 
background sheets. 
6. Stack background sheets 
in order, face up, last 
posi tion on top. 
3. Position overlay exactly 
over stencilled background 
sheet, using North Marker 
line. Prick through with 
dividers, to give pin-point 
marks at start and end of 
trail. 
7. Bend pack, holding bottom 
fi rmly, to spread upper 
edge-. (repeat if necessary) 
8. Staple top edge. Release 
pack. Check order of sheets. 
Store pack in flat position. 
Do not fold or roll. 
140 
!!~~!:!U . .2 
A typical simulation set 
__ .' '5 H01 11 
~MMe 2D 
"' 
,. 
". 
-
, 
o 
... ," 
(as seen from above with last sheet released) 
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Experimental simulation in use 
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b) Experimental area and apparatus. 
The equipment used in this experiment was designed 
to be simple and portable, and the experimental area 
was specified as any r00m having space for two chairs, 
a table and a p0wer s0cket, being adequately lit, and 
free from distracting interrupti0ns. 
Three eXperimental r00ms were employed. At the 
Lond0n Air Traffic Control Centre, a small experimental 
room was provided in the Training Section. This room 
had one window, which provided light from behind the 
experimenter, but had no view to distract the observer. 
At R.A.F. Station Sopley, the station commander, 
Wing Commander R.D.S. Orchard, M.B.E., very kindly 
allowed the use of his office, which had no natural 
lighting, but was provided with suitable artificiAl 
lighting. At Loughborough University a small 
experimental sound-proofed room was used, This room 
had a window, which was behind the experimenter, but 
pr0vided a view of the sky only. 
In each case, the laY0ut of the experimental 
equipment was maintained constant as far as possible. 
The subject was seated at 0ne side of a desk or table, 
with the experimenter seated oPPosite him. Within 
the field of view of the experimenter was a Venner 
Digital Stopcl0ck, set to count seconds. This 
provided the experimenter with a cue on which to release 
the next sheet of the simulation, and provided a check 
on the timing of observers' comments, 
The resp0nses.0f the observer were recorded by 
means of a specially modified tape recorder, with which 
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was combined a timing device which was intended to 
print out the time at which each comment was made. 
In future experiments, it is recommended that 
a simple tape recorder without interrupt facilities 
should be used for any recording required, and that 
timing should be by any quiet running clock equipped 
to indicate seconds. The Venner stop-clock is 
particularly well suited to the situation, being 
completely silent, and having a digital display. 
It is on the other hand, rather heavy, and requires 
mains supply. If a battery-operated tape recorder 
were employed, in conjunction with a self contained 
clock, the entire apparatus could be mane independent 
of power requirements. 
Figure 21 shows the experimental arrangement 
used at Loughborough University of Technology. In 
order to provide a clear view for photography, the 
equipment has been moved into an open laboratory 
from the cubicle normally used. Note the Venner 
stop-clock to the left of the experimenter, and 
the tape recorder (extreme right). 
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Experimental. arrangement empl.oyed 
at Loughborough University 
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3. Experimental procedure. 
Observers were t~sted singly, each observer viewing 
sixteen simulations lasting 200 seconds each, with an 
initial practice run las~ing approximately one hou~ 
including briefing. 
Observers were briefed by the experimenter on 
arrival, and were allowed to ask any questions about 
the simulation. During this briefing the simulation 
method was explained to the observer, who was asked 
to report the various decisions later analysed. 
The observer was told how to report that the situation 
was safe or a conflict, that the rogue was passing 
ahead of nr behind the control and so on. Forms of 
briefing were slightly different for skilled 
nbservers and unskillen observers, the latter not 
being asked to report any manoeuvres recommended, 
but being told more about how the radar that was 
simulated was used. When the experimenter was 
satisfied that the observer was able to operate the 
equipment and understood what was'required of him, the 
observer was seated opposite the experimenter, and an 
initial practice simulation was run. Observers were 
told at the start of each simulation what the simulated 
velOCity and heading of the control aircraft were, and 
were given the name of the type of aircraft it represented. 
Observers recorded their comments by preSSing a 
small button which started the tape recorder motor 
running, and speaking into a hand-held microphone. 
After speaking they released the button, and the tape 
recorder stopped. The experimenter noted the time at 
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which each comment was made, and a verbal record 
was made by the observer of the start of each 
simulation. It was therefore easily possible to 
link up the comments made with the successive times 
recorded. 
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VII. PAPER SIMULATION EXPERIMENT - FINDINGS 
1. Transcription of experimental data. 
The use of a tape recorder which ran only when 
the observer made a comment enabled considerable 
economies to be made in stocks of recording tape and 
in subsequent transcription times. The times at 
which comments were noted on a prepared form during 
the experimental run, and the comments made by the 
observer were coded and filled in by subsequent 
reference to the tapes. In the later stages of 
the experiment, it was found possible to code comments 
as they were made. This was particularly the case for 
unskilled observers, who held more olosely to the 
reporting procedure than did skilled observers. (It 
is worth remarking that the difference was primarily 
due to the lack of other ways of reporting situations 
on the part of unskilled observers. Skilled observers 
tended to use terms such as "port" and "starboard", 
and to report positions by clock-face methods -
"Rogue passing at three miles, ten o'clock"). 
The timed responses were coded and transcribed 
onto I.B.M. cards. The responses were then classified 
in the manner described in the next section and 
analysed statistically. 
2. Classification of decisions. 
As in the electronic simulation experiment, four 
main types of decision were produced (see page 68 
Chapter V, Electronic Simulation Experiment, 
2. Classification of Decisions.) 
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These were:-
a) The first decision. 
b) The first correct conflict/safe decision. 
c) The first correct ahead/behind decision. 
d) The first correct judgement of separation. 
The same definitions of correctness were applied 
as were used in the electronic simulation experiment. 
For the first decision, three measures of 
correctness could be obtained by evaluating the 
deciSion in terms of the three criteria of correctness. 
These were:-
a) Is the situation a conflict or is it safe? 
b) Is the rogue aircraft passing ahead of or 
behind the controlled aircraft? 
c) Is the separation estimated to within three 
miles? 
For decisions b, c, and d listed above, the 
number of correct decisions was used as a measure of 
the overall performance of the observer. (The reader 
is referred to the example in Chapter V, Section 2 
page 71 ). 
It was thus possible to carry out ten separate 
analyses of variance, each based on sixteen readings 
from each of forty subjectR who observed the paper 
simulations. 
The primary purpose of the paper simulation was to 
provide data which could be compared directly with the 
appropriate portion of the electronic simulation 
experiment. Accordingly the corresponding readings 
for the electronic simulation experiment were extracted 
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for the same sixteen simulations. These were analysed 
simultaneously with the readings from the paper 
simulation, so that the analyses were based on the 
performances of sixty-se",;en observers who each watched 
sixteen simulations. These observers may be divided 
into four groups, not of equal size. 
a) Thirteen skilled observers saw electronic 
simulations. 
b) Fourteen unskilled observers saw electronic 
simulations. 
c) Twenty skilled observers saw paper simulat:i.ons • 
cl ) 
. : .~ •.. '.~ .. " .. ~.':::::. 
Twenty unskilled observers saw paper 
simulations. 
The total number of readings for each analysis 
could therefore be as many as 1024. 
It is statistically inconvenient that the groups 
are of different sizes, since this makes it impossible 
to carry out an orthogonal partition of the analysis 
of variance. It is possible to cope with this 
situation either by carrying out a least-squares 
fitting, which is laborious, and gives greater emphasis 
to the larger groups, or by carrying out an analysis 
on the unweighted means for each group in each simulation, 
for each type of simulation. This method gives an 
estimate of the significance of interactions which is 
not biased in favour of larger groups, and corresponds 
m0re to what we require in this case. Winer (1962) 
gives an adequate discussion of the methods available, 
although in this experiment, the analysis applied to 
150. 
unweighted means is more elaborate than that described 
by Winer. 
In the experiments here described, we are 
interested in the effectR observed as samples of 
population behaviour, rather than as effects in their 
own right, so that the differences observed between 
simulations and between groups of observers overall 
are more properly compared with the differences between 
subjects within groups than with the overall residual 
term. (In addition, this is pre~erable for measures 
of accuracy since in fact the measures employed are 
two-valued rather than continuous, so that the overall 
residual term is not a true estimate of error.) 
Where a term (such as S - the difference between 
simulations) is not significant compared with the 
residual, then the term should not be further sub-
divided, since the variations present are explained 
in terms of the estimated variation between subjects. 
Where a term is significant, it may be subdivided in 
the appropriate way to produce the effects of the 
specific factors varied in this experiment. Table 40 
in Section 1 of Chapter VI showed the four factors 
employed, with the sub-division of the last of these 
factors into three two-way contrasts. These contrasts 
are 'a priori' - determined before the experiment was 
carried out, and representing items of interest in 
themselves - rather than members of a population. 
(The passage of the rogue ahead or behind the control 
is a choice between exactlY two alternatives, rather 
than a choice of two of a number of alternatives). They 
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may therefore be compared directly with the residual 
term of the sub-division, and are shown in the 
appropriate partitioned form. In order to calculate 
the size of higher order terms, if these are to be 
partitioned, the earlier terms must also be partitioned, 
and the corresponding sums of squares are shown in 
the accompanying analyses. Where the main term is not 
significant no conclusions are drawn from the variance 
ratios observed. 
Figure 22 shows how the readings obtained for a 
single decision are divided up, and what proportion 
of the readings are common to the analyses of chapter V 
and this chapter. 
3. First decision 
The first decision is the first recognisable 
decision made by the controller, regardless of whether 
it is or is not correct. The three measures of 
accuracy employed refer to the percentage of these 
decisions which are correct in terms of the definitions 
given in the previous section. 
Table 49 is an ana~ysis of variance for the time 
at which the first decision is made, and Tables 50, 
51 and 52 are analyses of the accuracy of this decision 
in terms of the three criteria of accuracy. The 
Significant effects derived from these analyses are 
summarised in Table 42. 
Considering the differences between group means 
(Table 4~, Figure 23), we observe that skilled 
observers make their first decisions earlier than 
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nei!££~_gg 
Meshing of Paper and Electronic Simulation experiments 
Eleotronio Simulation Paper Simulation 
13 Skilled 
Observers 
14 Unskilled 
Observers 
20 Skilled 
Observers 
20 Unskilled 
Observers 
16 Simulations 
a.t level 4 
of factor 5 
16 Simulations 
at level 3 
of factor 5 
16 Sill7Ulations 
at level 2 
of factor 5 
16 Sill7Ulations 
at level 1 
of fa.otor 5 
Readings used in "Eleotronio Simula.tion" analyses : 
64 simulations form a Hyper-Greco-Latin Cube ( 6 factors at 
27 observers provide 1728 rea.dings 
Readings used in "Paper Simulat ion" analyses : 
4 levels ) 
16 simulations form a Greoo-Latin Square (4 faotors at 4 levels ) 
67 observers provide 1072 rea.dings 
Rea.dings oommon to both sets of analyses 
16 simula.tions a.t level 40f fa.ctor 5 of' "Electronic Simulation" 
27 observers provide 432 rea.dings 
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unskilled observers, the difference being about 17 
seconds on the average. (An aircraft travelling at 
600 m.p.h. travels about three miles in this time.) 
Similarly simulations pr€sented on paper simulations 
are resolved some 23 seconds earlier than corresponding 
simulations presented by the electronic simulator here 
employed (corresponding to 2 to 3 scans of the radar 
beam, or sheets of paper simulation). 
Considering the accuracy effects reported in the 
same table, we observe that there are no significant 
differences in the accuracy with which the situations 
are judged to be conflicts or safe, which was the main 
purpose of the experiment. There is a significantly 
poorer performance in the judgement of which aircraft 
will pass in front of the other on paper simulations, 
both for skilled and unskilled observers, In addition, 
skilled observers are worse at judging separation on 
the first decision on paper simulation than they are 
using electronic simulations. These latter results are 
probably ascribable to the emphasis placed on reporting 
whether the situation was a conflict or safe, and the 
greater willingness of skilled observers to report 
operationally important information in the more 
operationally relevant situation. These differential 
effects are considerably reduced when the overall 
accuracies are considered, and can be ascribed primarily 
to failure to make reports rather than to failure to 
judge the situation or misjudgements of the situation. 
Considering next the overall effects' of different 
simulations, it should be first emphasised that our 
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interest lies primarily in the nature of significant 
interactions and their causes, rather than in 
simulations themselves. The effects of the factors 
varied in this experiment must be large to be 
significant at all, and represent only a small 
proportion of the information available about the 
two aircraft conflict situations. Table 44 presents 
the mean time of first decision for each simulation 
for all observers, and Figure 24 presents these times 
on the vertical axis, with the separation of the air-
craft at the time of closest approach on the 
horizontal axis, this being the most important other 
parameter influencing performance. A study of 
Figure 24 suggests that the time to Tca is inversely 
proportional to the difference of the separation 
fro~ the critical 5 miles between conflicts and safe 
situations, marKed as a pair of vertical lines. A 
linear regression of the observed means on that 
separation has been carried out, and yields a correlation 
of 0.37 for a regression equation of Y = 127 +14.5x 
where Y is the difference of the separation from 5 
miles. We may transform this equation to obtain the 
W-shaped line shown in Figure 24. The correlation 
is not quite significant, which is only to be expected 
in view of the small number of available readings, 
and the existence of certain exceptional situations 
such as no 4. 
Considering next the differences between 
simulations in the proportion of correct conflict/safe 
deciSions, we note that there are significant effects 
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both of simulation type and of skill of observer 
(Table 45, Figures 25 and 26). In addition there is 
a significant overall effect of the passage of the 
rogue ahead of or behind the controlled aircraft, 
the accuracy being considerably greater when the 
rogue is passing behind the control. 
Considering the effects in terms of the separation 
at closest approach, we observe that there appears to 
be a certain asymmetry of the data; situations where 
the rogue passes ahead of the controlled aircraft 
being particularly poorly assessed. There seems to 
be a general tendency for the accuracy to fall off 
with increasing separation, and for unskilled observers 
to be better at assessing safe situations than conflict 
situations. This presumably reflects the skilled 
observers reluctance to iJlake a decision having possibly 
disastrous consequences rather than one causing only a 
minor diversion of traffic. 
Considering the differences between paper and 
electronic simulations, shown in Figure 26, we observe 
a tendency for paper simulations to be more accurate 
where the separation is low, while electronic 
simulations are more accurate at higher separations. 
ConSidering next the accuracy of the first decision 
in terms of the judgement of which aircraft is passing 
ahead of the other, we observe no Significant interaction 
terms, only the overall effect of differences between 
simulations. These differences seem to represent a 
decrease in accuracy as the separation decreases, as 
might be expected. (Table 47, Figure 27). 
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Finally considering the accuracy in terms of 
judgement of separation we observe a significant 
effect of simulations, and a significant difference 
between paper and electrcnic simulations. (Table 48, 
Figure 28). The significance of the difference 
between simulations is considerably less than that 
observed for the previous two measures of accuracy, 
and appears to correspond to a slight trend for the 
accuracy to be less in proportion to the extent that 
the rogue is passing ahead of the control. The 
differences between paper and electronic simulation 
are very marked, so much so that the difference for 
simulation no. 3 suggested that the data might have 
been accidentally inverted. A direct check on the 
original transcriptions of data verified that the 
majority of observers viewing this simulation on the 
radar screen considered it to be safe at first sight, 
while the majority of subjects viewing it on the paper 
simulation considered it a potential conflict. It is 
worth noting that the situations in which the rogue 
passes well ahead of the control are more often 
judged correctly for separation when seen on an 
electronic simulation, while those in which the rogue 
passes very close to the control seem to be better 
judged on a paper simulation. 
Considering differences between subjects within 
groups, we observe that unskilled observers viewing 
paper simulations are significantly more variable than 
any other group of observers, including skilled observers 
watching the same simulations. We also observe that 
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there are significant differences between individual 
observers compared with the overall residual, except 
for the accuracy of the conflict/safe judgement. The 
non-significant level he~e is probably due to the 
drift of the overall mean accuracy away from the 
central 50% level to the 71% level (Table 43 - top 
line) leading to a lack of homogeneity and increased 
residual variance. 
TABLE 42. 
First Decision - Significant Effects. 
Type of Effect 
Differences Between Groups 
Within Groups Variability 
Differences between Observers 
Compared with Residual Variation 
Differences between Simulations 
Factors within Simulations 
Interactions with Simulations 
Factors within Interactions 
Time to Tca 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Paper/ 
Electronic 
Unskilled 
Paper Vs 
All others 
Signif icant 
Overall 
Conflict/Safe 
Overall 
Rogue Ahead/ 
Behind 
Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
Paper/ 
Electronic 
Accuracy 
Ahead/Behind 
Paper/ 
Electronic 
Separation 
Skill/Simulation 
Interaction 
Sig~iricant Significant 
Overall Overall 
Paper/Electronit 
.... 
\Jl 
(JJ 
• 
TABLE 43. 
Firs t Decis ion - Mean Perfor~ance Within Gro~ 
Group of Observers Titre to Tca C onf lic t/Saf e A:Jcuracy 
Ahe OidZBenind 
Separation 
All Observers 164 sec 71% 48% 49% 
Skilled Observers 172 sec 72% 49% 44% 
Unskilled Observers 155 sec 69% 47% 54% 
Electronic Simulation 150 sec 69% 65% 54% 
Paper Simulation 173 sec 73% 36% 46% 
Skilled/Electronic 160 sec 71% 69% 59% ~ unsKille~Electronic 140 sec 67% 62~ 49% \J1 
Skilled Paper 181 sec 73% 36~ 34% \.!) • 
Unskilled Paper 165 sec 72% 36% 58% 
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TABLE 44. 
First Decision - Time to go to Tca. 
Mean ·performance for each simulation for skilled/ 
unskillea ana paper/electronic simulation. 
Simulation Mean 
1 180 
2 160 
3 229 
4 48 
5 121 
6 139 
7 146 
8 234 
9 168 
10 114 
11 105 
12 168 
13 177 
14 204 
15 256 
16 152 
161 
• 
TABLE 45. 
First Decision - Accurac in Terms 
of Conflict Sa e Decision 
Simulation Mean Skille d Unskilled Electronic Pal2er 
1 79 91 68 63 90 
2 90 91 88 85 93 
3 48 42 53 56 43 
4 73 70 76 70 75 
5 31 42 21 37 28 
6 72 73 71 81 65 
7 88 91 85 89 88 . 
8 78 76 79 48 98 
9 73 76 71 67 78 
10 99 97 100 96 100 
11 84 91 76 85 83 
12 72 55 88 67 75 
13 63 79 47 37 80 
14 54 61 47 67 45 
15 99 97 100 96 100 
16 36 30 41 56 23 
TABLE 46. 
First Decision - Effect of Rogue Passing Ahead/Behind on Conflict/Safe Accuracy 
Observers Rogue Passinliil Ahead Rogue Passing Behini Mean Difference 
All Observers 60% 82% 71% 22% 
Skilled OQservers 65% 80% 72% 15% 
Unskilled Observers 56% 83% 69% 27% 
Electronic Simulation 60% 77% 69% 17% 
Paper Simulation 61% 84% 73% 23% 
... 
Skilled/Electronic 65% 77% 71% 22% 0'1 I\) 
• 
Unskilled/Electronic 54% 79% 6.7% 25% 
Skilled/Paper 64% 83% 73% 19% 
Unskilled/Paper 57% 86% 72% 29% 
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TABLE 47. 
First Decision - Accuracy in Terms 
of Ahead/Behind Decision 
Simulation Mean Accuracy 
1 49% 
2 10% 
3 37% 
4 69% 
5 60% 
6 73% 
7 21% 
8 37% 
9 45% 
10 28% 
11 55% 
12 78% 
13 54% 
14 72% 
15 22% 
16 57% 
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TAIlLE 48. 
First Decision - Accuracl in Terms 
of Judgement of Separation 
Simulation Mean Electronic Paper Difference 
Simulation Simulation 
1 46% 30% 58% +28% 
2 57% 52% 60% + 8% 
3 36% 81% 5% -76% 
4 66% 63% 68% + 5% 
5 31% 30% 33% + 3% 
6 54% 63% 48% -15% 
7 49% 59% 43% -16% 
8 51% 22% 70% +48% 
9 31% 48% 20% -28% 
10 60% 59% 60% + 1% 
11 40% 41% 40% - 1% 
12 61% 74% 53% -21% 
13 43% 37% 48% +11% 
14 58% 67% 53% -14% 
15 75% 81% 70% -11% 
16 31% 52% 18% -34% 
ALL 49% 54% 46% 
- 8% 
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TABLE 42. 
Anal;tsis of Variance - Time of First Decision 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat. w.r.t. Sig 
Sg,uares ol' 139,. 
1 G=SkUled! 
75,799.3 13.356 36 *** Utlskilled 75,799.3 1 
2 T=Paper! 
Electronic 134,050.9 1 134,050.9 23.620 36 *** 
3 GT= Skull 
Type lA 1,046 •. -8 1 1,046.8 0.184 36 NS 
4 S=Simulations 
(1 - 16) 2,682,416.2 15 178,827.7 31.510 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 270,157.4 3 90,052.5 0.276 11 NS 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 882,294.8 3 293,804.2 0.902 11 NS 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 65,144.4 3 21,712.6 0.067 111 NS 
8 B=Rogue Ahead! 
Behind 471,426.1 1 471,426.1 1.447 11 NS 
9L=Rotn. of Line 
of Sight 13,646.0 1 13,646.0 0.042 11 NS 
10 l=lnitial Posn. 
of Rogue 2,084 .3 1 2,084.3 0.006 11 NS 
11 Residual Between 
Sirnns. 977,663.2 3 325,855.1 
12 GS=Skill/Simn.lA 21,995.7 15 1,467.1 0.259 36 NS 
13 GH-ski/Hdg. lA 872.4 3 290.8 0.220 19 NS 
14 GA=Ski!Ang. lA 882.7 3 294.2 0.222 19 NS 
15 GV=Ski/Spd. lA 11,855.6 3 3.951. 5 2.987 19 NS 
16 GB=Ski/Psg. lA 184.9 1 184.9 0.140 19 NS 
17 GL=Ski/Rot. lA 625.4 1 625.5 0.473 19 NS 
18 GI=Ski!Pos. lA 3,605.5 1 3,605.5 2.725 19 NS 
19 Residual of GS 3,969.0 3 1,322.~9 
20 TS= Type!Simn. lA 57.191.3 15 3,814-.7 0.672 36 NS 
21 TH-Typ/Hdg. IA 14,812.2 3 4, 936. 9 0.895 27 NS 
22 TA=TY%Ang. lA 4,868.8 3 1,622.8 0.294 27 NS 
23TV=Typ Spd. lA 7,891.3 3 2,630.2 0.477 27 NS 
24 TB=Typ/psg. lA 7,319.2 1 7,319.2 1.327 27 NS 
25 TL=Tytl/Rot. lA 121.4 1 121.4 0.022 27 NS 
26 TI=Typ!Pos. lA 5,629.8 1 5,629.8 1.021 27 NS 
27 Residual of TS 16,548.6 3 5,515.6 
28.GTS=Ski!Type!Simn.lA24,552~5 15 1,637.6 0.289 36 NS 
29 GTH-ski/TYllfij!1i.IA 1,589.9 3 553.2 0.625 35 NS 
30 GTA=Ski/Typ!Ang.lA 3,036.0 3 1,012.0 1.123 35 NS 
31 GTV=Ski/Typ/Spd.IA 7,299.0 3 2,433.0 2.699 35 NS 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ/Psg.IA 1,269.5 1 1,269.5 1.408 35 NS 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot. lA 7,421.5 1 7,421.5 8.232 35 NS 
34 GTI=Ski!Typ!Pos.lA 1,132.0 1 1,132.0 1.256 35 NS 
35 Residual of GTS 2,704.6 3 901.4 
35 Between Subjects 357,543.9 53 5,675.3 7. 991 37 *** 37 Within GTS Res. 660,472.6 930 710.2 
38 rOTALrSmf OF 
SQUARES 4,015,269.2 1056 
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TABLE 50. 
Analysis of Variance 
No.of Correc~ Ini~ial ~onrIic~ZSafe Decisions. 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t. ~. 
Sg,uares or Sq. 
1 G==Skilled/ 
36 Unskilled 2,721.9 1 2,721.9 1.53 NS 
2 T==Paper/ 
Electronic 3,468.5 1 3,468.5 1.95 36 NS 
3 GT=Skill/Type IA 487.0 1 487.0 0.27 36 NS 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 364,278.5 15 24,318.6 13.70 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 31,783.3 3 10,594~1 1.43 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 90,480.3 3 30,160.1 4.07 
7 V=Speed of 
Clasing 59,187.6 3 19,729. 2 2.67 
8 B==Rague Ahead/ 
Behind 111,355.6 1 111,355.6 15.04 * 
9 L=Rotn. of Line 
of Sight 4,778.6 1 4,778.6 0.64 
10 l=Initial poen. 
of Rogue 44,986.0 1 44,986.0 6.08 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 22,207.0 3 7,402.3 
12 GS=Skill/Simn. lA 60,813.9 15 4,054.3 2.28 36 ** 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg lA 7,449.3 3 2,483.1 0.42 
14 GA=Ski!Ang IA 2,732.2 3 910.8 0.15 
15 GV==Ski!Spd IA 15,537.1 3 5,179.0 0.88 
16 GB=Ski!Psg IA 9,142.3 1 9,142.3 1.55 
17 GL=Ski!Rot IA 2,764.0 1 2,764.0 0.47 
18 Gl=Ski!Pos IA 5,438.0 1 5,438.0 0.91 
19 Residual of GS 17,751.0 3 17,751.0 
20 TS==Type/Simn lA 115,824.6 15 7,721.6 4.35 36 tt* 
21 TH==Typ!Hdg lA 12,608.1 3 4,202.7 0.27 
22 TA==Typ!Ang IA 37,887.5 3 12,629.1 0.80 
23 TV==Typ!Spd lA 8,868.6 3 2,956.2 0.19 
24 TB==Typ!Psg IA 2,262.1 1 2,262.1 0.14 
25 TL=Typ!Rot IA 1.2 1 1.2 0.00 
26 TI=Typ!Pos IA 6,671.5 1 6,671.5 0.42 
27 Residual of TS 47,525.3 3 15,841.7 
28 GTS=Skill/Type/Simn. 
IA 3°1 457 •6 15 2 1 030.5 1.14 36 NS 29 GTH-Ski/Typ/Hdg IA 5,099.0 3 1,699.8 14.46 35 * 30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang IA 12,910.4 3 4,303.4 36.62 35 ** 
31 GTV==Ski!Typ!Spd IA 8,881.5 3 2,960.5 25.19 35 * 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg IA 228.2 1 228.2 0.24 35 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot IA 766.9 1 766.9 6.52 35 
34 GTl=Ski!Typ!Pos IA 1,129.9 1 1,129.9 9.61 35 
35 Residual of GTS 352.5 3 117.5 
36 Between Subjects IA 111,869. 5 63 1,775.7 1.141 37 NS 
37 Within GTS RES. 1147°1218.4 945 1 1555.8 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 2,160,639.9 
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TABLE 51. 
Anal sia of Variance 
No.of Correct ni ia ea Be ~nd Decisions. 
Snurce of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t.~. 
S~uares of Sq. 
1 G=Skilled! 
Unskilled 2,880.7 1 2,880.7 0.41 36 NS 
2 T=Paper! 
Electronic 218,927.2 1 218;927.2 30.94 36 *** 3 GT=Skill!Type lA 2,880.7 1 2,880.7 0.41 36 NS 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 395,529.5 15 26,381.8 3.73 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 21,820.7 3 7,272.8 0.499 11 NS 
6A=Angle of 
Approach 101,728.9 3 33,906.2 2.328 11 NS 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 46,401.4 3 15,465.6 1.062 11 NS 
8B=Rogue Ahead! 
Behind 6,793.5 1 6,793.5 0.466 11 NB 
9 L=Rotn. of Line 
of Sight 74,722.2 1 74,722.2 5.129 11 NS 
10 l=lnitial posn. of 
Rogue 100,360.4 1 100,360.4 6.889 11 NS 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 43,702.5 3 14,566.0 
12 GS=Skill!Simn. lA 39,699.0 15 2,647.9 0.37 36 NS 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg lA 15,450.1 3 5,149.5 2.70 19 NS 
14 GA=Ski!Ang lA 3,484.8 3 1,161.5 0.61 19 NS 
15 GV=Ski!Spd [A 9,803.1 3 3,267.4 1.71 19 NS 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 4.6 1 4.6 0.00 19 NS 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 4,702.8 1 4,702.8 2.46 19 NS 
18 GI=Ski!Pos lA 521.0 1 521.0 0.27 19 NS 
19 Residual of GS 5,732.5 3 1,910.6 
20 TS=Type!Simn lA 145,700.7 15 9,718.2 1.37 36 NS 
21 TH=Typ!Hdg lA 40,554.4 3 13,516.8 4.75 27 NS 
22 TA=Typ!Ang lA 13,909.3 3 4,636.0 1.63 27 NS 
23 TV=Typ!Spd lA 8,507.3 3 2,835.5 1.00 27 NS 
24 TB=Typ!Psg. lA 33,394.2 1 33,394.2 11.73 27 * 25 TL=Typ!Rot lA 6,054.0 1 6.054.0 2.12 27 NS 
26 Tl=Typ!Pos lA 34,735.5 1 34,735.5 12.20 27 * 27 Residual of TS 8,544.4 3 2,848.1 
28 GTS=Skill/Type Simn 
lA 58:994.3 15 3:~33.0 0.55 36 NS 29 GTH-Ski/Typ/Hdg lA 4,620.7 3 1, 40. 1 0.47 35 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang lA 31,006.4 3 10,334.4 3.13 35 
31 GTV=Ski!Typ!Spd lA 8,514.6 3 2,837.9 0.86 35 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg lA 3,888.3 1 3,888.3 1.18 35 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot lA 2.7 1 2.7 0.00 35 
34 GTl=Ski!Typ!Pos lA 1,079.7 1 1,079.7 G.33 35 
35 Residual of GTS 9:881.9 3 3: 293.7 
36 Between SubJects 445.830.4 63 7,016.7 4. 96 31 *** 37 Within GTS Res. 1:347 1037.8 945 1:425.4 • 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 2,657,480.3 1071 
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TABLE 52. 
Anal~sis of Variance 
No.of Correct Initial Jua~ements of SeEaration. 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t.Sig. 
S!luares oI' Sg,. 
1 G=Skilled/ 
2.36 36 Unskilled 11 ,905.1 1 11 ,905.1 
2 T=Paper/ 
Electronic 14;435.3 1 14,435.3 2;86 36 
3 GT = Ski ll/Type IA 76,821.1 1 76,821.1 15,21 36 *** 
4 S=Simns. (1-16 ) 154,895.8 15 10,331.6 2.05 36 * 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 16? 922.1 3 5,640.2 0.48 11 NS 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 37,143.1 3 12,379.8 1.06 11 NS 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 29,464.3 3 9,820.4 0.84 11 NS 
8 B=Rogue Ahead/ 
Behind 20,801.4 1 20,801.4 1.78 11 NS 
9 L=Rotn of Line 
of Sight 14,507.7 1 14,507.7 1.24 11 NS 
10 I=Initial posn. 
of Rogue 890.9 1 890.9 0.08 11 NS 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 35,166.3 3 11,722.1 
12 GS=Skill/Simn. IA 79,145.2 15 5,276.4 1.04 36 NS 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg IA 8,836.2 3 2;945.4 0.97 19 NS 
14 GA=Ski!Ang IA 37,158.8 3 12,386.3 4.08 19 NS 
15 GV=Ski!Spd IA 5,364.1 3 1,788.0 0.59 19 NS 
16 GB=Ski!Psg IA 7,610.5 1 7,610.5 2.50 19 NS 
17 GL=Ski/Rot IA 10,835.6 1 10,835.6 3.57 19 NS 
18 GI=Ski!Pos IA 222.0 1 222.0 0.08 19 NS 
19 Residual of GS 9,117.9 3 3,039.3 
20 TS=Type/Simn. IA 185,516.5 15 12,368.4 2.45 36 ** 
21 TH=Typ!Hdg IA 2,529.7 3 843.1 0.05 27 NS 
22 TA=Typ!Ang IA 86,312.1 3 28,767.8 1.77 27 NS 
23 TV=Typ!Spd IA 28,287.6 39,461.6 0.58 27 NS 
24 TB=Typ!Psg IA 17,341.0 1 17 , 341. 0 0.12 27 NS 
25 TL=Typ!Rot IA 2,033.9 1 2,033.9 0.00 27 NS 
26 TI=Typ/Pos IA 22.7 1 22.7 
27 Residual of TS 48,889.4 3 16,296.4 
28 GTS-Skill/Type/Simn 
IA 63 2208.5 15 4 1 213.9 0.83 36 NS 29 GTH=Ski/Typ/Hdg lA 4,419.6 3 1.473.1 0.33 35 NS 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang IA 22,802.6 3 7,600.1 1.70 35 NS 
31 GTV=Ski!Typ!Spd IA 2,195.7 3 731.8 0.16 35 NS 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg IA 792.0 1 792.0 0.18 35 NS 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot IA 5,110.3 1 5,110.3 1.14 35 NS 
34 GTI=Ski!Typ!Pos IA 14,459.4 1 14,459.4 3.23 35 NS 
35 Residual of GTS 13 1428.9 3 4 z476.3 -36 Between Subjects 318,211.2 6; 5,051.0 2.71 ;7 *** 37 Within GTS RES. 1 1724 1563.5 945 1 1824.9 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 2,628,702.2 1071 
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4. First correct conflict/safe decision. 
The first correct conflict/safe de«ision is the 
first decision which states correctly whether the 
situation will be safe or a conflict. The standard of 
safety employed is the rule that:-
"A situation is a conflict if at any time the 
two aircraft will be within five miles of each other." 
The measure of accuracy here employed is the number 
of occasions on which a correct decision was made 
during the course of a trial, compared with the total 
number of occasions as described in chapter V, section 
2. 
Table 58 is an analysis of variance for the first 
correct conflict/safe decision in terms of the time to 
go to the time of closest approach, and Table 59 is 
an analysis of variance for the number of decisions 
made, expressed as a percentage. 
Table 53 is a summary of the significant effects 
deduced from these two analyses of variance. 
Considering the differences between group means 
(Table 54) we observe that skilled observers make their 
first correct conflict/safe decision earlier than 
unskilled observers by some 22 seconds, equivalent to 
two sweeps of the radar scan. In addition, paper 
simulations are decided earlier than electronic 
simulations by exactly the same amount. There is no 
significant interaction between skill and simulation 
type, as far as time to Tca is concerned. There is 
only one significant accuracy effect - paper simulation 
is more accurate than electronic simulation by about 
6%. This difference is significant only at the 5% level, 
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all other differences so far being significant at 
the .1% level. 
Considering next the overall differences between 
simulations, and rememb3ring that the differences 
we observe in this experiment are based on only 
sixteen simulatione, we observe that the time at 
which the first correct conflict/safe decision is 
made appears to depend on the direction of rotation 
of the line of sight, and the initial position of the 
rogue (Table 56). If these mean times are plotted 
against separation, (Figure 29), it will be observed 
that there are four simulations,Nos. 4, 7, 10 and 11 
which aTe reported particularly late. These are all, 
except no.4, situations with level 4 of the original 
fourth factor, (rogue passing behind, line of 
sight rotating anti-clockwise and rogue initially on 
right). Sit~ation no. 4 was an exceptional situation 
in which the aircraft started very close to the point 
of closest approach. It is not, however, possible to 
obtain a significant regression effect for the time to 
Tca in terms of the aircraft separation. The 
percentage of correct decisions for each simulation 
is given in Table 57, and observation suggests that 
the accuracy of this judgement can be expressed in 
terms of the number of miles separation at Tea, 
(Figure 30), a different constant being required for 
rogues passing ahead or astern. A regression analysis 
confirms this suggestion, providing a formula of 
the form 
Accuracy (%) = 91.4 - 4.8 Smin (Rogue ahead) 
= 91.4 - 1.0 Smin (Rogue astern) 
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In other words, the accuracy of judgement of whether or 
not the situation would be conflict was between 80 and 
100 percent when the rogue passed astern, but dropped 
off to about 68% when the rogue passed well ahead of the 
control. There are plausible reasons why this should be 
so. These are covered in more detail in chapter 9 -
Conclusions. 
There are certain significant differences between 
skilled and unskilled observers in terms of time to go 
to Tca (Figure 31). These are apparently of the form 
that skilled observers make their correct judgements 
earlier than unskilled observers to a significantly 
greater extent when the rogue is passing ahead of the 
control - that is to say, in just the si tuations~'when 
the percentage of correct judgements falls off most. 
There are significant differences between simulations 
in the times to go to Tca, according to whether the 
situations are presented on paper or electronic simulations 
(Figure 32). These differences appear to be greater for 
the cases where the rogue is passing ahead of the control, 
and suggest that the difference in the means remarked 
earlier is primarily due to these situations. 
There are no significant differences betwee~ 
simulations in the accuracy with which situations are 
judged between groups of observers or between simulation 
types. 
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TABLE 53. 
First Correct Conflict!Safe Decision. 
Type of Effect 
Differences between 
groups. 
Within groups 
variability. 
Observers!Residual. 
Differences between 
simulati ons. 
Factors within 
simulations. 
Interactions within 
simulations. 
Factors \Vi thin 
interactions. 
Time to Tca 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
Paper! 
Electronic 
Significant 
Significant 
Rotation 
line of 
sight 
Initial 
poai tion 
rogue 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
of 
of 
Paper! 
Electronic 
Accuracy 
Paper! 
Electronic 
Significant 
Significant 
176. 
TABLE 54. 
First Correct Conflic1/Safe Decision -
Mean Performance within Groups 
Group of Observers 
All Observers 
Skilled Observers 
Unskilled Observers 
Electronic Simulations 
Paper Simulations 
Skilled/Electronic 
Unskilled/Electronic 
Skilled/Paper 
Unskilled/Paper 
Time to Tca 
150 sec. 
161 sec. 
139 sec. 
139 sec. 
161 sec. 
150 sec. 
129 sec. 
172 sec. 
150 sec. 
Accuracy 
80% 
80% 
81% 
78% 
83% 
79% 
77% 
82% 
85% 
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TABLE 55. 
First Correct Conflict/Safe Decision - Time to Tca. 
Mean Performance for each Simulation 
Simulation Mean Skilled Unskilled Electronic faper (sea.) (sec) (sec.) (sec. ) sec.) 
1 168 179 157 139 196 
2 173 184 163 168 179 
3 202 198 207 192 213 
4 41 57 25 15 67 
5 73 103 44 76 71 
6 129 133 125 141 118 
7 141 151 130 135 146 
8 209 214 204 183 233 
9 171 183 160 156 187 
10 113 119 107 111 115 
11 102 112 91 96 107 
12 149 144 154 134 165 
13 164 173 155 149 179 
14 191 217 166 184 198 
15 254 262 246 245 263 
16 123 151 95 108 138 
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TABLE 56. 
Effects of Nature of Miss on Time to Tca. 
Mean Skille d Unskilled Electronic faper (sec'") (sec. ) (sec. ) (sec. ) sec. ) 
Ro~ue 
I!assin/li 
aFieaa. 168 183 154 156 180 
R0l:\:ue 
tassing 
-enina. 132 1,39 125 123 142 
Rotation 
of L. o. S. 
CL:mlmvise 152 164 141 142 163 
A/C'laukwise 148 158 138 137 159 
Roe:;ue 
initially on: 
Left 152 166 138 146 159 
Right 148 156 140 133 164 
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TABLE 57. 
First Correct Conflict/Safe De~ision -
Percentage of Correct Decisions. 
Mean performance for each simulation. 
Simulation Mean 
1 86 
2 96 
3 62 
4 77 
5 68 
6 85 
7 95 
8 84 
9 76 
10 100 
11 85 
12 86 
13 67 
14 66 
15 100 
16 53 
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TABLE 58. 
Anal sis of Variance 
First Correct Con lC a e Decislon Time to Tca. 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t.Sig. 
Squares of Sq. -., 
1 G=Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
2 T=Paper/ 
Electronic 
3 GT=Skill/Type lA 
89,057.2 1 89,057.23 19.643 36 *** 
89,057.2 1 89,057.23 19.643 36 *** 
75.0 1 75.00 0.01 36 NS 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 2,002,562.9 15 133,504.1 29.447 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 161,217.2 353,739,0 0.204 11 NS 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 732,643.8 3 244,214.6 0.927 11 NS 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 66,456.9 3 22,152.2 0.084 11 NS 
8 B=Rogue Ahead/ 
Behind 245,038.5 1 245,038.5 0.930 11 NS 
9 L=Roj;n of Line 
of Sight 3,253.5 1 3,253.5 0.612 11 NS 
10 l=lnitial posn. 
of Rogue 3,234.1 1 3,234.1 0.012 11 NS 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 790,718.8 3 263,572.9 
12 GS=Skill/Simn. lA 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg lA 
14 GA=Ski!Ang lA 
15 GV=Ski!Spd lA 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 
18 Gl=Ski!Pos lA 
19 Residual of GS 
20 TS=Type/Simn lA 
21 TH=Typ!HClg lA 
22 TA=Typ!Ang lA 
23 TV=Typ!SpCl lA 
24 TB=Typ!Psg lA 
25TD=Typ!~Ot lA 
26 TI=Typ/Pos lA 
27 Residual of TS 
28 GTS=Skill/Type/Simn. 
lA 
29 GTH-Ski/Typ/Hdg fA 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang lA 
31 GTV=Ski!Typ!Spd lA 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg lA 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot lA 
34 GTl=Ski!Typ/Pos lA 
35 ResiClual of GTS 
36 Between Subjects 
37 Overall ResiClual 
67,839.4 15 
12,133.4 3 
12,341.9 3 
14,735.0 3 
11 ,005.5 1 
581.0 1 
6,913.8 1 
10,128.7 3 
78,910.6 15 
7;466.3 3 
15,250.2 3 
20;835.8 3 
1,845.71 
33.2 1 
17,031.5 1 
16,448.0 3 
37,609.7 15 
285,622.6 b5 
894,682.4 741 
38 TarAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 3,545,417.0 867 
4,522.6 
4,044.4 
4,113.9 
4;911.6 
11,005.5 
581.0 
6;913.8 
3,376.2 
2;488.7 
5,083.4 
6;945.2 
1,845.7 
. 33.2 
17,031.5 
5,482.6 
2,425.5 
1,091.1 
865.1 
951.4 
14,259.3 
4,515.0 
4,738.2 
4,533.69 
1,207.40 
0.9975 
1.198 
1.219 
1.455 
3.260 
0.172 
2.048 
11 NS 
19 NS 
19 NS 
19 NS 
19 NS 
19 NS 
19 NS 
1.1603 36 NS 
0.454 
0.927 
1.267 
0.337 
0.006 
3.106 
0.533 
1.536 
0; 691 
0.548 
0.602 
9.028 
2.859 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
36 NS 
35 Ns 
35 NS 
35 NS 
35 NS 
35 NS 
35 NS 
3. 74549 37 *** 
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TABLE 59 
Ana~ sis of Variance 
First Conflict afe Decision - umber of Decisions. 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t.Sig. 
Sg,uares of Sq. 
1 G=Skilled/ 
Unskilled 78.0 1 78.0 0.060 36 
2 T=Paper/ 
Electronic 7,446.6 1 7,446.6 5.733 36 * 3 GT=Skill/Type lA 1,709.1 1 1,709.1 1 ,316 36 
4 S=Simns. (1-16 ) 190,123.3 15 12,681.2 9.763 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 12,677.2 3 4,225.3 1.837 11 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 42,662.2 3 14,219.3 6.182 11 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 32,193.6 3 10,730.1 4.665 11 
8 B=Rogue Ahead/ 
Between 65,778.5 1 65,778.5 28.596 11 * 9 L=Rotn of Line 
of Sight 20.4 1 20.4 0.009 11 
10 I=Initial posn. of 
Rogue 29,890,5 1 29,890.5 12.994 11 * 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 62 900.8 3 2z300.0 1~ GS-SkiII7Simn. IA 41,4~8.4 15 ~,7b;.) 2. , 2'7 ;b 1(: 
13 GH=Ski/Hdg lA 5,470.1 3 1,823.2 0.302 19 
14 GA=Ski!Ang IA 12,739.2 3 4,246.0 0.702 19 
15 GV=Ski!Spd lA 888.4 3 296.1 0.049 19 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 7.9 1 7.9 0.001 19 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 924.4 1 924.4 0.153 19 
18 GI=Ski!Pos lA 3,259.8 1 3,259.8 0.539 19 
19 Residual of GS 18,138.7 3 6,046.2 
20 TS=Type/Simn lA 98,927.4 15 6,598.5 5.080 36 *** 
21 TH=Typ/Hdg lA 11,452.9 3 3,817.3 0.217 27 
22 TA=Typ/Ang IA 15,280.1 3 5,092.9 0.289 27 
23 TV=Typ!Spd IA 17,012.5 3 5,670.3 0.322 27 
24 TB=Typ!Psg lA 1 ,191.5 1 1,191.5 0.068 27 
25 TL=Typ/Rot IA 604.4 1 604.4 0.034 27 
26 TI=Typ!Pos lA 500.7 1 500.7 0.028 
27 Residual of TS 52,885.4 3 17 z626.7 28 GTS-SkiII/Type/Simn 
lA 25 1604.9 15 1 1707.8 1.315 36 NS 29GTH-Ski/Typ/Hdg lA 5,458.0 3 1,819.1 1.0b6 35 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang lA 8,949.4 3 2,982.8 1.749 35 
31 GTV=Ski!Typ/Spd lA 4,676.2 3 1,558.6 0.914 35 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ/Psg lA 1,393.3 1 1,393.3 0.817 35 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot lA 0.1 1 0.1 0.000 35 
34 GTI=Ski!Typ/Pos lA 9.7 1 9.7 0.006 35 
35 Residual of GTS 5 1118.2 3 1z705.9 36 Between Subjects 83,129.4 64 1,298.9 1.937 37 * 37 Within GTS. Res. 630 1 900.4 941 670.5 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUilRES '5 , <DT9 , 347. 5 1071 
• 
I 
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5. First correct ahead/behind decision. 
The first correct ahead/behind decision is the first 
decision indicating correctly which aircraft is passing 
ahead of the other. In practice this decision was 
often not made, or given in the form of 'collision', 
where the observer could not distinguish between the 
possibilities, although he was able to judge that the 
situation was not safe. 
Table 64 is an analysis of variance for the time to 
Tca at which the decision was made, and Table 65 is an 
analysis of variance for the percentage of occasions 
on which the decision was made. Table 60 summarises 
the significant effects present in these two tables. 
Considering first the significant differences 
between group means, presented in Table 61, we observe 
that skilled observers make this decisionosome 24 
seconds before unskilled observers, a figure corresponding 
closely to that observed for the previous type of 
correct decision, and to that for the first decision. 
We observe also that there is a significantly higher 
percentage of decisions made if the simulation is seen 
on an electronic simulator, than if it is seen on a 
paper simulation, the difference being some 11%. 
We observe that there are significant differences 
between simulations in terms of time to go to Tca, 
(Table 62, Figure 33), although these differences cannot 
be linked to any of the factors varied within the 
experiment. The differences appear to resemble those 
observed for the first deciSion, with the situations 
in which the rogue passes relatively close behind the 
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control being decided rather later. The differences 
between simulations in time to Tca are not affected by 
the skill of the observers or by the simulation type. 
The accuracy measure is significantly different 
between simulations - as might be expected, (Table 63, 
Figure 34) - and correlates strongly with the absolute 
value of the separation (r = 0.7). The prediction 
equation for the mean accuracy is 
AccuracYa/ b = 49.4 + 61SminJ 
This expression would require that the accuracy should 
reach 100% at a separation of about eight miles. 
(The general form of the data suggests an asymptotic 
relationship, the accuracy tending exponentially to 
100%). There are significant differences between paper 
and electronic simulations in the accuracy of this 
decision. In general these tend to be greatest in the 
region of minimum separation less than three miles, 
although there is one anomalous situation (No. 3 -
separation 5.6 miles) which was correctly estimated on 
electronic simulation nine times out of ten, and 
incorrectly estimated on paper simulation nine times 
out of ten. The differences do not yield any systematic 
regression expression. 
There appear to be no further significant effects 
for the first correct ahead/behind decision. 
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TABLE 60. 
First Correct Ahead!Behind Decision. 
Type of Effect 
Difference between 
groups. 
Within groups 
variability. 
Observers! 
Residual. 
Differences between 
simulaiions. 
Factors within 
simulations. 
Interactions within 
simulaiions. 
Factors within 
interacti ons. 
Time to Tca 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
Significant 
Significant 
Percentage of 
Correct Decisions 
Paper! 
Electronic 
Significant 
Significant 
Paper! 
Electronic 
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TABLE 61. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision -
Mean Performance Within Groups. 
Group of Observers Time to Tca Accuracy 
All Observers 
Skil13d Observers 
Unskilled Observers 
Electronic Simulation 
Paper Simulation 
Skilled/Electronic 
Unskilled/Electronic 
Ski lled/Paper 
Unskilled/Paper 
137 sec. 
149 sec. 
125 sec. 
136 sec. 
139 Sec. 
145 sec. 
127 sec. 
153 sec. 
124 sec. 
72% 
72% 
72% 
77% 
66% 
78% 
76% 
65% 
67% 
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TABLE 62. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision - Time to Tea. 
Mean Performance for Each Simulation. 
Simulation Mean (sec:") 
1 158 
2 145 
3 218 
4 35 
5 96 
6 132 
7 65 
8 209 
9 141 
10 78 
11 89 
12 156 
13 149 
14 189 
15 211 
16 124 
189. 
TABLE 63. 
First Correct Ahead/Behind Decision -
Percentage of Correct Decisions 
Mean Performance for Each Simulation 
Simulation Mean Electronic 
1 69% 92% 
2 20% 12% 
3 50% 89% 
4 88% 78% 
5 94% 93% 
6 90% 85% 
7 59% 66% 
8 50% 77% 
9 81% 74% 
10 65% 59% 
11 84% 81% 
12 94% 93% 
13 77% 82% 
14 90% 89% 
15 43% 63% 
16 92% 96% 
Paper 
45% 
28% 
10% 
98% 
95% 
95% 
53% 
25% 
88% 
70% 
88% 
95% 
73% 
90% 
23% 
88% 
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TABLE 64. 
Anal~sis of Variance 
Time to Tca Ahead/Behind Decision. 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t. Sig. 
1 G=Skilled! 
Unskilled 
2 T= Paper! 
Electronic 
3 GT~Skill!Type lA 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 
5 H=Head ing of 
Control 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 
8 B=Rogue Ahead! 
Behind 
9 L=Ro':;n of Line 
o:r Sight 
10 l=lni";'j;o;.l posn. 
of :~~ogue 
11 Resj.r\ :;:)', Between 
Squares of Sq. 
83,753.8 1 
1 ,234.0 1 
5,049.6 1 
1,660,749.8 15 
83,753.8 13.079 36 
1,234.0 0.193 36 
5,049.6 0.789 36 
110,772.0 17.290 36 
159,589.7 3 53,191.2 0.310 11 
489,197.2 3 163,049.4 0.951 11 
49,568.2 3 16,521.1 0.096 11 
334,794.0 1 334,794.0 1,952 11 
47,423.2 1 47,423.2 0.276 11 
65,611.1 1 65,611.1 0.383 11 
514,566.5 3 171,505.0 
*** 
*** 
--_ .... _._--------------------
12 Gs=S\j.Jl/Simn. lA 45,466.7 15 3,032.6 0.474 36 NS 
--,---~-.--------------------------
13 GH=Ski!Hdg lA 
14 GA=Ski!Ang lA 
15 GV=Ski!Spd lA 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 
18 Gl=Ski!Pos lA 
19 Residual of GS 
20 TS=Type!Simn lA 
21 TH=Type!Hdg lA 
22 TA=Typ!Ang lA 
23 TV=Typ!Spd lA 
24 TB=Typ!psg lA 
25 TL=Tyti!Rot lA 
26 Tl=Typ!Pos lA 
27 Residual of TS 
28 GTS-Skill/Type! 
Simn lA 
2 G H= ki Typ H g I 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang lA 
31 GTV=Ski!Typ!Spd lA 
32 f .GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg lA 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot lA 
34 GTl=Ski!Typ!Pos lA 
35 Residual of GTS 
36 Between Subjects 
37 Within GTS RES. 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 
14,337.0 
4,407.9 
17,777.~ 
479.7 
3,469.8 
673.7 
4,321.6 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
62,313.0 15 
15,858.6 3 
7,467.8 3 
6,503.4 3 
2.0 1 
28.2 1 
2,207.0 1 
30,245.9 3 
403,434.5 63 
789,273.0 639 
3,137,814.5 765 
4,778.0 
1,469.1 
5,925.1 
479.7 
3,469.8 
673.7 
1,440.4 
3.317 19 
1.020 19 
4.113 19 
0.333 19 
2.409 19 
0.468 19 
4,156.3 0.649 36 
5,285.7 
2,489.0 
2,167.8 
2.0 
28.2 
2,207.0 
10,080.9 
0.524 27 
0.247 27 
0.215 27 
0.000 27 
0.003 27 
0.219 27 
0.901 
• 9 
4.566 35 
4.075 35 
0.324 35 
0.063 35 
0.000 35 
5.184 37 
NS 
NS 
*** 
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TABLE 65. 
Percenta~e 
Anal~sis of Variance 
Accuracl - ~irst AneaOLBehind Decision 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t. Sig. 
Sguares - of Sq. 
1 G=Skilled/ 
36 Unskilled .(£7 1 "; 6'7 0.018 NS I • " 
2 T=Paper/ 
36 Electronic 30,3;:J4.g 1 30,324.95 8.09 ** 3 GT=Skill/Type lA 995.4 1 995.41 0.26 36 NS 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 487,554.2 15 32,519.86 8.680 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 22,961.0 3 7,652.90 0.357 11 NS 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 252,125.7 3 84,303.49 3.921 11 NS 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 
8 B=Rogue Ahead/ 
61,039.0 3 20,344.31 0.949 11 NS 
Behind 7,833.0 1 7,833.02 0.365 11 NS 
9 L=Rotn of Line 
of Sight 55,653.2 1 55,653.20 2.597 11 NS 
10 I=Initial posn. 
of Rogue 23,640.8 1 23,640.88 1.103 11 NS 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 64,301.3 3 21,431.65 
12 GS=Skill/Simn. lA 47,180.7 15 3,146.95 0.840 36 NS 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg lA 4,120.0 3 1,373.22 0.323 19 NS 
14 GA=Ski!Ang lA 17.918.0 3 5,972.08 1.406 19 NS 
15 GV=Ski!Spd lA 8,154.1 3 2,717.76 0.640 19 NS 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 776.3 1 776.31 0.183 19 NS 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 2,892.1 1 2,892.15 0.681 19 NS 
18 GI=Ski!Pos lA 579.4 1 579.48 0.136 19 NS 
19 Residual of GS 12,740.5 3 4,246.43 
20 TS=Type/Simn lA 209,706.3 15 13,987.41 3.733 36 *** 
21 TH=Typ!Hdg lA 53,285.9 3 17,760.21 9.193 27 NS 
22 TA=Typ!Ang 'lA 48,459.5 3 16,151.57 8.360 27 NS 
23 TV=Typ!Spd lA 39,549.2 3 13,181.76 6.823 27 NS 
24 TB=Typ!Psg lA 29,054.1 1 29,054.19 15.038 27 * 25 TL=Typ!.Rot lA 6,665.2 1 6,665.29 3.450 27 NS 
26 TI=Typ!Pos lA 26,895.8 1 26,895.83 13.921 27 * 27 Residual of TS 
28 GTS-SkUljType/ 5.796.2 3 1.931.89 
Simn. lA 38 1085.3 15 2 1 539.02 0.677 36 NS 29 GTH skijTyp/Hdg fA 1,505.2 3 501.69 1.06b 35 NS 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang lA 27,391.1 3 9,129.47 19.281 35 * 31 GTV=Ski!Typ!Spd lA 4,246.4 3 1,415.35 2.989 35 NS 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg lA 8.2 1 8.22 0.017 35 NS 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rpt lA 163.9 1 163.96 0.346 35 NS 
34 GTI=Ski!Typ!Pos lA 3,349.6 1 3,349.65 7.073 35 NS 
35 Residual of GTS 11420.6 3 473.50 36 Between Subjects 2,361,028. 3 63 3,746.5 3.158 37 *** 37 Within Cells 1 % 121 %015.8 945 1 % 186.3 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 2,170,892.1 1071 
192 
!!S:!!!~_~~ 
First correct ahead/behind decision - Time to Tca 
4t a All Observers 
• 
250 
4t200 
Time 
to 
Tca 
'1 • 
(sec) 
100 
50 
(l,.l mile • 1 om ) Separation at time of closest approach 
5 miles BEHIND 5 miles AHEAD 
. i , i i 
12.6 11 4 
I I 
107 8 2 115 
Simulation 
!igure 31. 
;,' 3 
First correct a/b decn - Accuracy - Simulation type 
0 
100 
8 0 0 § 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 
0 0 
o c1ccuracy 
0 
0 60 
0 
0 
40 
o - Electronic Simulations only 0 0 
20 0 Oa Paper Simulations only 
0 &;b) Sepa.ration at time of closest approach (1.1 mile a 1 
5 miles BEHIND 5 miles 
, . 
• 
, i i , , it , i i , 
11 4 107 8 2 115 1314 9 3 
Simulation 
i \ 
5 16 
§ 0 
0 
AHEAD 
\ i 
5 16 
193. 
6. First correct judgement of separation. 
The first correct judgement of separation is defined 
as the first correct judgement of what the separation 
of the aircraft will be at their closest (the time of 
closest approach). A judgement is considered correct 
if it is within three miles of the correct judgement, 
counting the rogue passing ahead as positive, the rogue 
passing astern as negative, and 'collision' as zero. 
The three mile criterion was chosen to provide a 
reasonable accuracy distribution - it has no operational 
significance. 
Table 71 is an analysis of variance for the time 
to go to Tca at which the first correct 'judgement of 
separation is made, Table 72 is an analysis of variance 
for the average percentage of these judgements made. 
Table 66 is a summary of the significant effects 
ob3erved within these two tables. 
Considering first the differences between group 
means, we observe that both the Time to Tca, and the 
Accuracy are affected by the skill of the observer and 
the type of simulation. Table 67 shows that the mean 
time for skilled observers is 12 seconds before that 
for unskilled observers. Similarly the mean time is 14 
seconds earlier for paper simulation than for electronic 
simulation and paper simUlation is 8% more accurate. 
The significance levels for these effects are not high, 
and in addition, the interaction between skill and 
simulation type is just significant. A look at the 
group means shows that unskilled observers watching 
paper simulations produce an accuracy 10% greater than 
any group, and this abnormality results in a signifi-
cantly greater level for unskilled subjects overall. 
Considering now the differences between simulations, 
which are significant for time to go to Tca, (Table 68, 
Figure 35), we observe the usual pattern of late 
decisions where the rogue passes just behind the 
controlled aircraft. There are significant effects 
of skill on these differences in timing, the situations 
just mentioned and those where the rogue passes well in 
front of the Control being judged earlier by skilled 
observers. 
Accuracy also differs significantly from simulation 
to simulation, in a manner roughly proportional to the 
separation, (Table 69, Figure 36), (wfth the sign 
allotted). The correlation of accuracy of judgement 
of separation with separation is 0.54, which is 
significant. The regression e~uation corresponding 
is 
Accuracy sep = 74.3 - 1.5 Sep. 
In other words the accuracy with which the separation 
at Tca would be judged for a rogue flying behind the 
control at 5 miles distance would be about 82%, and 
for a rogue flying five miles ahead about 67%. 
The accuracy is significantly affected by the type 
of simulation, and regression on the difference between 
skilled observers and unskilled suggests that the 
difference is proportional to the absolute separation. 
Combining the regression e~uation for the mean 
accuracy with that for the difference between paper and 
electronic simulation we obtain the following results. 
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For electr'mic simulation 
Accuracy sep = 91.4 5.04 Sep (rogue ahead) 
= 91.4 - 2.08 Sep (rogue behind) 
For paper simulation 
Accuracy sep = 57.4 + 2.08 Sep (rogue ahead) 
= 57.4 + 5.Q4 Sep (rogue behind) 
Tabulation of these values at the extremes may 
be helpful. 
Separation -5 miles 0 +5 miles 
Electronic 81.4% 91.4% 66.2% 
Paper 82.6% 57.4% 67.6% 
In other words this seems to suggest that electronic 
simulations are judged fairly well for accuracy, 
except when the rogue is passing well ahead, and that 
paper simulations are judged fairly badly for accuracy, 
except when the rogue is passing well astern. This 
generalisation holds for judgements of separation, 
which are the judgements required last in the original 
procedure, and most frequentlY omitted. 
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TABLE 66. 
First C0rrect Judgement of Separation -
Significant Effects. 
Type of Effect 
Differences between 
groups. 
Within ~roups 
variablli ty. 
Observers! 
Residual 
Differences between 
simulations. 
Factors within 
simulations. 
Interactions within 
simulations. 
Factors within 
interactions. 
Time to Tca 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
Paper! 
Electronic 
Significant 
Significant 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
Accuracy 
Skilled! 
Unskilled 
Paper! 
Electronic 
Significant 
Significant 
Rogue initially 
left!right 
Paper! 
Electronic 
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TABLE 67. 
First Correct Judgement of Separation - Mean Performance 
GrouE of Observers Time 1:0 Tea Accuracy 
All Observers 138 sec 74 % 
Skilled Observers '140- sec 72 % 
Unskilled Observers 128 sec 76 % 
Electronic Simulation 130 sec 70 % 
Paper Simulation 144 sec 78 % 
Skilled/Electronic iH3 sec 71 % 
Unskilled/Electronic 152 sec 70 % 
Ski lled/Paper 118 sec 73 % 
Unskilled/Paper 135 sec 83 % 
TABLE 68. 
First correct ~~dgement of SeEaration 
Mean Time to Tea 
Simulation ~ (sec) Skilled (sec) Unskilled (sec) 
1 155 160 150 
2 159 160 157 
3 189 176 202 
4 34 47 22 
5 67 94 40 
6 119 122 117 
7 107 110 104 
8 210 199 202 
9 133 146 120 
10 96 105 87 
11 78 101 56 
12 149 149 149 
13 148 141 155 
14 182 205 159 
15 243 250 237 
16 118 142 95 
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.TABLE 69. 
First Correct Judg~ment of Separation -
Percentage of Correct Decisions. 
Simulation Mean Paper Electronic 
1 66% 44% 88% 
2 77% 66% 88% 
3 46% 85% 8% 
4 85% 74% 95% 
5 79% 77% 80% 
6 80% 78% 83% 
7 88% 85% 90% 
8 66% 37% 95% 
9 67% 60% 75% 
10 80% 74% 85% 
11 77% 74% 80% 
12 79% 81% 78% 
13 69% 45% 93% 
14 78% 78% 78'1> 
15 94% 93% 95% 
16 53% 70% 35% 
TABLE 70. 
Effect of Initial Position of Rogue 
on Percentage of Correct Decisions 
Mean Paper Electronic 
Rogue initially on left 78% 76% 84% 
Rogue initially on right 69% 64% 71% 
1'9'9 .. 
TABLE 71 
First Correct 
Anallsis of Variance 
Jua~ement or SeEaratlon - Time to Tea. 
Source of Variation Sum of dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t._Sig. 
Sg,uares of Sq. 
1 G=Skilled/ 
6.896 36 * Unskilled 42,187.7 1 42,187.7 2 T=Paper/ 
Electronic 32,439.8 1 32,439.8 5.303 36 * 3 GT=Skill/Type lA 9,421.1 1 9,421.3 1.540 36 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 1,812,520.8 15 120,895.1 19.761 36 *** 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 167,112.1 3 55,698.5 0.246 11 NS 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 670,291.3 3 223,408.1 0.987 11 NS 
7 V=Speed of 
Closing 51,538.9 3 17,177.9 0.076 11 NS 
8 B=Rogue Ahead/ 
Behind 222,010.3 1 222,010.3 0.981 11 NS 
9 L=Rotn of Line 
of Sight 16,343.7 1 16,343.7 0.072 11 NS 
10 l=lnitial posn. 
of Rogue 
11 Residual Between 
5,995.8 1 5,995.8 0.026 11 NS 
Simns. 679,228.6 3 226,386.9 
12 GS=Skill/Simn. lA 83,495.3 15 5,569.1 0.910 36 *** 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg IA 5,768.9 3 1,922.8 0.235 19 NS 
14 GA=Ski!Ang lA 9,754.9 3 3,251.3 0.398 19 NS 
15 GV=Ski!Spd lA 19,617.7 3 6,538.6 0.800 19 NS 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 2,043.0 1 2,043.0 0.250 19 NS 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 3,569.0 1 3,569.0 0.436 19 NS 
18 Gl=Ski!Pos lA 18,212.0 1 18,212.0 2.227 19 NS 
19 Residual of GS 24,529.8 3 8,175.8 
2G TS=Type/Simn. lA 88,348.1 15 5,892.8 0.963 36 NS 
21 TH=Typ!Hdg IA 2,157.8 3 719.2 0.075 27 
22 TA=Typ!Ang lA 31,839.0 3 10,611.9 1.107 27 
23 TV=Typ!Spd lA 15,252.2 3 5,038.5 0.530 27 
24 TB=Typ!Psg lA 4,255.5 1 4,255.5 0.444 27 
25 TL=Typ~ot lA 5,945.9 1 5,945.9 0.620 27 
26 Tl=Typ!Pos lA 142.0 1 142.0 0.015 27 
27 Residual of TS 28,755.8 
28 GTS-Skill/Type/ 
3 9,584.3 
Simn. lA 54 1895.3 15 3 z661.5 0.598 36 NS 29 GTH-Ski/Typ/Hdg fA 1,710.1 3 570.0 0.737 35 
30 GTA=Ski!Typ!Ang lA ;30,889.5 3 10,295.5 13.306 35 31 GTV=Ski!Typ!Spd lA 14,060.8 3 4,686.5 6.057 35 
32 GTB=Ski!Typ!Psg lA 1,519.4 1 1,519.4 1.963 35 
33 GTL=Ski!Typ!Rot lA 32.4 1 32.4 0.042 35 
34 GTl=Ski!Typ!Pos lA 4,361.5 1 4,361.5 5.636 35 
35 Residual of G~S 2z321.5 3 773.8 35 Within Subjects lA 389,204.3 53 5,117.8 3.308 37 tf* 
37 Within GTS Res. 1 1 120 1 832.0 606 1 z849.6 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 3,633,344.4 732 
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TABLE 72. 
Analysis of Variance 
First Correct Jud ement of Se aration -
um er 0 orrect ecisions 
Source of Variation 
1 G=Skilled/ 
Unskilled 
2 T=Paper/ 
Electronic 
3 GT=Skill/Type lA 
4 S=Simns. (1-16) 
5 H=Heading of 
Control 
6 A=Angle of 
Approach 
7 "V=Speed of 
Closing 
8 B=Rogue Ahead! 
Behind 
9 L=Rotn of Line 
of Sight 
10 l=lnitial posn. 
of Rogue 
11 Residual Between 
Simns. 
12 GS=Skill/Simn. lA 
13 GH=Ski!Hdg lA 
14 GA=Ski!Ang lA 
15 GV=Ski!Spd lA 
16 GB=Ski!Psg lA 
17 GL=Ski!Rot lA 
18 Gl=Ski!Pos lA 
19 Residual of GS 
20 TS=Type!Simn. lA 
21 TH=TY.ll!.Hdg lA 
22 TA=Typ!Ang lA 
23 TV=TYIi/spd lA 
24 TB=Typ/Psg lA 
25 TL=Typ!Rot lA 
26 Tl=Typ!Pos lA 
27 Residual of TS 
28 GTS-Skin/Type/ 
Sum of 
Squares 
5,564.6 
14,531.9 
8,272.0 
dF Mean Sum Var.Rat.w.r.t. Sig. 
of Sq. 
1 5,564.6 3.002 36 
1 14,531.9 7.941 36 
1 8,272.0 4.463 36 
NS 
** 
* 
146,088.0 15 9,739.2 5.254 36 *** 
25,810.2 
14,283.7 
14,120.3 
25,786.2 
21,649.1 
36,473.8 
7,964.6 
3 8,602.6 3.241 11 
3 4,760 1.793 11 
3 4,706.3 1.773 11 
1 25,786.2 9.713 11 
1 21,649.1 8.154 11 
1 36,473.8 13.738 11 
3 2,654.6 
* 
35,734.4 15 2,383.5 1.286 36 NS 
3,917 .8 
11,776.6 
4,603.8 
1,434.5 
299.5 
2,562.1 
11,140.0 
3 1,305.8 
3 3,925.1 
3 1,534.4 
1 1,434.5 
1 299.5 
1 2,562.1 
3 3,713.0 
0.352 
1.057 
0.413 
0.386 
0.081 
0.690 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
244,851.3 15 16,323.4 8.807 36 *** 
9,639.0 
87,947.4 
39,209.3 
15,716.2 
6,179.5 
21.8 
86.138.1 
3 3,212.7 
3 29,312.9 
3 13,068.5 
1 15,716.2 
1 6,179.5 
1 21.8 
3 28.709.8 
0.112 
1.021 
0.455 
0.547 
0.215 
0.001 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
27 NS 
Simn. IA 19.546.1 15 1.303.7 0.703 36 NS 
35 Within Subjects Res.116,757.1 
37 Residual Overall 1.294,343.2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
53 
944 
38 TOTAL SUM OF 
SQUARES 1,885.698.6 1070 
30.3 
1,199.6 
291.2 
163.6 
498.3 
4,194.4 
3.374.9 
1,853.4 
1 ,371.1 
0.009 
0.355 
0.086 
0.048 
0.148 
1.243 
1. 352 
36 
36 
35 
35 
35 
35 
37 * 
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VIII. DATA REDUCTION 
The previous chapters have provided certain 
items of information, with assessments of their 
significance. In this chapter a process of data 
reduction is undertaken in order to provide more 
concise answers to the original problems. 
In order to establish a consistent terminology, 
a first section defines twenty-two possible 
parameters relating to a situation of the type 
studied, and discusses their mathematical relation-
ships. 
The second section discusses the statistical 
relationships existing between these parameters in 
the sixty-four situations employed in the electronic 
simulation. This is necessary to avoid the use of 
irrelevant but highly correlated variables to describe 
behaviour. 
The third section discusses measures of 
performance, and establishes that the time to go to 
the time of closest approach is the most consistent 
measure of the situaticn. 
The fourth section derives a series of multiple 
linear correlations to describe the performance of 
observers. This section uses the mean times to go to 
Tca and mean accuracies as the predicted variables 
for the sixty-four simulations for skilled observers. 
Northings 
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1. Mathematical relationships between situation 
parameters. 
Any situation in which two aircraft, one considered 
to be controlled, the other a rogue aircraft, take part, 
may be defined at any time by specifying the following 
independent parameters, four for each aircraft. 
Parameter Controlled 
Aircraft 
Easting (X co-ordinate) Ec 
Northing (Y co-ordinate) 
Heading 
Speed 
Nc 
Dc 
Vc 
'", 'Rogue 
Aircraft 
Er 
Nr 
Dr 
Vr 
In the general situation, all of these values 
may change for any aircraft. In the situations with 
which this report is concerned, the aircraft are known 
to maintain steady Heading and Speed. 
If we decide that we will measure time with respect 
to the time at which the aircraft are at their closest, 
the time of closest approach (Tca) , we may write the 
above formulae in the form 
Parameter 
Eastlng 
Northing 
Controlled 
Aircraft 
Ec + Vc.sinDc.t 
Nc + Vc .cosDc. t 
Rogue 
Aircraft 
Er + Vr.sinDr.t 
Nr + Vr.cosDr.t 
The position of the controlled aircraft relative to the 
rogue aircraft can be expressed in cartesian co-
ordinates as 
Ec-Er+(Vc.sinDc-Vr.sinDr).t, Nc-Nr+(Vc.cosDc-Vr.cosDr).t 
This expression may be broken down into horizontal and 
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vertical components of the relative position at time 
t = 0, and the horizontal and vertical components of 
velocity, which are formulated as below, and will be 
assigned symbols as shown for ease of manipulation. 
Parameter Horizontal Component Vertical Oomponent 
Position 
at t=O De = Ec - Er Dn = Ne - Nr 
Relative 
velocity Re = Vc.sinDc-Vr.sinDr Rn = Vc.cosDc-vr.cosDr 
In terms of these relative initial position and 
velocity parameters, the co-ordinates of the control 
relative to the rogue are 
(De + Re.t, Dn + Rn.t) 
For mathematical convenience we now assume that 
the relative velocity is not zero (Re2+ Rn2 F 0) and 
that the separation of the two aircraft is not 
actually zero at any time, although it may become as 
small as necessary. 
Under these conditions we may work out the 
following basic formulae, which apply at any time t. 
At any time t the separation of the two aircraft is 
S = «De + Re.t)2+ (Dn + Rn.t)2r~· 
Differentiating with respect to time 
dS/at = s = (De.Re + Dn.Rn + (Re2+ Rn2).t) 
S 
and 
d2S/dt2 =·8 = (Re2+ ~n2)._s 
The angle of the line of sight is 
Q = tan-1 De + Re.t 
Dn + Rn.t 
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Again, differentiating with respect to time 
dG/dt = g = Dn.Re 2 De.Rn 
S 
• • 
d2G/dt2 = 'Q = -2.G.S ~ S 
At time t = 0, which we have now made the time of 
closest approach 
S = Smin = (De2+ Dn2)t 
• S = 0 (which is consistent with S being a minimum) 
(which is a positive quantity, and, 
in fact, a maximum) 
• Similarly G = is a maximum, since its upper term is 
independent of t, and the lower is a minimum. It has 
the value 
Dn.Re - De .Rn 
= De2 + Dn2 
• Gmax 
G = 0 (because S is zero) 
•• • •• By equating G to zero we can determine that Gx G has 
zero slope at times 
~ «De 2+ Dn2)/3.(Re2+ Rn2))t 
•• 
the maximum, and minimum values of G then being 
(Dn.Re _ De .Rn) (Re2+ Rn2)t ( 3 //2 
4 (De 2+Dn2) 
We will now derive 22 parameters which do not vary 
fnr .a given situation, but which vary from situation 
to situation. We will derive these parameters, as far 
as possible, from the relative velocities, speeds, 
headings and relative positions at Tca of the two aircraft. 
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Each parameter is allotted a number, and a mnemonic 
symbol for convenience, and the type of variable will 
be noted. For the purpose of this exposition, th~ 
types of variables are distances, angles, speeds, times, 
angular velocities, angular accelerations, and choices. 
A choice is a "dummy variable" which can have only a 
few possible values, such as the passage of the rogue 
ahead of or behind the Controlor the direction of 
rotation of the line of sight. 
Parameter 1 is the heading of the controlled 
aircraft. Symbol=Dc, Type=Angle, Units= Compass 
Degrees. (The convention used by navigators is that 
degrees are counted in a clockwise direction from 
North, which is 0 up to 360 degrees, which is again 
North. Non significant zeros are usually written 
thus: 005,090) 
Parameter 2 is the heading of the rogue aircraft. 
Symbol=Dr, Type+Angle, Unit=Compass Degrees. 
Parameter 3 is the Angle of Approach. This is 
the angle between the trails of the two aircraft, 
expressed in conventional angular terms, with a 
possible range from 0 to 180 degrees. (In fact, 
only 45, 90, 135 and 170 degrees were used) 
Symbol=Aa, Type=Angle, Unit=Degrees. 
Parameter 4 is the Speed of Closing. This is 
the vector difference of the velocities of the aircraft 
involved. Symbol=Sc, Type of measurement=velocity, 
Units employed=Miles per Hour. (In caclulation miles 
per second are used, but these are less familiar to 
most observers) 
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Parameter 5 is the passage of the rogue ahead of, 
or behind the controlled aircraft,_ This parameter is 
a choice, passage of the rogue ahead of the control 
being coded as +1, passage of the rogue behind being 
coded -1. The value of this may be determined as 
the sign of the difference between two subsequently 
defined parameters (21 and 22). Symbol used Prb. 
( ) dTcx-dTrx Prb = sign dTcx - dTrx =,dTcx-dTrxl 
Parameter 6 is the direction of rotation of 
the line of sight. This is a choice, coded +1 for 
clockwise rotation, -1 for anti-clockwise rotation. 
The symbol employed is Rls • 
• 
Rls = sign (9) 
Parameter 7 is the position of the rogue 
initially on the right or left of the ccntrolled 
aircraft. This is determined by the combination 
of the previous two choices. The s~rmbol used is PrI. 
Prl = prb.Rls 
Parameter 8 is the track intersection distance, 
defined as the distance of the rogue from the point of 
cross-over when the controlled aircraft reaches it. 
Symbol = Tid, Type = Distance, Unit = Miles. 
Tid = IdTcx - dTrxl. Vr 
Parameter 9 is the position on the PPI. This 
parameter is not dependent ~n the relative positions, 
but on the absolute positions on the PPI. It is 
considered as a choice parameter, having four levels 
corresponding to distance from the centre. These are 
coded as: 
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1. Outer ring? control heading inwards. 
2. Outer ring, control heading outwards. 
3. Median. 
4. Central. 
Symb0l = Pppi, Type = Choice, Units = 1,2,3,4. 
Parameter 10 is the separation of the aircraft, 
measured directly, at the time when they are at 
their c10sest. Symbol = Smin, Type = Distance, 
Units = Miles. 
\SminJ = (De 2", Dn2)! 
Parameter 11 is the separation at closest 
approach, with the sign of the passage of the rogue 
added. Symbol = Smin, Type = Distance, Units = Miles. 
Smin = ISminl. Prb 
Parameter 12 is the difference of the separation 
from 5 miles, using the absolute value of separation, 
but retaining the sign of the difference. Symbol = dSep, 
Type = Distance, Unit= Miles. 
dSep =ISminl- 5. 
Parameter 13 is the absolute value of the 
preceding item. Symbol = dSep, Type = Distance, 
Unit = Miles. 
\dSepl =IISminl - 5' 
Parameter 14 is again not truly a parameter 
dependent on the initial positions, velocities and 
headings. This is the time between the start of the 
simulation and the time of closest approach. This 
is not constant, for obvious technical reasons, and is 
systematically related to some of the factors, for 
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technical reasons. (For example, if one were to film 
only the two hundred seconds before Tca, situations 
in which a slow rogue passes well astern would be 
obviously resolvable as soon as seen. Such 
situations were therefore moved backward in time 
by from two to four minutes.) Symbol = Dt, Type = Time, 
Unit = Seconds. 
Parameter 15 is the speed of the controlled 
aircraft, one of the basic parameters. Symbol = Vc, 
Type = Speed, Units = Miles per Hour. 
Parameter 16 is the speed of the rogue aircraft, 
another basic parameter. Symbol = Vr, Type = Speed, 
Units = Miles per Hour. 
Parameter 17 is the scalar difference between 
the speed of the control and that of the rogue. 
Symbol = Vd, Type = Speed, 
Units = Miles per Hour 
Vd = Vc - Vr 
Parameter 18 is the peak angular velocity • 
• Symbol = gmax, Type = Angular Velocity, Units = 
Degrees/Sec. 
• Dn.Re - De.Rn gmax = 2 2 
De + Dn 
Parameter 19 is the peak angular acceleration • 
• • 
Symbol = gmBx, Type = Angular Acceleration, Units = 
Degrees/Sec/Sec. 
Parameter 20 is the indirect distance at the time 
of closest approach, measured via the point at which 
the aircraft tracks intersect (Pxo). Symbol = IDDtca ' 
Type = Distance, Unit = Miles. 
IDDtca = dTcx.Vc + dTrx.Vr 
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Parameter 21 is the time between the time of 
closest approach and the time at which the controlled 
aircraft reaches the cross-over point. Symbol = dTxc, 
Type = Time, Unit = Seconds. 
dT x - Rn.sin Dr - Re.cos Dr 
c - Vc(siriDc.cosDr _ cosDc.sinDr} 
Parameter 22 is the time between the time of 
closest approach and the time at which the rogue 
aircraft reaches the point of cross-over. 
Symbol = dTrx, Type = Time, Unit = Seconds. 
dTrx _ Rn.sinDc - Re.cosDc 
- Vr(siriDc.cosDr - cosDc.siriDr} 
Summary Table of Situation Parameters, derived from 
relative positions and velocities of aircraft on steady 
courses. 
Parameter Symbol 
1. Heading of Controlled 
Aircraft Dc 
2. Heading of Rogue 
Aircraft Dr 
3. Angle of Approach Aa 
4. Speed of Closing Sc 
5. Passage of Rogue 
Ahead or Behind 
Control Prb 
6. Rotation of Line of 
Sight Clockwise/ 
Anti-Clockwise Rls 
7. Position of Rogue 
Initially on Left/ 
Right of Control Prl 
8. Track intersection 
distance Tid 
9.*Position on PPI 
Outer,cont. in or 
out, Median,Central Pppi 
10. Separation at Tca ISminl 
Unit 
Angle Degrees 
Angle Degrees 
Angle Degrees 
Speed m. p. s. 
Choice +/-1 
Choice +/-1 
Choice +/-1 
Distance Miles 
Choioe 1/2/3/4 
Distance Miles 
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No. Parameter Symbol ~ Unit 
11. Separation at Tca (wi th sign of 
passage of Rogue)' Smin Distance Miles 
12. Difference of 
Separation from fiv8 
miles ISminl -5 Distance Miles 
13. Absolute value of 
IISminl-5/ item 12 Distance Miles 
14.*Time from closest 
approach to start 
of simulation Dt Time Seconas 
15. Speea of controlled 
aircraft Vc Speed M. p.h. 
16. Speed of rogue air-
craft Vr Speed M.p.h. 
17. Difference of speeds Vd Speed M. p.h. 
18. Peak angular • 
velocity Qmax Ang.Vel. aeg/sec 
19. Peak angular .. 
iJeg/sec.2 acceleration 9max Ang.Acn. 
20. Indirect distance 
at Tca IDDtca Distance Miles 
21. Time between Tca ana 
control reaching 
Cross-over dTxc Time Seconds 
22. Time between Tca ana 
rogue reaching 
Cross-over dTxr Time Seconds 
*These items do not aepend on the relative positions 
and velocities of the aircraft simulated, but can be 
determined for any simulation, and may be relevant 
to subject's performance. 
2. Statistical relationships between simulation parameters •. 
The twenty-two parameters of the experimental 
situation definea and discussed in mathematical terms 
in section 1 of this chapter are not statistically 
inaepenaent. 
It is therefore necessary to investigate how they 
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vary with or against each other, in the sample of 
sixty-four simulations used in this experiment. 
Table 73 shows the correlation coefficients between 
the twenty-two parameters for the sample of sixty-
four simulations. It is worth noting that if a 
different set of simulations were taken, forming a 
sample with different bias (for example, one in 
which all the conflicts were either overtaking or 
head-on conflicts) differing values of these 
correlation coefficients would be appropriate. 
The upper triangle of Table 73 gives the 
correlation coefficients to two decimal places, 
the lower triangle gives the significance of their 
difference from zero. 
Notice that parameters 1 and 2, (the headings 
of the aircraft), 6, (the direction of rotation 
of the line of sight), 7, (the initial position of 
the rogue) and 9, (the position of the conflict on 
the PPI) do not show any significant correlations with 
any parameters. In addition, parameter 12 differs 
from parameter 10 by a constant only, so that the 
correlation of parameters 10 and 12 is 1. Notice 
also that those parameters which are based on the 
levels of the Hyper-greco-latin cube design used 
are, apart from minor rounding errors, independent 
of each other. (The parameters in question are 
numbers 3 to 9 inclusive). 
The correlation matrix so produced is not 
particularly informative in itself. Accordingly 
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Table 74 has been prepared. In this table, parameters 
have been arranged so that large correlations are 
grouped as closely as possible to the diagonal of the 
matrix. The direction in which the correlations 
are measured is not important in these circumstances, 
so certain of the parameters have been inverted in 
sign to provide the maximum number of significant 
positive correlations. 
Examination of this table shows that there appear 
to be two groups of parameters (Clusters). The first, 
the largest contains eight of the sixteen significantly 
related parameters. These are, in numerical order 
Parameter 3 - the angle of approach 
Parameter 8 - the track intersection distance 
Parameter 10 - the absolute distance of minimwm 
separation 
Parameter 13 - the difference of this from 5 miles 
(unsigned) 
Parameter 16 - the speed of the rogue aircraft 
Parameter 17 - the difference of velocities 
Parameter 18 - the peak angular velocity of the 
line of sight 
Parameter 19 - the peak angular acceleration of 
this line 
Parameter 20 - the indirect distance at Tca. 
These may be considered as measures of the closeness 
of the aircraft in relation to their speed, although 
the attaching of 'a posteriori' labels to empirical 
groupings is not really advisable. 
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The second group of variables contains five 
parameters, these being 
Parameter 5 - the passage of the rogue ahead of 
or behind the controlled aircraft. 
Parameter 11 - the separation at Tea, with the 
sign of the previous term 
(parameter 5) 
Farameter 14 - the time before Tea at which the 
simulation starts 
Parameter 21 - the time for the control to reach 
the point of cross-over from the 
time of closest ,approach 
Parameter 22 - the time for the rogue to reach 
the pOint of cross-over from the 
time of closest approach. 
This group of variables is concenred primarily 
with the precedence of the aircraft, although the 
presence of variable 14 is interesting. This variable 
is mathematically urelated to any of the other 
parameters, but was in practice related to the expected 
t±me at which decisions would be made, which in turn 
is determined by some of the other parameters in the 
group. 
Finally, there are two variables forming an 
intermediate group:-
Parameter 4 - the speed of closing 
Parameter 15 - the velocity of the controlled 
aircraft. 
These two parameters appear to be intermediate 
between the two main groups, and are related to both. 
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So much is observable by examination of the matrix 
of correlation coefficients. It is now appropriate to 
use more elaborate mathematical methods to formalise 
our conclusions so far. 
If we carry out a factor analysis of the data 
matrix consisting of the twenty-two parameter values 
obtained for the sixty-four simulations - remembering 
that these are not really independent data sets, so 
that any 'factors' resulting are primarily of 
illustrative value, we find that nine eigenvalues 
exceed the normal unit. cut-off value. These account 
for 24.8, 14.5, 8~4, 8.1, 6.8, 5.6, 5.1,4.8 and 4.6 
per cent of the variation present, a total of 82.5~ 
in all. The principal components matrix is not very 
informative, for so many significant factors. Rotation 
of the nine factors to give a simple structure produces 
roots which group together parameters 3, 10, 12 and 
13, parameters 5, 11, 14, 21 and 22, parameters 4 and 
15, parameters 9, 18. and 19, parameters 8 and 20, 
parameters 1 and 2, with parameters 4, 6, and 7 
appearing as single independent factors. 
Clearly, this distribution of roots is too 
detailed in the circumstances, and depends to too 
great an extent on the intial experimental design 
parameters 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the original factors 
varied, appear in separate factors derived in this form. 
In order to get a better idea of the general 
statistical relations obtaining the two largest 
factors were considered. (These account for 24.8~ 
and 14.5~ of the variation present - the remaining 
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roots may be neglected for simplicity). For this 
sample of sixty-four simulations, the first two 
factcrs are almost exactly at.the varimax rotation 
position for simple structure, the rotation required 
being less than half a degree. 
The factor matrix for the first two factors is 
given in the acommpanying Table 75, and illustrated 
in Figure 38. Note that the pOints representing 
parameters are spread out in the form of a cross, 
with only a few pOints (14, 8, 20) considerably 
away from the arms. Axis I, which represents the 
principal component making up the observed correlations, 
is heavily represented by parameters 10 (and 12, which 
is identical, except for a difference in the mean of 
five units) and 16, which are positively weighted 
and by parameters 3, 10, 17, 18 and 19 which are 
negatively weighted. This axis, in fact, corresponds 
to the group of variables previously called the first 
main group. 
Axis II, the second largest component of variance, 
shows up particularly in parameters 5, 11 and 21 
positively, and 22 negatively. This corresponds to 
our second main group of parameters. Notice that 
variables 4 and 15, which were not assigned to either 
group, and the other variables showing no significant 
correlation appear in the region of the zero point. 
Notice also that parameter 14, included on inspection 
in the second group, is much further off axis II than 
any other member, and has less significant correlations 
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with the other members of the group. Parameters 8 
and 20, which are more or less on the fringes of 
the first main group of parameters, also appear to 
be further off axis I than the other members of 
that group. 
To sum up, statistically the parameters describing 
a simulation can be divided as a first approximation 
into two groups: one corresponding to the closeness 
which the aircraft get to, (and their speed), the 
other corresponding.to the order in which they arrive 
at the cross-over point. These account for about half 
the differences between simulations. 
TABLE 73. 
Correlations between Situation Variables. 
Parameter Parameter (Number) 
No. Symbol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3 10 11 
1 Dc * -.18 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .... 02 -.04 2 Dr • * • 15 -.05 .00 .00 .08 .10 -.10 -.14 -.04 3 Aa • • * .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 -.69 -.04 4 Sc * -.01 .00 -.01 .01 .00 .10 -.03 • • • 
5 Prb • • * .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .17 • • 6 RIs • , * .00 .00 .00 .10 .01 • • I\) 
7 Prl * .00 .00 .02 .06 • • • • • • .... 8 Tid • • • • * .0)0 .47 .00 '" • • • .. 9 Pppi • • • • • • • • * -.04 .00 10 ISminl • • • • • • +++ • * .06 11 Smin • • • • +++ • • • • • * 12 ISminl -5 • • • • • • +++ • +++ • 
13 I1Sminl -51 • • +++ • • • • • • 
14 Dt • • ++ ++ • • • • • • + 
15 Vc • • • +++ • • • • • • • 16 Vr • • +++ • • • • • +++ • 17 .'ld • • +++ • • • • • • 18 .·.Qmax • • +++ • • • • • • • 19 Qmax • • + • • • • • • • 20 IDDtca • • • • • • • +++ • +++ • 21 dTcx • • • • +++ • • • • • +++ 22 dTrx • • • • • • • • • 
r..pl!!73 '~ont. 2 
Correlations between Situation Variables 
Parameter Parameter (Number) 
No. Symbol 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 Dc -.02 .03 -.04 .00 -.01 .00 .03 .00 
-.01 .01 -.01 2 Dr -.14 .14 -.05 -.03 -.19 .16 .12 .15 -.07 .02 -.02 
3 Aa -.69 .69 .33 -.19 -.66 .54 .51 .33 -.13 .07 -.11 
4 Sc .10 -.03 ' ... :'>85 .54 .54 -.26 .06 -.05 .12 .00 .01 
5 Prb .04 -.05 .38 -.01 .00 -.01 -.14 -~ 15 .03 .62 -.59 6 Rls .10 -.07 -.03 -.01 .01 .01 .07 .11 .18 .12 -.15 
7 Prl .02 -.13 .10 -.01 .00 -.01 -.11 -.13 .04 .02 .10 f\) 
8 Tid .47 -.36 .05 .01 ··.,..~)Ql .01 -.06 -.05 .52 .16 -.10 f\) 0 9 Pppi -.04 .08 -.14 -.01 -.01 .01 -.15 -.18 .02 .04 .02 • 10 ISminl 1.00 -.82 -.22 .09 .61 
-.54 -.48 -.34 .58 -.02 • .03 1 1 Smin' .06 -.06 .30 .03 .00 .01 -.01 -.Ql .00 .70 -.37 12 ISminl -5 * -.82 -.22 .09 .61 -.53 -.48 -.34 .58 -.02 .03 13 I/Sminl -51 * .23 -.05 -.49 .44 .55 .39 -.44 -.04 -.02 14 Dt • • * -.27 -.27 .13 .22 .16 .08 .25 -.51 15 Vc • • * .15 .34 -.03 -'.12 -.17 -.04 .00 16 Vr +++ • * -.88 -.25 -.18 .33 -.02 .06 17 .Vd +++ • ++ * .23 .12 -.39 .00 -.06 18 •• Qmax +++ • • • * .92 -.37 .00 .~2 19 Gmax ++ • • • +++ * -.34 -.01 .03 20 IDDtca +++ • • ++ * .18 -.24 21 dTcx • • • • • • • • • * -.62 22 dTrx • • • • • • • • * 
TABLE 74 - Clutll;Jt'jng of Coeffioients. 
No. Symbol Inverted? -19 
Perralileter nttr.iber (with 
-18 -3 1$0 -13 16 -17 20 
sign inversion, if any) 
8 -15 -4 14 -22 21 5 11 
•• 
19 gmax Yes 
18 max Yes 
3 Aa Yes 
10 ISminl No 
13 If Sminl-51 Yes 
16 Vr No 
17 Vd Yes 
213 IDDtca No 
-~+ 
+++ +++ 
+ +++ "-. 
++ +++ +++ 
++ +++ +++ 
+++ 
+++ 
++ ++ 
8 Tid No 
15 Vc Yes 
4 Sc Yes 
14 Dt No 
22 dTrx Yes 
21 dTcx No 
5 Prb No 
11 Smin No 
Parameter 12 (ISminl -5) is identical with 
parameter 10 as far as variation is concerned. 
Parameters 1 Dc 
2 Dr 
6 Rls 
7 Prl 
9 ·'Pppi 
are not significantly related to any 
other parameters. 
++ ++ ++ 
+++ +++ ++ 
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Fig1l!:!_~!! 
Two-component Factor Analysis of situation parameters 
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16 Speed of Rogue aircraft 
3 Angle of Approach 
13 Difference of separa.tion from 5 miles (modulus) 
17 Difference of speeds 
18 Peak angular velocity of line of sight 
19 Peak angular accelerstion of line of sight 
Axis 11 - Precedence 
Positive 
Negative 
5 Passage of Rogne Ahead or Behind Control 
11 Separation at time of olosest approach (with sign) 
21 Time from Tca thnt Control reaches oross-over 
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3. Choice between possible Variates for description 
of performance. 
a) Possible variates for description of performance. 
We have described twenty-two parameters of the 
conflict situation, which vary from simulation to 
simulation, but which are fixed for any simulation in 
which two aircraft approach one another on constant 
courses at constant speeds. If we wish to describe 
the performance of an observer, or a group of observers 
in useful terms, we must have measures of the situation 
which do vary with the development of the situation, 
and we must define events which we will measure in 
these terms. 
If we consider first the choice of measures of 
the situation, five possible variates which are not 
linearly related suggest themselves. These are:-
1. The time to go to the time of closest approach. 
This we will call t. This possible variate 
is of the type Time, the unit used will be 
seconds. 
2. The separation of the aircraft, measured 
directly between the two aircraft. This will 
be called S, is of the type Distance, and the 
unit used will be Miles. This is related to 
the first possible variate by the formula: 
S = (De2+ Dn2= (Re2 + Rn2).t2)! 
3. The indirect distance between the aircraft, 
mea8U~eB via the point of cross-over. 
Symbol = IDD, Type = Distance, Units = Miles. 
IDD = Vc., t - dTcxl + Vr. It - dTrxl 
• 
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4. The rate of rotation of the line of sight 
between the aircraft. The Sign of the variate 
is taken as positive throughout • 
• Symbol = g, Type = Angular Velocity, 
Unit = Degrees/Second • 
• 
g = IDn.Re - De.Rnl = IDn.Re - De .Rn I 
S2 
5. The rate of change of the rate of rotation 
of the line of sight. (Again the sign is 
•• 
discarded). Symbol = g, Type = Angular 
Acceleration, Unit = Degrees/Second/Second. 
• • 
•• g S 
g = -2.-t-
In addition to these five non-linearly related 
possible variates, there are four other possible measures 
in terms of time, measured from different zero-points. 
These are:-
6. The time before the controlled aircraft reaches 
the point of cross-over. 
Symbol = tcx, Type = Time, Unit = Seconds. 
tcx = t - dTcx 
7. Time before rogue aircraft reaches the point 
of cross-over. 
Symbol = trx, Type = Time, Unit = Seconds. 
trx = t - dTrx 
8. Time before first aircraft reaches point of 
cross-over. 
Symbol = txl, Type = Time, Units = Seconds 
txl = t - max(dTcx,dTrx) 
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9. Time before second aircraft reaches point of 
cross-over. 
Symbol = tx2, Type = Time, Unit = Seconds. 
tx2 = t - min(dTcx,dTrx) 
Table of Possible Variates 
No. Possible Variate 
1 Time to go to time of 
closest approach 
2 Separation of aircraft 
- measured directly 
3 Separation of aircraft 
- via cross-over point 
4 Angular Velocity of Line 
of Sight 
"5 Angular Acceleration of 
Line of Sight 
6 Time before control 
reaches cross-over 
point 
7 Time before rogue 
reaches cross-over 
point 
8·Time before first air-
craft reaches 
cross-over point 
9 Time before second air-
craft reaches cross-
over point 
Symbol 
t 
S 
IDD 
• 
9 
•• 
tcx 
trx 
txl 
tx2 
Unit 
-
Time Seconds 
Distance Miles 
Distance Miles 
Ang.Vel. Deg/sec 
Ang.Accn. Deg/sec2 
Time Seconds 
Time Seconds 
Time Seconds 
Time Seconds 
Let us now·consider the events we wish to measure. 
An observer watches the simulation, and at some point he 
reaches conclusions as to what is going on in the 
situation. 
The types of decisions that he is required to make 
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and the definitions of these decisions are described in 
detail in Chapter V, Section 2. For the convenience of 
the reader the three questions that the observer was 
required to answer were:-
A) Is the situation a conflict or is it safe? 
(i.e. will the aircraft ever be within five 
miles of each other?) 
B) Is the rogue passing ahead of, or behind the 
control? 
C) How far apart will the aircraft be at their 
closest? 
At this point he will make a decision, stating 
the answers to some of these questions, as they appear 
to him at that stage. He will continue to observe the 
situation, and may make further decisions later, in 
which he may answer the other questions, or correct his 
earlier answers. These decisions can be scored as 
correct or incorrect in terms of each of the three 
questions, and his performance over anyone trial can 
be quantified in terms of the following ten measures. 
No. Measure Symbol ~ Unit 
1 First Decision(State 
of Situation) FD qualitative 
2 Accuracy of Initial 
Decision (Conflict! 
Safe) choice 0/100 
3 Accuracy of Initial 
Decision (Ahead! 
Behind) choice 0/100 
4 Accuracy of Initial 
Decision (within 3 miles) choice 0/100 
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No. Measure 51mbol ~ 
5 First Correct C/S 
Decision (State of 
FC/SD situation) qualitative 
6 Final accuracy of C/S 
Decision choice 
7 First Correct A/B 
Decision (State of 
FA/BD situation) qualitative 
8 Final accuracy of A/B 
Decision choice 
9 First Correct estimate of 
separation (State of 
situation) F=/-3D qualitative 
10 Final accuracy of +/-3 
Decision choice 
Unit 
0/100 
0/100 
0/100 
If we consider a single observer watching a single 
simulation, then we will be unable to make any estimatd 
of the state of the situation for the first correct 
conflict/safe decision unless he did in fact make a 
correct decision of this type. Similarly, for a single 
observer the scores for accuracy will be limited to 
o or 100 for a single simulation. If we take averages 
for groups of observers, or over groups of simulations, 
however, we can obtain qualitative estimates of the 
accuracy of the different decisions at the initial 
decision (Measures 2, 3 and 4) and over the whole 
simulation (Measures 6, 7 and 10). 
b) Choice between possible variates. 
We have described nine possible variates in the 
first sub-section of this section. Five of these 
variates are measures of time, using differently 
defined starting points. These measures will differ 
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systematically from simulation to simulation, so that, 
for example, if the mean time to go to Tca is known 
for a particular simulation it is possible to calculate 
the mean time to go before the rogue aircraft reaches 
the point of cross-over. 
The remaining four measures are not so simply re-
lated as the first five. For example, when the aircraft 
are close together a small increment in the time to go 
to Tca may lead to a very large change in the rate of 
rotation of the line of sight. Figure .3"g shows how 
the rate of rotation of the line of si[h~, the 
separation, and the rate of change of t:~e rate of 
rotation of the line of sight vary with time to go 
to Tca for a typical simulation. This sImulation is 
in fact number 21 in the electronic simulation 
number 5 in the paper simulation series. Note that 
at the time of closest approach the rate of rotation 
of the line of sight is a maXimum, the separation is a 
minimum and the rate of change of the rate of rotation 
of the line of sight is zero. If one were to calculate 
the mean of a number of times in the region of the point 
of closest approach and convert this to angular 
acceleration, one would not get the same value as one 
would by converting each reading to angular acceleration 
and taking the mean of the resultant set of values. 
In an ideal world one would be able to take one 
of these variables, and specify a 'threshold value' at 
which it became possible to make the judgements 
investigated in this thesis. Unfortunately this does 
not appear to be the case. All the possible measures 
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are affected to a greater or lesser extent by the factors 
varied between simulations, and by individual judgement 
oias, and by experimental error. It is therefore 
necessary to formulate the decision in some more 
indirect way. 
Proceeding by elimination, certain measures are 
not unique. For example, the linear separation of the 
aircraft reaches a minimum and increases, so that to 
say 'This judgement was made when the aircraft were 
separated by ten miles' may mean that they were 
approaching each other, or that they were already 
diverging, after having passed close to each other. 
Similar objections apply to the indirect distance 
between aircraft, which shows different rates of 
change depending on whether the aircraft have neither, 
one or both reached the point of cross-over. The 
rate of rotation of the line of sight, and the rate 
of change of the rate of rotation of the line of sight 
suffer from the same ambiguity, and are therefore 
discarded. 
The time to go to the time of closest approach, 
and the other four measures linearly related to it are 
left. We wish to choose the variate which is most 
nearly constant, so that deviations will be more nearly 
linear, and residual error will be reduced to a minimum. 
For this purpose, the Coefficient of Variation may be 
employed. (This is simply defined as the sample s.d. 
divided by the sample mean, expressed as a percentage). 
This statistic has the advantage of being a dimension-
less ratio, so that variates employing different units 
may be compared. 
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For each of the sixty-four simulations, for each 
type of decision, for each observer, the values of the 
nine parameters were derived. From these the Arithmetic 
mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation 
for skilled and unskilled observers were found. In 
general the values for unskilled observers resembled 
those for skilled workers, except that the means tended 
to be smaller in proportion, and coefficients of 
variance were consequently larger. Because we are now 
primarily concerned with the performance of skilled 
observers we will not discuss further the performance 
of unskilled observers. 
Table 75 gives for each type of decision, for each 
parameter, the arithmetic mean, standard deviation and 
Coefficient of Variation for skilled observers only. 
A low coefficient of variation implies that the variate 
is more nearly constant. 
The coefficient of variation tends to be lower 
for the first decision than for others, the coefficient 
of variation for the first correct conflict/safe decision 
running it close. 
The lowest coefficient is that for the time to go 
to closest approach, whioh has also the lowest standazd 
deviation of the 'time' measures. If this measure is 
not suitable, since it is not always easy to find the 
time to go to Tca quickly, then the time before the rogue 
aircraft reaches the point of cross-over provides nearly 
as good a measure. If a time measure is not suitable, 
then the direct linear separation is the most suitable 
measure. 
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mt could be argued that these coefficients ought 
to be adjusted to eliminate known significant effects from 
the analysis of variance in terms of each parameter. 
This has been done, and it appears that the pooled 
non-significant terms and residual terms for each 
measure - which form an estimate of the standard 
deviation, with some mathematical manipulation -
provide exactly the same conclusions as reach~d above. 
To sum up:-
The progress of the situation may be described 
in terms of nine variates, described in this section. 
None of these provides a 'Threshold Value'. We choose 
the time to go to Tca as our variate because it is 
nearest to that ideal, is unambiguous and because we 
are not limited in computational facilities. 
N 
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Figure 3,2 
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TABLE 75 
Performance Measures for Skilled Observers. 
Parameter Measure First First First First 
Decn. aiEl TIecn. A/..B TIecn. +t.. -; Decn. 
Time to 
Tca A.M. 157.1 146.1 142.1 142.0 
S.D. 42.7 44.7 46 .. 1 46~6 
a of Vn 27.2 30.6 32.4 32.8 
Separ-
ation A.M. 20.7 19.1 18.8 18.5 
S.D 6.4 6.2 6.8 6.3 
a of Vn 30.9 32.4 36.2 33.9 
Indirect 
Distance A.M. 27.0 24.6 224-";6 24.0 
S.D. 10.2 8.4 11.1 9.5 
a of Vn 37.8 34.4 45.0 39.6 
• Q A.M. 0.96 1.07 1.07 1.11 
S.D. ,0.87 0.97 0.90 1.01 
a of Vn 90.1 90.1 84.8 91.0 
•• Q A.M. 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.019 
S.D. 0.014 0.081 0.081 0.021 
a of Vn 104.4 106.4 100.6 109.0 
tcx A.M. 161.3 150.4 146.4 146.3 
S.D. 78.4 78.0 78.4 77.4 
a of Vn 48.6 51.9 53.6 52 9 
trx A.M. 151.7 140.8 136.8 136.6 
S.D. 44-.4 51.4 45.9 50.7 
C of Vn 29.3 36.5 33.6 37.1 
txl A.M. 120.7 109.7 105.7 105.6 
S.D. 43.7 48.7 43.6 46.9 
a of Vn 36.3 44.5 41.2 44.4 
tx2 A.M. 192.5 181.5 177.5 177.4 
S.D. 60.3 61.6 61.5 61.7 
a of Vn 31.4 33.9 34.6 34.8 
234. 
4. Regressian e~uatians describing performance of 
abservers. 
The formal analyses given in Chapter V on the 
electronic simulation experiment show how the six 
factors varied affect the performance of observers in 
terms of the time before Tca and the accuracy of their 
decisions. A brief study of Sections 3 to 6 of 
Chapter V of this thesis will show that there is a good 
deal in common between the various measures employed. 
Because the overall accuracy of the first decision is 
high (75% for conflict/safe decisions, 60% for other 
decisions), the mean time and accuracy of the first 
decision Play a decisive role in determining the mean 
time and accuracy of correct decisions. 
It is therefore worth going into the structure 
of the First Decision in some detail. In order to 
simplify the discussion we will take only the values 
of time and accuracy for skilled observers watching 
electronic simulations into consideration, since the 
results for unskilled observers are generally similar, 
but more erratic and of less intrinsic interest. 
Let us first consider the development of a 
situation from the point of view of the controller, 
bearing in mind the briefing given to him (Appendix 4) 
and the experience of controllers in general. 
The controller was told to say "Conflict" if he 
was sure the situation was a conflict, or "Safe" if he 
was sure it was safe·.. He was then to say what action 
he would advise, and finally to estimate what was going 
to happen. (The lesser emphasis placed on the last part 
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of this instruction is reaected in the lower final 
accuracy of the second and third types of correct 
decision). 
As a matter of observation, the controllers showed 
signs of tension until they made their first report. 
(The signs of stress observed were a tendency to hunch 
over the radar screen, to follow aircraft movements 
with the point of a pencil, or to play with the press-
to-talk switch.) Once the first "conflict" or "safe" 
report had been delivered, the observers would lean back, 
stretch or adjust their headphones. The period of 
about a minute following a decision would usually be 
free from additions or corrections. 
The time at which the decision was made depended 
on the urgency and difficulty of the situation. (Two 
aircraft heading straight for each other at high speed 
present an urgent but net difficult situation. Two 
aircraft, where the control will pass behind the rogue 
by about four and a half miles present a difficult but 
not urgent situation). 
The correlation between speed and accuracy is not 
significant, suggesting that there is no "selling 
accuracy for speed" or vice-versa. 
Section 3 of Chapter V lists;the's±gn±fioant 
effects on the timing and accuracy of the first decision 
of the six factors varied in the latin cube experimental 
design. These factors are independent, so that effects 
which cause a significant difference in terms of one 
factor will be independent of those causing variation 
in another. Table 5 presents all the significant effects 
observed. 
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a) Time of first decision. 
There are three factors affecting the time of 
first decision of skilled observers. These are: 
The angle of approach (Aa) 
The speed of closing (Sc) 
The passage of the rogue ahead of, or behind the 
controlled aircraft (Prb) 
The first of these, the angle of approach, affects 
both time and the initial accuracy of the decision which 
aircraft passes ahead of the other. Table 7 and 
Figure 11 show the effect of this factor on the time of 
the deciSion, and Table 8 and Figure 12 show the effects 
on the accuracy of the first ahead/behind decision. 
The nature of the difference in timing is that head-on 
cases are resolved raptdly, while other types of 
situation are resolved about 42 seconds later, on the 
average, The accuracy with which it is decided which 
aircraft is passing ahead of the other is also 
considerably worse for head-on cases than for other 
angles of approach. The difference in accuracy is 
considerably less for the final deciSion, indicating 
that observers often become aware of the situation as 
a confliot, .and find it advisable to take action before 
they can determine which aircraft is passing ahaad of 
the other. 
The second significant factor is the speed of 
closing. This affects only the time before Tca at which 
the decision is made, in fact only the 5th and 50th 
percentiles of the time. All three times are included 
in Figure 13 and Table 9. As might be expected, the time 
237. 
to Tea is greater for slow speeds of closing, and 
smaller for high speeds, although it remains nearly 
constant at intermediate speeds. 
The final significant effect, shown in Table 10 
and Figure 14 is that of the passage of the rogqe 
ahead of, or behind the controlled aircraft. This 
affects only the 5th percentile of the time to Tea, 
in other words the time at which observers start to 
make decisions. The nature of the difference is that 
skilled observers tend to start making decisions about 
34 seconds earlier when the rogue aircraft is paSSing 
ahead of the control than when it is passing behind. 
This could be attributed to the need for less thought 
on what to do in those circumstances, except that 
unskilled observers, who do not have to decide what 
action ought to be taken, exhibit the same pattern of 
timing. An alternative is that the urgency of the 
situation appears greater when the rogue is passing 
ahead, the "n:entre of gravity" being somewhere between 
the times at which the two aircraft pass the cross-over 
point. 
To sum up the deductions we can make from the 
analysis of variance:-
As the angle of approach increases the time to Tea 
remains steady until the nearly head-on position is 
reached. At that point it increases sharply. The 
accuracy with which the skilled observer can judge which 
aircraft will pass ahead drops steadily as the angle 
increases, being almost random in the head-on case. 
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As the speed of olosing increases, the time to Toa 
decreases, but the accuracy is not affected. 
Decisions are made earlier when the rogue is 
passing ahead of the control. 
These effects are, by the nature of the design of 
the experiment, mutually independent. There are other 
possible measures of the situation, and it may well be 
profitable to study their effect on the situation. To 
this end, a series of multiple linear correlations has 
been carried out with a view to finding the most useful 
predictor sets. We start with the 22 parameters defined 
in Section 1 of this chapter. 
Some of these parameters are redundant, being 
linear combinations of other variables within the set. 
If these are included in the analysis, the matrix which 
is inverted to solve the necessary simultaneous 
equations becomes "ill-conditioned", and rounding-off 
errors combine to produce nonsensical results. 
Variables 10, 12, 15, 16 and 17 are eliminated for 
this reason. Variable 14, the time between the start 
of the simulation and the time of closest approach is 
a parameter which cannot be generalised to other 
situations. It is also not really independent of the 
measured variable, since the time was chosen so that 
most subjects would find themselves becoming certain 
towards the middle of the run. 
If we carry out a multiple linear correlation of 
the remaining sixteen variables against the mean time 
to go to Tca, we obtain a regression equation having 
sixteen variables, of which only four appear to be 
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significant. The correlation of the observed and 
predicted times is 0.807. This is significant, and 
accounts for about three-quarters of the variation 
present in terms of sums of squares. The equation 
would be impossibly clumsy in use, and contains 
redundant, non-significant terms. 
We therefore proceed in the opposite direction, 
first choosing the single variable most closely 
correlated with the time to Tca, and adding other 
terms to find the best pair, triplet etc. of variables. 
(In order not to construct too elaborate a structure 
we are constrained to stop when no new variable has 
a significant regression coefficient, and to test each 
variable at each stage to see if it can be eliminated). 
The best single parameter turns out to be number 
twenty-two, the time required for the rogue to reach 
the point of cross-over from the time of closest approach. 
The resultant prediction equation is T=154.6-.47Trxo • 
The predicted and observed times have a correlation of 
0.527, which is significant, but the decrement in the 
standard deviation of the time to Tca is only from 
43 seconds to 36 seconds. 
Parameter 4, the speed of closing, turns out to be 
almost as good a predictor, having a correlation of .368 
with the observed time to Tca. For this variable, which 
in this experiment has four standard values, 240, 360, 
480 and 600 knots, the prediction equation is 
t = 205.7 - 0.1 Sc where Sc is the speed of closing. 
Using this equation one o"btains the following 
values for the mean time of first decision before Tca. 
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SEeed of Closi~ 
. Time to Tca 
(seconds) 240 knots 360 knots 480 knots 600 knots 
Observed 184 156 148 140 
Predicted 178 164 150 137 
(The prediction equation is linear). 
Parameter 3, the angle of approach, is nearly as 
good a predictor as parameter 4, having a correlation 
of 0.351 with the observed time to Tca. The equation 
for parameter 3 as predictor is: 
t = 122.4 + 35 Aa 
Using this equation one obtains the following values for 
the mean times of first decision before Tca. 
Time to Tca 
(Seconds ) 
Angle of Approach 
45 degrees 90 degrees 135 degrees 170 degrees 
Observed 
Predicted 
143 
138 
149 
154 
146 
170 
Referring back to Section 2, it will be noticed that we 
have here one parameter from each group (3 and 22) and 
one in neither (4). We have also one parameter with a 
heavy factor I weighting (3), one with a heavy factor 
11 weighting (22) and one with no heavy weighting for 
either factor (4). 
Considering parameters in pairs, the most effective 
pair of predictors appears to consist of parameter 22~ 
the time for the rogue to reach the point of cross-over 
from the point of closest approach, and parameter 4, the 
speed of closing. The combination of these two produces 
a prediction equation of the form 
t = 202.9 - .1 So - .47 dTrx 
190 
182 
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The correlation of the predicted with the cbserved 
value is .641, accounting for about half the observed 
variation. 
Considering triplets of parameters, we find that the 
most effective combination of three predictors is the 
angle of approach (3), the speed of closing (4) and the 
time for the rogue to reach the point of cross-over from 
the point of closest approach (22). The prediction 
equation is of the form 
T = 173.6 - 0.44 dTrx - 0.1 Sc + 0.27 Aa 
The predicted value produced by this equation has a 
correlation of 0.707 with the observed value, compared 
with the correlation of 0.807 obtained by using all 
sixteen parameters. Notice that the coefficients of 
the variables are almost the same as those employed 
when they are used by themselves, indicating that they 
are virtually independent. 
No significant fourth term can be found, so that 
no further elaboration of the prediction equation for 
the time before Tca at which the first decision is made 
from the parameters of the situation is possible. 
b) Accuracy of first decision. 
Just as it is possible to derive equations 
predicting the time at which the first decision is taken, 
so is it possible to derive equations predicting the 
percentage of occasions on which these decisions will be 
correct in terms of the three criteria of "accuracy" 
defined in Chapter 5. 
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The three types of judgements were:-
Are the aircraft passing within five miles of 
each other? 
Is the rogue passing ahead of the control? 
How close will they be at their closest? 
(within 3 miles accuracy). 
For briefness these will be referred to as the C/S 
criterion, the A/B criterion and the +/-3 m criterion. 
For the first decision the best predictor of the 
percentage accuracy of the decision in terms of the 
Conflict/Safe criterion is Parameter 13, the absolute 
difference of the separation from 5 miles. The 
predicition equation is 
Acs := 45.4 + 9.891ISep: - 5\ 
This equation would predict that the accuracy of 
decision for aircraft passing at exactly the li~it 
would be about 50%, while the accuracy for aircraft 
which are actually about to collide would be about 95%. 
Similarly for aircraft passing at more than 10 miles the 
accuracy of judgement should be about 95%. 
If two prediction terms are used, the second should 
be Parameter 6, the direction of rotation of the line of 
sight, Rls. It appears that the accuracy is slightly 
greater when the line of sight is rotating clockwise, 
so that the equation should then be 
Acs = 44.4 + 10.2 liSepl -51 + 6.0 Rls 
The improve~ent in the fit caused by the addition 
of the second term is not great, the standard error of 
estimates falling only from 20.6 to 19.8, and the 
243~ 
correlation of predicted and observed values rising 
only from .56 to .61. Under the circumstances the 
second term should be treated with some reserve, as a 
possible statistical artefact. No significant third 
term can be added. 
The second type of accuracy decision is on whether 
the rogue passes ahead of the control. For this again 
the best single predictor is the difference of the 
absolute separation from 5 miles, although the 
relati0nship is now reversed, the effect of increasing 
the difference being negative instead of positive. 
The equation is:-
Aab = 98.7 - 12.9 j\Sep\ -5\ 
This equation predicts that the accuracy of judgement 
for separations in the region from -1.2 to +1.2 miles 
will be less than 50%, and when the aircraft will 
actually collide it will be about 34%. In fact, this 
is to say that where the aircraft are passing extremely 
close, in only one case in three will it be apparent 
which is passing ahead of the other, and it will be an 
even chance when they are passing within about a mile. 
The implications of this for collision avoidance rules 
based on determining which aircraft passes ahead of 
the 0ther are considerable. 
If a second predicting term is added, this should 
be Parameter 9, which describes the position of the 
enc0unter on the radar screen. This variable has hovered 
on the edge of significance in some of the formal 
analyses, but is not significant considered in isolation. 
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It appears to allow the equation to be more affected by 
the separation term, but compensates for this effect in 
the centre of the screen. The equation takes the form 
Aab = 86.1 - 13.3/ISepl -5\ + 5.4 Pppi 
Or, substi,';uting for the four possible levels of PpPi , 
Aab = 91.5 - 13.3 IISepl -5\ at the outer edge,' 
control heading in 
Aab = 96.9 - 13.3 IlSep I -51 at the outer edge, 
control heading out 
Aab =102.3 13.3 jlSePI -51 in the median region 
Aab ;107.'7 13.31ISep\ -51 in the oentre of the 
screen. 
Thus the region in which only 50% of judgements are 
'correct i 3 about +/-13 mile at the centre of the screen 
and about +/-2 niles towards the centre. This effect 
can be aticribed to the nature of the simulation technique, 
and the ·liffereIl.tial accuracy of posi ti oning of points 
between the cen'tre and the periphery. 
There is ne significant third term. 
Th~ third ~ecision, the judgement of how far apart 
the airoraft wiLl be at their closest, to within three 
miles, is the l!H),3t vague of the three judgements, and 
appeat"l'l to be af:?ec te d by I a mul tiplici ty of fac tors I • 
The on.ly factor tlignificant on its own is the speed of 
closir,g, producing a prediction equation of the form 
.A3m '" 75.5 • 0,'03 Se, which for the three levels 
of steed of closing predicts accuracies of 67, 63, 59 
and ~j5 percent ccmpared with observed mean accuracies 
of 6~, 58, 61 aniJ 54 percent. The nature of the 
predicting formula employed is such that it cannot 
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predict non-linear relations, but as a linear prediction 
t",le agreement is close. The speed of closing did not 
affect the accuracy significantly in the analysis of 
variance, being just non-significant. 
If a second term is introduced, the peak angular 
velocity is the best addition to the speed of closing, 
providing a combination which is significant considered 
as a pair, but in which the second term is not 
significant in itself. There exists no combination 
of two variables both of which are significant in 
themselves, nor is there one of three variables of 
which all three are Significant, although the combination 
Of Parameters 4, speed of closing, 13, difference of 
separation from 3 miles and 18, peak angular velocity 
is nearly adequate. 
If however the four Parameters 4, 13 and 18 are 
taken together, they are individually significant and 
therefore worth employing as separate terms. The 
prediction formula is then:-
A3m= 77.0 - .034Sc + 4.1Pppi- 4.77i1Sepl -51+ 0.4 dThmax 
The effect of applying this formula is to reduce the 
standard error of the estimate of percentage accuracy 
from 19 to 17.5, and the correlation of the estimated 
accuracy with the actual is 0.45, not a very impressive 
prediction performance using four predictors. In 
practice it would be better to stick to a single 
predictor, the speed of closing. 
We may summarise our predictions of the four variables 
by the following table and diagram. 
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Predicted item: Time to Tca A",-, cs Aab A3m 
-
Predictor 
No. 
3 Aa +0.27 
A Se -0.10 
-0.034 
6.:::Rls +6.0 
9 Pppi +5.4 +4.1 
13 \ISepl -5\ +10.2 -13.3 -4.77 
18 dThmax +0.4 
22 dTrx 
-0.44 
-
Constant 173.6 44.4 86.1 77.0 
Correlation 0.71 0.61 0.58 0.45 
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c) First correct decisions from first decisions. 
Let us now consider the first correct decisions of 
the various types defined in Chapter V. 
In the previous sUb-section we noted that the first 
decision was in fact correct in terms of whether the 
situation was a conflict or safe in 75% of trials, in 
terms of whether the rogue was passing ahead or behind 
in 60% of trials and in 61% of trials the separation was 
given accurately to within 3 miles. 
In these cases, the first decision was the first 
correct decision of that type.' The final accuracies of 
these judgements were 83%, 72% and 72%, so that a first 
correct decision other than the first decision occurred.':Ln 
only 8%, 12% and 11% of trials. In addition, no oorrect 
decisions were made in 17%, 28%, and 28% of trials 
respectively. These figures may be summarised as a 
ta ble (be low ~. 
Correct Decision Made: First Time 
Type of Decision 
Conflict/Safe 75% 
Ahead/Behind 60% 
Within 3 miles 61% 
Later 
8% 
12% 
11% 
Not at all 
17% 
28% 
28% 
In view of these figures, it is not unexpected that 
there should exist large correlations between the speed 
and accuracy figures for the first decision, and those 
for the first correct decisions of all three types. 
Considering first the first correct decision that 
the situation is a conflict or is safe, we find that there 
is a correlation of .90 between the time of the first 
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decision and the time of the first correct conflict/ 
safe decision. The prediction equation is of the form 
T = -1.8 + .94 Tfd cs 
Since this is measured in terms of the time before the 
time of closest approach, this implies that the mean 
time for the first correct conflict/safe decision is 
later than the time of the first decision, and that 
although the difference in times is roughly proportional 
to the time available, the delay becomes a larger 
proportion of the time to go as the latter gets less. 
If we include a term corresponding to the accuracy 
of the first decision, we obtain a correlation of 0.96, 
which is sufficiently large for most of the remaining 
error to be accounted for by the inherent inaccuracy 
of data recording and quantificaticn techniques. The 
prediction equation is 
This equation suggests that the effect of an 
aecurate initial decision is to decrease the delay 
between the first decision and the first correct 
conflict/safe decision. 
No third significant term can be found which 
provides a Significant addition to these two terms, 
and the residual error is of so small an order that 
these two terms Virtually determine the values cf the 
time of the first correct conflict/safe decision. 
Similarly we may predict the accuracy of the first 
correct conflict/safe decision, that is to say, to 
predict the percentage of trials for which the decision 
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thaj):o.tlne:ituat:ion is a cOllrli.ct or safe is made either 
, 
initially or subsequently, The best predictor is the 
accuracy of the first decision in terms of this decision, 
the correlation being 0;93. The prediction equation is 
A f = 27.9 + .73 A . cs CSl 
This equation can be transformed into a prediction 
equation of the percentage of cases in which a correct 
decision is not eventually made, in terms of the 
percentage of cases in which it is not made initially. 
It then becomes 
where AcSi and Acsf 
represent the percentage of situations not correctly 
judged. This is to say that the percentage decrease 
in inaccuracy is a constant proportion of the percentage 
of inaccurate first decisions, with a very small 
modifying factor. 
The time at which the first decision is made has no 
predictive value for the accuracy of the first correct 
conflict/safe decision, nor does any other variable add 
significantly to the prediction equation. 
If we now consider the first correct decision 
which aircraft is passing ahead of the other, for which 
predictions of mean time and mean accuracy may be made 
on the basis of the time and accuracy of the first 
decision, we find that the best predictor of the mean 
time of the first correct decision which aircraft is 
passing ahead of the other is the time of the first 
decision, the prediction equation being of the form 
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where Tid is the time of the first decision. The fact 
that the constant term is negative implies that the time 
of the first correct decision is not merely a simple 
fraction of the time of the first decision, but that 
an additional constant delay sho~ld be added. 
The best pair of predictors is the time and the 
accuracy of the first decision in terms of the relevant 
criterion. The prediction·equation is then 
Tab = 1.03 Tfd + 0.47 Aabi - 48.6 
Comparing this with the prediction equation for the 
first correct conflict/safe deCiSion, which was 
Tcs = 0.94 Tfd + 0.62 Acsi - 48.6 
we observe that the effect of the time of the first 
decision appears more important, and the accuracy of 
the first decision less important, while the constant 
delay term is Virtually identical. 
Considering the accuracy of this deciSion, we find 
that the accuracy of the first decision is the best 
predictor of the accuracy of the decision overall, the 
prediction equation being:-
Aabf = 21.5 + 0.81 Aabi 
This equation may also be transformed to become a 
prediction of the percentage of cases not resolved, in 
which case it becomes 
Aabf = 0.81 Aabi - 2.14 
This equation which considerably resembles that for 
the accuracy of conflict/safe decisions suggests that 
a constant proportion of incorrect judgements is rectified. 
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The table given earlier shows that 12% out of a possible 
40% of possible errors are corrected, compared with 
8% out of a possible 25% for conflict/safe decisions. 
For the first correct decision of how close the 
two aircraft will pass, closely similar equations can 
be obtained, although the~ do not account for so much 
of the variation. 
The best single predictor of the time of the first 
correct judgement of separation is the time of the first 
decision, the prediction equation being 
T3mf = 0.98 Tfd - 11.9 
and the best pair of predictions, which is the best 
significant prediction includes also the accuracy of 
this decision. The consequent prediction equation is 
The resemblance of this equation to that for the 
first correct conflict/safe decision is considerable. 
The best prediction for accuracy of the judgement of 
which aircraft will pass within three miles of each 
other is the accuracy of the first decision in this 
respect, the prediction equation being :-
A3mf = 26.4 + 0.75 A3mi 
This equation again bears a considerable resemblance to 
the previous equation, and can be transformed into a 
prediction equation for the percentage of errors in 
the final equation in terms of those in the initial 
equation, in the form:-
- .. 
A3mf = 0.75 A3mi - 1.14 
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We therefore observe that for each type of correct 
decision a sufficient prediction of accuracy can be made 
from the initial accuracy, and a sufficient prediction 
of the mean time of the correct decision can be made 
from the time of the initial decision and its accuracy, 
and that these equations bear strong mutual resemblances. 
The table below summarises these equations for 
camparison. 
Predicted item: Time to Tca 
Decision Type: c/s A/B +1-3m 
Predictor 
Time of First 
Decision 0.94 1L'03 0.98 
Accuracy of First 
Decision by relevant 
criterion 0.62 0.47 0.74 
Constant Term -48.6 -48.6 -57.2 
Overall Accuracy 
c/s A/B +1-3m 
0.73 0.81 0.75 
27.9 21.5 26.4 
The diagram below summarises the system of prediction 
equations from the situation parameters to the times 
and accuracies of correct decisions via the first deeision. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 
In chapter III three main objectives were defined 
for this investigation. These were:-
1. To describe in ~uantitative terms the ability 
of observers to form judgements of the future relative 
positions of aircraft presented on a Plan Position 
Indicator type display. 
2. To investigate the effects of reducing the 
degree of detail by changing the simulation technique 
employed. 
3. To investigate the difference in performance 
occurring between skilled and unskilled observers. 
On the basis of the experimental work and 
statistical evaluation described in chapters IV 
to VIII, these objectives can now be reached. 
1. Ability of observers to form judgements. 
The time to go to the time of closest approach 
(Time to Tca) is the most consistent measure of when 
the observer can form judgements. The linear distance 
between the aircraft is nearly as good, and may be 
easier to obtain in practical situations (for example, 
by post-analysis of filmed records) (Chapter VIII, 
Section 3). 
The performance of skilled observers is described 
in terms of this variate, and in terms of the correct-
ness of decisions made, considered in terms of three 
criteria. Measures employed are the time before T6a 
at which the first decision is made, the times before 
Tca at which the first~correct decisions are made, 
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the accuracy of the first decision made, and the number 
of correct decisions made in terms of the three criteria. 
The results obtained show considerable variation, and 
certain marked resemblances from measure to measure. 
(Chapter V). 
The experimental results described so far are 
reduced to more practical form in chapter VIII, 
which includes a detailed discussion of the situation 
parameters. The times and numbers of correct 
decisions are shown to be derivable from the time and 
accuracy of the first decision made, which are them-
selves derivable from the parameters of the situation 
- to a certain extent, not absolutely. (Chapter VIII). 
For most practical purposes, only the first 
decision made will be of importance, since action will 
usually be taken on the basis of that decision. The 
available regression equations imterlve parameters of 
the situation which may not always be available. 
The spread of values to be expected should be 
comparable with those observed in this experiment -
from about 3t minutes to 2 minutes before Tca. 
(Chapter V, Section 3). 
This range of values is based on the empirical 
data derived from the simulations studied in this 
thesis. It has been shown that the time of the first 
decision is significantly affected by three factors 
which together account for half the variation observed. 
To recapitulate, the formula for prediction of the time 
at which this decision is made is of the form 
where: 
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T = 173.6 - 0.44 dTrx - 0.1 Sc + 0.27 Aa 
T is the time at which the first decision 
is made, dTrx is the time for the rogue to 
reach the point of cross-over from the time 
of closest approach (this will be positive 
if the rogue is passing behind the control 
- for most normal circumstances) expressed 
in seconds. 
Sc is the speed of closing - the vector 
difference of velocities (expressed in miles 
per hour, not knots). 
Aa is the Angle of Approach of the two 
aircraft, expressed in degrees. 
Where it is desired to predict the mean time at 
which decisions will be given, the appropriate values 
of the parameters described should be substituted 
in this equation. If any of the parameters are not 
available, it is probably best to substitute the mean 
values used in the derivation of this equation, which 
are -5.4 seconds, 482 miles per hour, and 110 degrees 
respectively. 
It is possible to use the above equation to predict 
mean values where the relative frequencies of the 
predicting parameters differ from those employed in 
this experiment, by substituting mean values for each 
parameter weighted according to the frequency desired. 
Such a process, however, is not recommended if any 
alternative can be found, since the real relationships 
of some these parameters must be non~linear, and such 
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predictions may give a false impression of accuracy. 
Similar equations, to which similar restrictions 
apply, may be obtained for the accuracy of the first 
decision. (Chapter VIII, Section 4(b)). The 
predictions so obtained are as follows:-
Acs ::: 44.4 + 1 O. 2 11 Se pI-51 + 6. 0 R Is 
Aab = 86.1 - 13.3 ! ISep\ -5\ + 5.4Pppi 
A3m = 77 .0 - 0.034 Sc + 4.1Pppi - 4-.7'1-HSep\ 
+ 0.4 dThmax 
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where the parameters not already defined are as follows 
Rls - direction of rotation of line of sight 
(1 = clockwise, -1 = diesel) 
Pppi - position on PPI 
I~ep -5\ - difference of separation at time 
closest from 5 miles 
dThmax - peak velocity of rotation of line of Sight. 
Should it be necessary to work in terms of the 
total number of correct decisions and the mean time 
of correct decisions, these may be derived with 
considerable confidence' from the times of first 
decisions and the accuracies in terms of the relevant 
criterion. The relevant equations are: 
First correct conflict/safe decision 
Time = 0.94 T = 0.62 A - 48.6 
Accuracy = 0.73 A + 27.9 
First correct Ahead/Behind Decision 
Time = 1.03 T + 0.47 A - 48-.-6 
Accuracy = 0.81 A + 21.5 
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First Correct Judgement of Separation 
Time = 0.98 T + 0.74 A - 57.2 
Accuracy = 0.75 A + 26.4 
Where in each case T is the time of first decision, 
and A is the accuracy of the first decision in terms 
of the relevant criterion. 
The relations observed can be summed up 
descriptively in the final diagram of Chapter VIII -
Data Reduction. 
2. Effect of reducing simulation accuracy. 
Chapter VII - Paper Simulations (Findings) -
contains detailed analyses and comparisons of the 
performances of skilled and unskilled observers using 
the two different types of simulation method. There 
First 
Correct 
Decision 
is not sufficient material in these sixteen simulations 
to allow for comparisons to be made with any great 
accuracy. It should be noted that this constraint is 
inherent in the different nature of the question now 
being asked. In the previous section we were concerned 
with differences between simulations primarily, 
differences between individuals being mainly an irrele-
vant variation to be 'filtered out' during analysis. 
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We are now concerned with differences between groups 
of individuals, which must be shown to be signifioant 
in terms of the variation between the individuals. 
Although the results are not entirely unambiguous, 
it seems to be the case that decisions are made some 
twenty seconds earlier in paper simulations, and that 
there are significant, unsystematic differences 
between paper and electronic simulations in accuracy. 
There are differences between individual simulations 
in the way in which they are affected by the way in 
which they are presented. These differences are not 
related to any of the factors varied, but are 
statistically Significant. 
The differences in timing are particularly marked 
where the rogue is passing ahead of the control. This 
may be because these situations are relatively easy 
to solve in terms of 'what is to be done', so that in 
the more realistic Situations, more urgency was 
attached to ordering avoidance manoeuvres than where 
the simulation is obviously unreal. 
The differences in accuracy appear to be very 
marked in a few situations. This tends to suggest that 
these situations may have in fact appeared incorrectly 
on the electronic simulation. The 'jumping' observed 
may well have given the impreSSion that some of these 
simulations involved closer passage than was in fact 
the case. It is noticeable also that in viewing paper 
simulations observers were more accurate in their 
judgements of whether situations were conflicts or safe, 
both initially and overall, while the other two types 
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of decision were much less often reported correctly 
(or at all) initially. 
The precise causes and descriptions of these 
differences are of less importance than the fact that 
they do occur. In every case, there is less variation 
between paper and electronic simulations than there is 
between simulations themselves. It must, however, 
be concluded that attempts to use simple simulations 
in cases where precise answers are required are 
unjustifiable. 
3. Differences between skilled and unskilled observers. 
Differences between skilled and unskilled observers 
appear in Chapter V - Electronic Simulation - Findings, 
and in Chapter VII - Paper Simulation - Findings. 
The differences appearing in Chapter VII 
represent differences between the averages for paper 
and electronic simulation, and are of value only as 
part of the analysis of variance. The analyses show 
that there are no significant interactions between 
skill and simulation type, although there appears to 
be a just significant interaction (5% ~, p ";. 1%) between 
the ~ean accuracies of judgement of separation for 
skill and simulation. This is because the mean accuracy 
for unskilled observers is 83%, while for all other 
conditions the accuracy is about 70-73%. This can 
reasonably considered to be a statistical artefact, 
rather than evidence of a genuine interaction. 
In order to examine the differences between groups 
of observers in their own right, it is better to t~rn 
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to chapter V, in which the differences observed are 
based on 64 simulations, rather than sixteen. 
From this data it appears that there is a 
significant difference between skilled and unskilled 
observers in the mean time that they make decisions. 
Skilled observers make their first decisions seventeen 
seconds earlier, their first coirect'decisions about 
twenty seconds earlier. There are no significant 
differences between groups of observers for different 
simulations, and there are no significant differences 
between groups in accuracy. 
There is a significant difference in within-group 
variability between skilled and unskilled observers in 
the mean time at which they make their first decisions. 
The nature of the difference is well illustrated in 
Figure 10, which shows that although skilled and 
unskilled groups of observers start making decisions 
at about the same time, the skilled observers have 
virtually completed the task at two minutes before Tca, 
while about 20% of unskilled observers have still to 
make a decision. Although the differences between 
groups in variability reflect this differences in 
other analyses, they do not again reach significance. 
There seems to be no objection, on the basis of 
the data here analysed, to the use of a sufficient number 
of unskilled observers in place of skilled observers, 
where estimates of difference between situations are 
required, or ~here timing is not important. It would, 
however, be unwise to make assumptions about the 
distribution of mean times for skilled observers from 
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unskilled observers. Unskilled observers start to 
make decisions at about the same time as skilled, but 
finish later. Estimates based on 5th percentiles 
for unskilled observers would therefore be unduly 
pessimistic. 
4. Discussion. 
This section contains a discussion of the practical 
implications of this research and allied points of 
general interest. It should be emphasised that this 
discussion is partly speculative and entirely individual. 
It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of any 
official body or of anyone other than the writer. 
(The writer is however indebted to his colleagues and 
the air traffic controllers and others with whom he 
has come into contact in the course of this research 
for many illuminating and informative discussions.) 
The major part of the training of air traffic 
controllers is in procedures. These are for the most 
part stereotyped patterns of verbal and other 
communication, using standard formulae. Emphasis 
is put on the correct and punctilious performance 
of procedures. While this is of course an essential 
feature of air traffic control, it is by no means 
sufficient in itself. An ~nalogous situation has 
occurred in naval situations (personal communication of 
Dr. N.S.Kirk), where radar operators were required to 
report targets approaching their ships. The operation 
was performed correctly, ranges and bearings being 
found rapidly, accurately and in the correct manner. 
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However, observers studying the performance of the 
operators found that they were not reporting many of 
the targets until long after the observers had seen 
them. It was found that the radar operators had been 
trained extensively on simulators which presented very 
large and definite echoes, far larger than those 
observed in practice. It was found that the objective 
performance of radar operators could be greatly 
improved by instruction in recognising faint and 
fleeting targets of the type that occurred in practice. 
Perhaps the main reason why this aspect of radar 
training was neglected is that very little was known 
about how or why targets were not detected. There have 
now been extensive studies of target detection, and 
much is now known. General theories of some predictive 
value have been developed to explain why certain 
targets were not detected, and training includes 
instruction in the detection of targets. 
Although a formal theory of conflict assessment has 
not been developed, certain practical inferences can be 
made on the basis of this study, which do not require 
formal theoretical justification. There are certain 
types of situation in which it is particularly difficult 
to assess what is going to happen. These are in general 
situations in which a fast'rogue' aircraft overtakes a 
slow controlled aircraft, and those in which aircraft 
approach each other 'head-on', or nearly so. These tend 
to be situations where the angle between the aircraft 
tracks is either very acute, or very obtuse, so that 
slight errors in directional accuracy have major effects 
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an the point at which the tracks cross. In addition 
to this, it seems that when a decision has been taken, 
it takes at least a minute to alter it, and the 
probability that a wrong decision will be corrected 
is small compared with the probability that a correct 
decision will be made initially. In general, it appears 
that controllers are able to cope with deceptive 
si tuations onere these have be6nll.iwentified, so that it 
should suffice for the deceptive situations to be 
drawn to their attention. General experience of such 
situations suggests that this would require practical 
demonstration, in view of the reluctance of many 
observers to believe that they themselves are liable 
to errar, however willing they may be to admit the 
possibility of such errors in the abstract. 
The reasons why some situations seem particularly 
difficult are not always clear. One possible cause 
may be a form of perceptual distortion attributable 
to the background structure displayed on the radar. 
It appears that radar trails may be liable to a number 
of possible optical illusions, the Hering and Ponzo 
illusions being the most important. The former of 
these is the illu.sion that causes a rectangle drawn 
an a background of circles to appear 'cushion-shaped'. 
Under certain circumstances, the trail of an aircraft 
may be just touching a range ring. The observer will 
tend to extrapolate this line at a slight angle to the 
true course, in the direction of the centre of the 
display. The Pon~o illusion occurs where a trail 
approaches two parallel lines diagonal to its course. 
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In this case the trail is displaced rather than dis-
torted, and will often be judged to cross the second 
line at a point closer to the first crossing than in 
fact it does. These illusions can usually be eliminated 
by making sure that the background is relatively dull 
compared with the relevant radar trails. 
It may be argued that the increasing use of 
automatic systems renders this discussion academic, 
as the task will not in future be performed by human 
operators but will be taken over by automated conflict 
avoidance systems. 
While this is to a certain extent a valid point, 
it is by no means a decisive argument. Automation is 
costly, complex and liable to errors of a different 
type to those of human operated systems. Social, 
political and economic considerations limit the extent 
to which it is possible to rely absolutely on automation. 
Filtered radar displays may well reduce 'noise' in a 
technical electronic sense, but may induce other 
perceptual distortions of unknown or unsuspected types. 
The work of J.F. Brown suggests that the size and 
shape of symbols may influence subjective perception 
of speed, to name only one possible cause of difficulty. 
Although the electronic equipment may not be subject 
to these perceptual errors, it will be checked and 
supervised by operators who are. If, for example, air-
craft moving down a radar screen appear to move in 
towards the centre, then out again as they pass it, 
the electronic engineer will be expected to rectify 
this. The more elaborate the equipment involved, the 
more willing the operator will be to attribute such 
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malfunctions to the system. 
Another point of importance is that it is often 
usual to maintain the original unautomated system as 
a stand-by in the event of technical failure of the 
automatic system. If the original system relies on 
human skills, particularly human perceptual skills, 
it may well be of critical importance that these 
perceptual skills be maintained at an adequate level. 
If this is to be done by training, the training should 
concentrate on the most difficult situations, which 
should be known beforehand. 
Finally, a general word of warning may be 
appropriate. It is often the case that automation 
is introduced into such situations as an escape from 
the stress of human decision making. This is a very 
dangerous and undesirable process, both from an y\. 
operational and a sociological and psychological 
point of view. The automatic systems at present 
under development are designed with a view to what 
we expect to be the situation in the forseeable future. 
This period is getting steadily shorter as the rate 
of the technological change accelerates. The only 
certain feature of the future is that it will involve 
change, much of which will not be only quantitative, 
but also qualitative. Not only will there be more 
aircraft to cope with, but there will be a steadily 
widening range of type of flight. Most aircraft of 
the present day fly at between 100 and 600 knots, 
carry between ten and one hundred passengers, and take 
off and land on conventional runways. The occasional 
rotating-wing aircraft can be treated as special cases. 
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In the foreseeable future, the system may have to cope 
with 'Jumbo Jets' carrying up to a thousand passengers, 
'SSTs' carrying a more normal number, but not very 
manoeuverable, and very short of stacking time, and 
'V STOLS' carrying passengers to dispersed terminals 
and operating from within the airports, using subsidiary 
take-off and landing strips, to say nothing of any 
other unforeseen developments. 
It is extremely unlikely that a contemporary 
automatic system could handle all this traffic without 
extensive modification, and without human supervision. 
Thg psychoidgical danger of a completely automatic 
system will be familiar to anyone who has had to do 
with a computer installation. These installations are 
only as good as their programming, but within those-
limits are virtually infallible. As soon as their 
limits are exceeded, they become fallible to an equally 
marked extent. The operators of computing equipment 
are not usually of high intellectual calibre, being 
selected to be obsessional, routine minded and reliable. 
They rapidly develop an emotional attachment to their 
equipment, (or leave and take another job). When a 
person not skilled in their art approaches them with 
a complaint, they react defensively. Most often they 
are justified, but in some cases they are not. In 
digital computer installations, the result is usually 
a sharp argument, a full-scale row or an appeal to 
higher authority. In on-line air traffic control the 
result could be several hundred tons of aluminium, 
aviation spirit and human lives arriving in Oxford 
Circus in the rush hour. In an early report on 
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this research, possible casualties were estimated 
at probably hundreds, possibly a thousand. Developments 
since that time make the figures probably a thousand, 
possibly five thousand. Such risks are not to be 
taken lightly. 
Finally, what are the implications of this work 
for the future air traffic control systems. It may be 
assumed that most future air traffic control systeTs 
will employ remote radar installations, that the radar 
information will be filtered, and that the information 
will be presented on a sophisticated display. It i·s 
probable that secondary surveillance systems will be 
introduc·ed to carry out routine information transmission 
from aircraft to ground and vice versa. The routine 
work of the controller will be considerably 
lessened. Instead of being an 'operative' he will 
become increasingly an 'inspector', concerned with 
supervision of equipment, and monitoring of performance. 
He will be relieved of a considerable amount of direct 
stress at the cost of a certain indirect stress, 
because he will have to allow 'black boxes' to do a lot 
of what he has been doing himself. He will have to 
learn at the same time to trust his equipment and to 
watch it 60htin-tioutllyl. for failure - not an easy task. 
He will have to develop a high level of alertness -
which he already does - in a much less stimulating 
environment. It may well be that the 'false target' 
expedient sometimes employed in vigilance tasks may have 
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to be adapted to this similar situation. (The false 
target technique in radar vigilance work involves the 
introduction of a number of false alarms at random times 
at sufficient frequency to maintain peak alertness). 
It is, however, more lik~ly that a certain amount of 
the operational task will deliberately not be automated, 
simply so that the air traffic controller can be 
oontinuously enga~ed at a suitable level of activity. 
The specific task of conflict avoidance may well be a 
suitable one for delegation to the controller, since 
observation of the manoeuvres recommended by controllers 
suggests that they do not in fact obey exactly the 
formal rules laid down where such observation is not 
necessary. The judgement task involved is complex 
and allows for a range of attention. It is neither 
excessively irregular nor monotonous, and it is 
directly satisfying to the controller. It is not a 
major part of the controller's task, as the system at 
present runs, but it could well increase considerably 
if air traffic continues to increase. 
5. Recommendations. 
The following recommendations are made in view of 
the results of this experiment:-
1. That the time to go to the time of closest 
approach should be used as a measure of the urgency of 
situations, or, alternatively the linear separation 
between the aircraft. Air traffic controllers will' 
be able to take decisions at between three and two 
minutes before T6a, or at between ten and thirty miles 
separation, depending on the situation. 
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2. That there is na single 'threshold' value for 
time to go to Tea, ar separation, nor for any otherc 
measure of the situation developed in this report. 
3. That the rate of rotation of the line of sight 
is not a good measure of whether the situation can be 
determined, and in particular that the traditional 
'three degrees per second' does not apply to situations 
where the observer is not situated at one end of the 
line of sight. (See appendix 1, paragraph 1, for the 
origin of this measure). 
4. That unskilled observers may be used to give 
an idea of the performance of skilled observers, group 
for group. Skilled observers will show less variat~on 
among themselves, and will make their judgements at the 
same time as the best of the unskilled observers. 
Skilled and unskilled observers will be equally accurate. 
5.That the present simulation method cannot be 
relied·.upan for comparative timing of simulations, 
although it is fairly satisfactory for measuring 
accuracy. 
6. That there are significant differences between 
observers so that analyses should be based on the 
performances of sufficiently large groups of observers. 
It would be unwise to compare the performance of one 
observer in one situation with that of another observer 
in a different situation, and to draw conclusions about 
the situations or the observers. 
7. That in future experiments, attention should 
be paid only to the first decisions made. 
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The following recommendations are made for 
further work in the field. 
8. The range of simulation techniques should 
be extended by introducing comparisons with more 
accurate digital simulation techniques at one end, 
and with Hopkin and Ledwith's (1963) type of 
simulation. (This employed pictures on cards, and 
measured accuracy but not timing). Comparisons of 
the present situations should be made to determine 
which type of simulation is more at fault. 
9. Situations involving fast rogue aircraft, 
and head-on conflicts should be examined in more detail. 
10. Shorter simulations should be employed, and 
only first decisions recorded. 
11. To extend the investigation in the opposite 
direction, a 'critical incidents' survey should be 
carried out in which practicing air traffic controllers 
ar-e asked to recount occasions when conflict or near 
conflict situations have occurred. It might be possible 
to co-ordinate this with a systematic analysis of 
'air-miss reports' where these refer to incidents in 
controlled airspace'. A systematic analysis of video" 
tape and voice recordings, where these are available, 
might also be rewarding. 
The following general recommendations are made:-
12. That the possible occurrence of optical 
illusions and distortion should be considered when 
design of advanced systems is in progress. 
13. That controllers should be shown examples of 
illusions,and practice'giv"en at resolving situations 
of particular difficulty. 
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14. That in automatic systems sufficient work 
should be left unautomated to allow the operators 
to maintain full alertness. 
15. That consideration should be given to the 
changing nature of the task in the recruitment of 
future air traffic controllers. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
Literature Survey of the Visual Perception of Motion 
Historically, the first reference to the perception 
of movement is by Porterfield (1759) who discusses the 
idea of a 'threshold of movement' (although he did not 
use those terms). He stated that "an object moving 
with any degree of velocity will appear at rest if the 
space it runs over in one second of time is to its 
distance as 1 to 1400". 
Czermak (1847) first stated that movement was 
"phenomenally" - subjectively - different from point 
to point within the eye. By a process of subjective 
comparisons he determined that the movement appeared 
to be slower at the periphery of vision than at the 
centre. 
Fleischel (1882) investigated the problem of 
'phenomenal' velocity. He found that the velocity 
of an observed object seemed to be twice as great 
when the eyes were held stationary as when they were 
allowed to follow thr- moving object. Similar results 
were produced by Aubert (1886). 
Bourdon (1902) devotes a chapter to the perception 
of motion (pp 176 -204). He found that the threshold 
of movement was larger for a large object than far 
a small one. (In other words, the large object must 
be moving faster to be seen to be moving at all). 
Grimm (1911) found that the threshold for movement 
depended on the curvature of the track on which the 
object was moving. The more curved the track was, the 
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more readily was movement perceived. 
Wertheimer (1912) found that the perception of 
velocity by observers was extremely variable - previous 
research workers had made now allowances for differences 
between observers - but was not able to ascribe any 
systematic causes for this variation. 
All these research workers employed highly 
subjective methods, such as following the minute hand 
of a watch, or some similar approximately constant 
motion. 
Dembitz (1927) originated an extremely simple 
method of measuring observed motion, using a broad 
belt of white material moving over rollers and viewed 
through a slit. A diagonal line was drawn on the 
material, and gave the impression of a moying point. 
Dembitz used a belt 90 cms. wide,and asked his 
subjects to estimate the time at. which the point would 
reach a mark 72 cms. further on. He found that the 
errors made were inversely proportional to the velocity 
of movement of the point. (The greater the velocity, 
the less the error). Dembitz concluded that the human 
mind operated by judging the time taken to travel a given 
distance rather than the distance travelled in a fixed 
time. It should be noted however that Dembitz was 
specifically asking his subjects to make a judgement of 
this type. Had he asked his subjects to mark the posittn 
to which a point would have travelled in a given time, 
he might have observed considerably different results. 
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Dembitz carried out his work in ~unswiak. and 
similar, work was carried out in Berlin,using similar 
techniques ,by J.F.Brown (1931). In three papers 
(1931 a, b, c) Brown summarises extensive work in the 
perception of motion. 
Brown's equipment consisted of two boxes containing 
motor-driven bands; one being of a fixed (pre-set) velocity 
,the other variable by using a potential divider. The bands 
employed had markers on them which moved across the face 
of the box. 
Brown investigated a considerablo range of phenomena, 
and ob:l:ainudl' a considerable number of experimental results. 
He summarises these in general as indicating that motion 
percieved appears to be more constant than motion as it 
actually takes place. For example, suppose the subjoct 
is viewing the two moving bands in total darkness~ . 
Let one box be at a distance or <l:hrej):feet, and the 
other at a distance of thirty feet. If the speed of the 
nearer band is fixed,then the subject will perceive the 
two ppeeds to be the same when the more distant band is 
adjusted to travel ten times as fast,provided that he has 
no clues to show him that it is more distant. 
If the same experiment is carried out in broad 
daylight,so that the distance of the moving band can be 
judged by looking at the background,then the more distant 
band need only move at 1.56 times the speed of the nearer, 
to be perceived as moving at the same speed. 
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In general, Brown stated, perceptual velocity is 
proportional to perceptual distance divided by perceptual 
time. In less technical terms, he is saying that where 
perceptual distcrtions occur the perceptual velocity 
is consistent with these. For example, returning to our 
example of the previous paragraph, the subject would 
judge that the second box, ten times further away, is 
really only 1.56 times further away. (In practice, of 
course, the human adjusts to this phenomenom by a trial 
and error process, and learns to judge distances by 
comparison with memories of similar distances rather 
than by direct perception - although the apparent 
distortions of near objects in photographs are examples 
of occasions on which the adjustment system fails). 
A similar example is that of watching the minute 
hand of a clock as it passes one of the graduations of 
the dial. In this case, the hand seems to move faster 
when it is actually passing the graduation than when it 
is against a blank background. However, the apparent 
time taken is less, so that the overall effects cancel 
out. The precise statement of the effects of visual 
distortion is complex and unrewarding, but Brown listed 
the following specific differences. 
The apparent speed increases under the following 
conditions:-
1. Smaller Distance 
2. Varied Background 
3. Smaller Field Width 
4. Smaller Object 
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5. Object Oriented in Direction of Movement 
6. Object Moving Vertically 
7. Brighter Illumination 
8. Eyes Fixated, Rather than following 
Object. 
Brown used two 'permanent' experimental subjects, 
of whom he was one himself, the other being his assistant. 
These two observers were supplemented by undergraduate 
students from time to time. Brown took care to avoid 
providing visual cues for his observers, and used a 
method of ad jus tment to 'phenomenal equali ty' • (In 
other wordS, he got the subject to adjust the variable 
speed box until it appeared to be going as fast as the 
fixed speed box). It is not easy to assess the 
reliability of his results from the published data, 
and some reservations must be attached to the "Gestalt" 
theory interpretations given. His summary of findings, 
however, provides a useful guide to visual effects. 
Certain reservations however must be made. Brown 
worked under circumstances very different from the 
present investigation. He used for the most part only 
two trained subjects, both presumably sophisticated in 
this type of task. 
There is some evidence that 'phenomenal' judgements 
depend to a very great extent on the observers previous 
experience - dwellers in conventional houses observe 
trapezoidal window shapes as being square - whereas 
Zulus do not. The experience of the radar observer of 
the present day may be very different from that of the 
psychologist of forty years ago. 
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Gottsdanker (1952, 1955) ~eecr1bo" experiments 
using an arparatuc essentially similar to that of Dembitz. 
but using a pointer held by the subject to indicate the 
e'xpected track of the apparently moving point after 
its disappearance. Gottsdanker found that subjects 
could maintain constant velocity motion for about six 
seconds after the disappearance of the object point. 
If the object point had been accelerating. however, the 
subjects maintained a constant velocity, less than the 
final veloCity, but greater than the average velocity 
of the object point. A later experiment by Gottsdanker 
and Edwards (1957) deals specifically with the prediction 
of conflicts and is discussed in Chapter II. 
Weiner (1962) studied the effects of the duration 
of target presentation and the speed of the moving 
target. He used apparatus similar to that of Gottsdanker, 
and employed ten undergraduate observers 'inexperienced 
in tracking, motion predictton, or radar'. He found 
that, over a minimum of two seconds, the length of time 
for which the target was visible had little effect on 
estimation of speed. 
Weiner measured the absolute error in speed 
measurements, by extending the lines drawn by the 
observers to a terminal line, and measuring the dis-
placement from the correct point of intersection. In 
order to obtain a measure of 'relative error' he divided 
the 'absolute error' by the distance the point would have 
travelled during the nine seconds during which the 
subject was predicting. 
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He found that the mean relative error fell with 
increasing speed, although the mean absolute error 
increased. This is a general type of finding in 
similar situations. 
Johansson (1950) considered velocities in the region 
of 2Omm/sec., and used a method of adjustment similar 
to that of Brown (1931). Although the actual experi-
mental work is not reported in detail, the general 
results obtained are discussed by Johansson in terms 
of Gestalt psychology. Some relevant conclusions are 
that where two objects are moving they tend to form a 
simple 'configuration of motion'. The impression of 
velocity is formed by their relative displacement, 
not by the background (this difference from Brown's 
findings may reflect the slower speeds employed by 
Johansson). Where'two objects are in motion and one 
at rest, there is a greater tendency to fovm a group 
of the two moving objects than of the object at rest 
and a moving object. It is possible for two different 
effects to occur, cancelling each other out. (For 
example, apparent time may be reduced at the same time 
as apparent distance, resulting in apparent constant 
veloc~ty). 
A final conclusion of Johansson is that occurrences 
independent of visual motion may influence the perception 
of motion - even events observed from another sensory 
mode. (An interesting example of such an occurrence is 
provided by one of the last types of steam locomotive 
employed by British Railways. This suffered from few 
mechanical faults but always ran late. Investigation 
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showed that the driving wheels were some four inches 
smaller in diameter than was traditional, so that the 
drivers, who relied on the sound of the driving pistons' 
rather than the speedomete,r, consistently ran the 
engine about five per cent too slowly. Eventually, 
the class of engines had to be discarded.) 
Slater-Hammel (1955) used the same general type 
of apparatus to estimate the time that a disappearing 
target passed a marker. The disappearing target was 
in the form of a bar, travelling at 1! in. per sec. A 
total of 90 observers was employed, all being physical 
education students at an American university. Slater-
Hammel found that the overall error in timing increased 
as the distance of the marker from the point of 
disappearance was increased. In addition the mean 
error for all observers tended to be an overestimate 
of the time needed (H· secs.) when the marker was at ! 
2 5/8 in. from the point of disappearance, and an 
underestimate when the marker was at 5 1/4 in. (3 sec.) 
and 7 1/8 in. (4sec.) The times and distances employed 
in this experiment are rather shorter than those employed 
in other experiments. The possibility that some of the 
systematic variation is attributable to simple reaction 
time cannot be excluded. 
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APPENDIX 2. 
Glossary 
This glossary is provided to define or explain 
various ,terms used in the text of the :Chesis. In order 
to make the thesis as easily understood as possible, 
explanatian of some terms that might be considered well 
knawn to all radar users are included. 
Angle of Approach (Type of Conflict) 
This is the angle marked in.. Ftgu!'e' 37. Under 
the title 1!Type of Conflict" it is one of the factors 
used in this experiment. In this study four angles were 
used, 45, 90, 135 and 170 degrees. 
Blips (Paints l 
Blips or Paints are the bright spots produced 
where the radar trace passes over the point corresponding 
to an aircraft, or in this case, a simulated aircraft. 
They lose brightness over an interval of about 40 seconds. 
The decay time is a property of the tube used, and depends 
primarily on the candition of the phosphor coating on 
the tube. 
Collision 
A collision is the physical contact of two aircraft. 
A 1!Collisian "Situation1! is a situati.on in which, unless 
action is taken, a collision will occur. 
Conflict 
A conflict is the passage of two aircraft 
dangerously close to each other. For the purposes of 
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this experiment "Dangerously Close" was defined to be 
within five miles, whatever the speed of heading of 
aircraft. A "Conflict Situation" is one in which a 
conflict may occur if no action is taken. 
Control (Controlled Aircraft. Control Aircraft) 
This is the aircraft considered to be under the 
control of the controller. The controller is informed 
of its heading and speed. 
Correct Decision 
In this report a Correct Decision means a decision 
which corresponds with the objective fact that the Rogue 
will, or will not pass within five miles of the Control. 
Criterion 
A measure of the situation which may be used to 
describe the performance of a subject. For example, 
the "Time to go to Time of Closest Approach", or the 
"Separation" (as in Figure. 37. ) 
Factor 
In this experiment, a factor is a parameter of the 
experimental situation which is altered in a controlled 
manner, four levels of each factor being used. The levels 
of the factors used are listed in Table 1. Factors 
employed were: 
Heading of Control 
Type of C onflic t 
Speed of Closing 
Nature of Miss 
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Track Intersection Distance 
Posi tion on PPI 
For oetailF!d explanations of the meanings of these, 
see the relevant headings in this glossary, or Section 
First DecisiQn 
In this report a First Decision is the first 
distinguishable decision made by the subject, whether 
Qr not it is cQrrect. This decision serves in part to 
assess the extent to which the subject perceives the 
situation as difficult. The accuracy of this decision 
(seeChapt'er;V ) gives some indication of the actual 
deceptiveness of the situation. 
Heading 
The heading of an aircraft is the direction in 
which it is going. This is expressed in degrees, 
measured clockwise from due North. Throughout this 
experiment, all aircraft were assumed to be maintaining 
constant headings at constant speeds and at the same height. 
Image 
The image of an aircraft is the representation of 
that aircraft on the P.P.I., which is composed of a 
series of paints of decreasing brightness. The distance 
apart of these paints, and their direction give an 
indication of the speed and heading cf the aircraft. 
Level 
The level of a specific factor in any particular 
situaticn is its value in that situation. The values of 
the four levels of the six factors used are listed in 
Table 1. 
Line of Sight 
The line of sight is thp lj no d:t"awn from the 
Control Aircraft to the Rogue. (eR in diagram 37 
The speed with which the line rotates and the rate 
at which the speed of rotation changes are important 
criteria. Formulae for the derivation of these are 
given in Cha.pter VIII,Sec::tion 1 
Metravick Film Recorder (Metrovick) 
The Metrovick film recorder is a special purpose 
recorder, used to record and display radar pictures. 
It operates by recording on a continuous film, 
35 mm. wide, the sweep of the radar. It is not a 
"Frame-by-Frame" system. Points displayed by the 
P.P.I. in polarco-ordinates are stored in cartesian 
co-ordinates. It is, therefore, necessary to provide 
a "North Marker lt as a reference point for joining film. 
Miss Distance 
This term is used as an abbreviation for Track 
Intersection Distance for technical reasons connected 
with computer storage. It is also sometimes used 
(not in this report) to indicate the separation at 
the point of closest approach. 
Nature of Miss 
This is one of the factors used in this experiment. 
It was originally made up of a 2 x 2 combination of the 
passage of the rogue ahead or astern, and the freedom 
may be sub-divided into those due to the two factors and 
that due to the interaction between these. However, 
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exam:!.navi",n o! hha Bitl1ll1.1vnA shows vhat this interaction 
is in fact identical with the starting of the rogue on 
the c~ntrolled aircraft's left or on its right. This 
factor:cmay, therefore, be partitioned into three 
orthogonal two-way choices. 
North Marker 
In this experiment, on all films, a North Marker 
in the form of a vertical line from the centre to the 
circumference of the tube was included. This made it 
possible to join films, so that faulty sections could 
be replaoed. 
Observer 
The term "Observer" is ased to cover any person 
looking at a radar screen for experimental purposes. 
Experienced subjects are referred to as "Skilled 
Observers". 
Paints 
See "Blips". 
Point of Cross-Over 
This is the point of intersection of the tracks 
of the two aircraft. It is marked X in P)j)g.ul!"e\:.37. 
Point of Closest Approach 
This is the position of the rogue aircraft at thetime 
of closest approach. It is not used in this report. 
Position on P.P.I. 
This factor was included in the experiment in an 
attempt to determine whether the quality of the pictnre 
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at'f' .. ",+.",a jud/Scmott-!;. (The oharac"\;GristloB of the recorder 
included a tendency for errors in the positioning of 
blips to be exaggerated towards the edge of the P.P.I.). 
The levels used were:-
1. Outer Heading Outwards. In this case, the 
conflict took place near the edge of the screen, 
with the controlled aircraft heading towards -
and becoming more erratic. 
2. Outer Heading Inwards. In this case, the 
conflict took place near the edge, but the 
controlled aircraft was heading towards the 
centre. 
3. Median. In this case, the ccnflict took place 
between about 30 and 60 miles from the centre. 
4. Central. In this case, the conflict took 
place within about 30 miles of the centre. 
For technical reasons, on initial filming, certain 
aircraft did not initially appear on the screen, so 
that certain conflicts had to be moved inwards from 
the edge, or outwards from the centre. Moves made 
were held as small as possible. 
P.P.I. 
A P.P.I. or Plan Position Indicator is a radar screen 
.arranged to provide a two-dimensional display similar to 
an ordinance survey map. Aircraft appear at positions 
corresponding to those they would assume on a map of 
the area. This is the type of radar display used in 
Air Traffic Control. Ncrth is invariably assumed to 
be the vertical in the display. 
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Rogue 
In this experiment, the Rogue or Rogue Aircraft, 
is an aircraft which is involved in a conflict situation 
with the controlled aircraft. The Observer is told 
only that it is at the same height as the control, and 
that it is flying a steady course at constant velocity. 
Safe. 
A situation is safe when the aircraft visible will 
not pass at any time oangerously close to each other. 
Script 
In this experiment, a script is a series of 
sixteen simulations. 
Separation 
In this experiment, the separation of any two 
aircraft is the distance S (SeeChapter VIII) between 
the control and the rogue. The separation is a possible 
criterion. 
Simulation 
In this experiment, a simulation is a single 
si tuation, as described in Cha.pter IV. 
Skilled Observer 
In this experiment, the term "Skilled Observer" is 
used to denote a member of the combined group of Service 
and Civil Controllers. 
Speed of Closing 
The speed of closing is the vector differenoe of 
the velocities of rogue and control, It is not quite 
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the same as the relative velocity for aircraft not on 
collision courses. It is the limit to which the 
relative velocity tends as the aircraft are considered 
at increasingly early times. Four values are used in 
this experiment, 240, 360, 480 and 600 knots. A knot 
is one nautical mile (6020 ft.) per hour. It is 
traditional to express aircraft speeds in knots. 
Time of Closest Approach 
This is the time at which the two aircraft are 
at their closest. For mathematical derivation see 
.Cha.pter VIII Section 1 
Track Intersection (Distance) 
This is the distance of the rogue from the point 
of cross-over when the control reaches the point of 
cross-over. 
!ype of Conflict 
This is an alternative name for the Angle of 
Intersection. 
Unskilled Observer 
Observers who have no experience of radar observation 
are called "Unskilled" for the purposes of this report. 
See Cha.pter IV. 
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APPENDIX 3. 
References 
This list of references includes a number of 
'background' references, not referred to in the text. 
These are references of historical or purely academic 
interest. They have been included in this appendix 
for the convenience of subsequent research workers in 
this field. They are distinguished from the more 
relevant references by asterisks. 
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APPENDIX 4. 
Briefing of Subjects. 
This appendix contains examples of the materials 
used during the briefing of the subjects (referred to 
in section 7, Experimental Procedure). 
A/4.1 is the form used for briefing skilled 
subjects, and A/~.2 is the form used for briefing 
unskilled subjects. These briefs were read to the 
subjects and any queries were explained. A/4.3 is 
an example of the sheet showing the details of the clock 
face indicating method, the four possible headings of 
the control aircraft, and the size of a 5 mile radius 
circle, drawn to scale. 
A/4.4 is an example of the sheet giving the initial 
information which was provided to each subject and 
A/4.5 is a sheet giving the required procedure, which 
was also given to the subjects to act as an aide-memoire. 
During the running of the experiment a watch was 
kept for misunderstandings of the instructions, and, 
where it was possible to do so, these misunderstandings 
were eliminated individually. 
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A 4.1 
Brief for Skilled Subjects - Electronic Sumulation 
Good Morning/Afternoon. 
First of all I must thank you for coming here to help us. 
What we are trying to do is find a way of saying 
what an Air Traffic controller does when he makes a 
judgement by watching a P.P.I. Radar set. We are NOT -
I repeat NOT - trying to test you either as individuals 
or as a group. You are part of a ~epresentative sample 
of people who do this sort of job, and we are after t~ 
average sort of ability. We are ~ going to report 
the performance of individuals to ANYONE. 
You are going to watch four sets of sixteen short 
simulations. (Two in the afternoon, two in the morning). 
The radar will be set to have a centre scan, six sweeps 
per minute, that is 12 seconds per sweep, and a range 
from centre to edge of 100 miles. 
In each short simulation you will be given the 
approximate position, in terms of the clock face 
direction from the centre, and Outer, Middle or 
Centre, the type, the speed in knots, and the direction 
of a control Aircraft. This will always be the first 
to appear on the screen. After about three sweeps, 
the rogue will appear, and the situation will develop 
for four minutes. You may switch on range rings if you 
want them. 
In all cases the aircraft will travel on a straight 
course without altering speed, although there may well 
be some jumping of the blips owing to irregularities in 
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be travelling at the same height. At the end of each 
four minute simUlation there will be at least one 
blank sweep. 
This is what you have to do. 
At the start of each excercise give your console No. 
When you see the control say "CONTROL ON" 
When you see the rogue say IIROGUE ONn 
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A 4.2 
Brief far Unskilled Subjects - Electronic Simulation 
Good Afternoon. 
First of all I must thank you for coming here to 
help us in this experiment. I had better explain that 
this is a special research unit of the Ministry of 
Aviation, which is devoted to making it safer to travel 
by air, by keeping aircraft from bumping into each other 
in mid-air. 
We are investigating how people can watch radar 
screens. It is obviously better to use the people who 
normally do this, but they are few and far between, 
and very much overworked. We are therefore carrying 
out a study to see if unskilled people react in a 
similar way. It this is so we can use the results of 
a lot of experiments people have done already. If it 
isn't we knaw that those experiments may be misleading. 
An Air Traffic Controller is a skilled man who 
sits in front of a radar console, and makes decisions. 
You are going ta try to copy just one of his functions, 
though it is ane of the more important ones. The 
controller sits at his console, which is like a large 
desk, with a radar tube set into it. He sees the beam 
swinging round six times a minute, like the hand of a 
clock. As it passes over spots which correspond to the 
pOSitions where aircraft are, it leaves little blobs 
of luminous green. These blobs get slowly fainter, 
but at any time there is a fading trail of blips, 
showing where each aircraft is coming from, and how 
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fast it :i.a going. What the Qontroller has to watch 
is where two aircraft come together. It is the rule that 
aircraft must never be less than five miles apart, so 
that if he sees any aircraft coming close to the aircraft 
he controls, he must tell the CONTROL aircraft to turn 
to avoid the ROGUE, which is what they call the other 
aircraft. To help him judge the scale, he has range 
rings, which are circles at 2 mile intervals, with a 
heavier one at 10 mile intervals. 
You are going to watch four sets of sixteen 
simulations, each being about four minutes. At the 
start of simulation you will be told the shot number, 
the position of the CONTROL aircraft from the centre, 
i.e. 6 O'clock being straight down, and central Outer 
or Middle, as in the diagram. You will also be told 
the type of aircraft, the speed in knots, which are near 
enough miles per hour, and the direction it is heading 
in. I have given you all a sheet with the four directions 
indicated on it. In practice, these directions may not 
be followed exactly, and the blips you see may not be in 
a dead straight line, owing to the age of the machine. 
In general all the aircraft are supposed to be travelling 
in straight lines at the same height. 
After the Control has been on for three sweeps, 
the Rogue will appear. They will both move steadily 
in straight lines. At the end of each four minute 
simulation there will be at least one blank sweep • 
. When you see the CONTROL: say IIControl on" 
When you see the ROGUE: say IIRogue on". 
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Who" you er .. "",.., "'ba~ 1;he airoraft will pass 
wi thin five miles of each other say "CONFLICT". 
If you are sure they won I t say "SAFE". 
If you are sure there will be a conflict, that is 
to say that the aircraft will pass closer than 
five miles say "CONFLICT". 
In either case, say what you think the rogue is 
going to do, i.e. ROGUE CROSSING AHEAD, or ROGUE 
CROSSING ASTERN. 
Then way how near you think they will be at their 
closest point, i.e. 4 miles. Carry on watching. If 
you decide to revise your estimate say CORRECTION and 
give your new estimate. 
Do you have any questions? 
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Brief for Skilled Observers - Paper Simulation 
The idea of this experiment is to compare a series 
of situations drawn on paper with a series recorded on 
a radar simulator. We are measuring in general the 
way in which people are affected by four factors - and 
by the type of simulation. 
You will be shown a series of sixteen simulations, 
each lasting 200 seconds. Each simulation is made up 
of 20 pictures representing the radar picture 
diagrammatically. The scale is 20 miles to the inch., 
the radius of the screen being 100 miles, and the range 
rings are at 10 mile intervals. You will see each 
picture for 10 seconds. 
At the start of each simulation you will be told 
the type of the controlled aircraft, its speed, and 
its heading. This is the BLUE aircraft. The RED 
aircraft is a ROGUE. Both aircraft fly at constant 
speeds, on constant headings, and are at the same height. 
We want you to:-
1. As soon as the first picture is shown, press 
the button, and when the light comes on say 
"SHOT ONE - or TWO - or whateverll. Then 
release the button. 
2. As soon as you are sure say "CONFLICT" if you 
think that the rogue is going to pass within 
give miles of the control at any time. If it 
will not pass within five miles of the control 
say IISAFE". 
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3. Say what inst~uction yuu would give the 
"control", i.e. "TURN LEFT FORTY DEGREES". 
4. Say what y~u think will happen if no action 
is taken. Say if the ROGUE is going to 
pass AHEAD of or BEHIND the Control, and how 
far apart they will be AT THEIR CLOSEST, i.e. 
"ROGUE BEHIND - 3 MILES" or "ROGUE AHEAD -
7 MILES". 
If you wish to make any revised estimates, simplY 
press the button, say "CORRECTION" ana give your new 
estimate. 
Have you any questions? 
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Brief for Unskilled Observers - Paper Simulation 
The idea of this experiment is to compare a simple 
type of paper simulation with a more elaborate type of 
electronic simulation. We are measuring in a general 
way the extent to which people are affected by four 
factcrs - and by the type of simulation. 
You will be shown a series of sixteen simulations, 
each of which lasts for 200 seconds. Each simulation 
is made up of 20 pictures representing the picture 
you would see on a radar plan position indicator, which 
resembles a map. Normally there is a sweeping line of 
light which puts in the new position of aircraft, so 
each aircraft is visible as a bright dot, with a trail 
of fading dots. In our experiment, we cannot produce 
any bright dots, so we represent the aircraft by 
circles, and the trail of fading dots, which usually 
overlap, by a diminishing tail. The length of the tail 
gives an idea of how fast the aircraft is going, and the 
direction of the tail shows where it has come from. 
Each simulation is made up of 20 sheets, with pictUres 
of the radar screen, including two aircraft. After you 
have seen the first one for 10 ~econds, you will be shown 
the next, and you will find that the two aircraft have 
moved slightly closer. The scale used is 20 miles per 
inch, the radius of the screen is equivalent to 100 
miles, and the range rings are ten miles apart. At the 
start of each simulation you will see two aircraft, 
one RED, which is the ROGUE, and one BLUE, which is the 
CONTROL. You will be told what type of aircraft the 
controlled aircraft is, what speed it is flying at,and 
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in whieh dj't'enT.;.on it t,. h"adine. Both aircraft "fly 
at eon5tant speeds in straight lines. 
We want you to do the following things:-
1. As soon as Y:ou see the first picture say "SHOT 
ONE" and so on for each new simulation. (When you speak, 
press the button, and speak when the light comes on -
hold the button down until you have stopped speaking). 
2. As soon as you are sure say "CONFLICT" if you 
think that the aircraft are going to pass within five 
miles of each other, or "SAFE" if you think they aren't. 
3. Say what you think is going to happen. In 
particular, say whether the.ROGUE is going to pass 
AHEAD of, or BEHIND, the controlled airoraft, and try 
to estimate how far apart they will be at their closest, 
i.e. "ROGUE AHEAD - FIVE MILES". 
If you want to make any revised estimates simply 
press the button, say "CORRECTION" and give your new 
estimate. 
Have you any questions? 
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ATCEU Pr9ject No. EU. 12 - Determination of Radar 
Information Threshold. Details of 'Controlled" 
Aircraft 
SCRIPr No. 1 
~HOT IDENT AIRCRAFT STARTING srnED ITRACK ~INAL POSITION TYPE POSITION (CONTROL TO NO. 
ON PPI ROGUE) 
1 VISCOUNT 1 OUT 360 225 HOT USED 
2 D,\KOTA 3 OUT 180 090 
3 VISCOUNT 6 MID 360 090 
" 4 AMBASSADOR 9 OUT 370 090 
- 5 11 9 OUT 320 090 
- 6 11 6 OUT 310 350 
.-. 
7 11 12 OUT 320 350 
8 VISCOUNT 10 OUT 420 090 
9 AMBASSADOR 11 OUT 330 350 
10 VISCOUNT 8 CNTR 400 350 
11 11 2 MID 400 350 
.-
12 DAKOTA 7 MID 200 350 
13 AMBASSADCDR 11 MID 310 225 
14 VISCOUNT 4 OUT' 400 150 
15 11 2 MID 420 225 
16 DAKOTA 2 OUT 170 225 
, , 
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Example of Procedure 
You hear:-
"Shot Number 65 - Control is at 10 o'clock, middle, 
speed 400 knots, heading 090 degrees" 
When you see control aircraft, YOU SAY "CONTROL ON" 
When y.ou see rogue aircraft, YOU SAY "ROGUE ONE" 
When you decide YOU SAY "SAFE" or "CONFLICT" 
Then if you say conflict you order "Alter course 60 
degrees RIGHT" 
Then you say "ROGUE CROSSING ASTERN - 2 MILESII 
If you revise your distance estimate for example SAY 
"CORRECTION - ROGUE CROSSING ASTERN - '3 MILES" 
EXAMPLE OF YOUR RESPONSES 
"CONTROL ON" 
"ROGUE ON" 
---------------------------------
"SAFE" 
"ROGUE CROSSING ASTERN - 6 MILES" 
"CORRECTION" 
"CONFLICT" 
"ALTER COURSE 20 DEGREES RIGHT" 
"ROGUE CROSSING ASTERN - 4 MILES" 
---------------------------------

ORGANISATION EUROPEENNE 
POUR LA SECURITE 
EUROPEAN ORGANISATION 
FOR THE SAFETY 
DE LA NAVIGATION AERIENNE OF AIR NAVIGATION 
CENTREEXPERUMENTAL EXPERUMENTAL CENTRE 
lATE: 28 JUIN 1991 r 
IOTRE REF. : 1 0 9 1 IUR REF.: 
The Librarian " 
University of Technology, 
Loughborough, 
Leicestershire, 'OTRE REF. : 
OUR REF.: LEll 3TU, 
IBJET : 
,uBJECT: 
Angleterre 
~: L 
NCL. : 
~ :(1)6988 
Dear Sir, 
Somewhere in your archives you may have a 
doctoral thesis 'Human Factors in Air Traffic 
study of the Ability of the Human Operator 
dangerously close approaches between aircraft 
radar displays.' 
copy of my 
Control; A 
to predict 
on simulated 
This thesis was submitted in the (then) Department of 
Ergonomics and Cybernetics, in July 1969. 
Rather to my surprise, I have recently seen several 
references to this thesis, which I thought long buried. 
Subsequent experience has shown that this thesis is in some 
respects potentially misleading. Please will you insert this 
letter and the attached copy of a paper I presented to an 
Ergonomics Society Conference some time ago, which which 
records a substantial modification of my initial position on 
the detection of conflicts by controllers? 
Attached : -
Yours Sincerely, 
n r 
~ 
~~.I'oco>\<r~(} 
~ ,,~ 
f"Jrp ",w.~+ 
Dr. H. Dav . 
'The Radar Air Traffic Controller - A Paradigm Shift' 
'Contemporary Ergonomics 1984' Taylor and Francis 
0-85044-268-0 
In' 
ISBN 
TEL. : (1) 69 88 75 00 
TELEX: AIREURO 602 150 F 
TELEFAX: (1) 60 85 15 04 
ADRESSE I ADDRESS: BP15 
91222 BRETIGNY·SUR·ORGE CEDEX 
FRANCE 
.J 
7 Transport control 
THE RADAR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER 
A PARADIGM SHIFT 
H. DAVID 
EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre, B.P. 15 
91220 Bretigny-sur-Orge, France 
ABSTRACT 
The ability of the Radar Air Traffic Controller to prevent 
dangerously close approaches bet~'een aircraft has been 
described by a mathematical model of' the extrapolation of 
future relative positions of aircraft. 
Evidence from previous experiments 
observation sho~s that controllers appear to 
predictions long before it is possible to do 
this model. 
and real-life 
be ,able to make 
so according to 
This Bnd other observations, and consideration of human 
information handling abilities, suggest that the controller 
does not extrapolate, but recognises previous configurations 
of aircraft in terms of position relative to boundary points 
and of aircraft types. 
A crucial experiment is proposed to 
hypotheses, and the impli.cation!i~~for 
considered. 
1 Il;"TRODUCTIO)l 
choose bet~een these 
display design are 
Air Traffic Control is a particularly satisfying field 
for the erg6no:nist. Hethods and equipment are evolving 
-rapidly, the allocation of tasks bet",,'een man and computer is 
constantly being revised, and man-computer interfaces are 
critical aspects of the system. The flo~s of information and 
control are ",'ell defined, and reasonably accessible. The 
judgements made by the controller are hard to quantify, but 
an understa~ding of these judgements is necessary if 
adequate controller-computer interfaces are to be developed. 
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Radar Air Traffic Control' 
0-- •• 
Radar ~as initially introduced as an auxiliary technique, 
to allow closer spacing of traffic at points of congestion 
(such as the Terminal AreaS surrounding airports) and to 
ensure separation from traffic (usually military) crossing 
the ain,ays. ICAO (the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation) requires that aircraft should be separated 
"ertically by 304.8 m (1 000 ft) be10.· 8 839.2 m (29 000 
feet) or 609.2 m (2 000 feet) above that level or by 9 266 m 
(five nautical miles) laterally - apparently because at that 
distance the 'blips I on early radar screens merged. The 
radar controller ~as assigned pairs of aircraft by the 
procedural controller. 
In recent years, the radar controller has become· an 
executive controller, using synthetic radar and electronic 
data displays to monitor and marntain tr'affic separations, 
~hile the procedural controller has become a planning 
controller) assigning crulslng flight le\'e~s in advance and 
maintaining a steady flo\o' of traffic "'ith the minimum of 
potential conflicts. 
2 BACKGROUXD 
Investigations into the ability of the air traffic 
controller fall into three broad categories, ~hich will be 
discussed separately, although they have taken place 
concurrently. Limits of time and space preclude an 
exhaustive diSCUSSion, but reference is given to major 
works. 
Observation 
Direct observation of the radar controller has been 
attempted on many occasj.ons. It is subject 'to practical' and 
ethical problems. The infrequency of radar conflicts 
requires prolonged periods ef observation and the difficulty 
of judging potential conflicts reqUires observers to be at 
least as aler't Bnd as skille.d as the controller. Con'trollers 
do· not like being observed, aad the ~presence of an observer 
may interfere ""ith the efficiency of control. There can also 
be ethical problems if the observer is aware of, a 
potentially dangerous situa·\:io:l ""hen the controller is not, 
should he alert the controller? 
These problems have been to some extent eased by the 
introduction of continuous recording from ",'hich incidents 
may be isolated - although e·ven It.'ith modern digitised radar 
records· it is still not easy to jdentify and reconstruct 
incidents, particularly ~here several aircraft Bre involved. 
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In spite of such difficulties, valuable information has 
been derived from such studies - for example Laion (1978) 
recorded horizontal Bnd vertical separations, analysing 
these in terms of the dimension in ~hich the contr611er did 
NOT intervene . 
.. 
Experiment 
Early experimental studies adopted the methods of 
experimental psychology, attempting to model aspects of the 
task in the laboratory. For example Hopkin & Ledwith (1963) 
presented static pictures containing dots representing 
aircraft trails, and asked observers to find which trails 
~'ere in conflict. Later studies used radar simulators 
David (1969) varied the position, closing angle, relative 
speeds and other features of pairs of aircraft in an attempt 
to find a suitable threshold criterion at which correct 
judgements ~ere made, and to identify factors affecting the 
controllers· judgement. 
More recent simulators have made possible similar 
experiments, in ~hich ATe experience has been taken into 
account, to include the special problems of climbing ~nd 
descending aircraft, and of aircraft on the same or op~os~ng 
headings. Such experiments (David 1980) show that, glven a 
simple radial structure of ain.;ays, cont~o~lers cou:d make 
judgements of the future relative poslt~ons of Blrcraft 
separated by as much as 180 km (100 nautical miles) - and 
that performance ~as not significantly affected by the 
provision or absence of a simulated radar trail or speed 
vector. 
Modelling 
In parallel with attempts to measure empirically the 
radar controller's ability to resolve potential conflicts, 
attempts have been made to develop a mathematical model of 
the process. Dunlay and Horonjeff (1974) made use of David's 
(1969) results to develop a mathematical model for the 
frequency of intervention to resolve conflicts.. Similarly 
Bisseret (1981) used a signal detection model to define the 
ability of controllers to detect conflicts, and to explain 
the differences between trainees . and experienced 
controllers. (The research team based at IKRIA has used a 
combination of system analysis, experiment observation and 
intervie\o,'s to study conceptual problems in air traffic 
control - Leplat & Bisseret1965, Leplat & Hoc 1981 etc.) 
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,1 u1>."RESOLI'ED PROBLE~S 
In spite of the efforts devoted to the analysis of the 
radar controller's strategy and perceptual abilities, some 
Significant anomalies remain: -
- Controllers appear to be able to make judgements of 
potentisl conflicts long before they should (on the 
basis of the information given on the display) be able 
to do so. 
- Controllers do not appear to need an indication of the 
actual speed of the aircraft (provided they know v.'here 
it is going). 
~ Controllers attach great importance to the types ~of 
aircraft involved in a potential conflict situation. 
... .In discussion controllers emphasise that the strategic 
organisation of air traffic flow is more important than 
the solution of ~pecific short-range conflicts. 
... Controllers prefer to ~ntervene as soon as they see a 
possible conflict, even if it is not necessary to do so, 
in case they are unable to intervene later. 
4 ALTERSATII'E PARADIGM 
Consideration of these anomalies suggested to the author 
an alternative paradigm: ... 
!be controller, on assuming 
compares its position with those 
conflic~ing routes, on the basis 
of similar types of aircraft in 
control of an aircraft, 
of aircraft on potentially 
of his previous experience. 
the same configuration. 
(It may be of interest that this paradigm shift occurred 
in exactly the manner described by Poincare' (1908) except 
that the vehicle involved "as a BAC 111 airliner rather than 
a horse -dra\o,'Il omnibus.) .: 
5 DISCUSSIOS 
The immediate reaction mast be that there are so many 
types of aircraft and entry points to sectors that such a 
method ~ould require an unacceptably large number of 
·situations to be learned. In practice, for the civil en-
route controller, the bulk of the traffic is made up of a 
few t}~es of airliners, falling into similar performance 
categories, and follo\o,'ing a fev; well-used routes. Radar 
conflicts . tend to occur \o,'here routes converge, since 
crossing traffic is separated by the planning controller, or 
when one aircraft is climbing or descending. Climbing and 
I , 
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(to a lesser extent) descending aircraft tend to be subject 
to more individual variation than cruising aircraft, but 
even here, the controllers are a~'are of general-rules 
aircraft leaving Europe for America climb more slo~ly, 
because they have full fuel loads - aircraft climb more 
slowly in hot weather,etc. 
-," The alternative paradigm must not be over-extended. The 
original paradigm was derived from military air traffic 
control, for which it is probably still valid, as it may be 
for off-route or area navigation of civil aircraft. 
Experimental Validation 
A crucial experiment could .. easily be devised to decide 
between these hypotheses. For example, if controllers Bre 
practiced ~dth a limited number of aircraft types in a 
familiar route structure, they should subsequently produce 
better performances ~ith that route structure than with 
identically placed aircraft in an unfamiliar region. 
. Consequences 
In the immediate future, the acceptance of the 
alternative paradigm has consequences for the design of 
future ATC displays. Rather than attempting to present 
relati"e velocity data, (Falzon 1982) we should perhaps aim 
to present relative distance markers for converging routes 
to ~hich aircraft can be referred on entry to the sector, or 
generalised ~arnings of abnormal meteorological conditions 
",-hich may affect the normal traffic pattern. 
In the long term, the increasing allocation of direct 
routings to aircraft equipped ~ ~'ith precise. navigation 
capabilities may call for reversion to the 'extrapolation' 
strategy, ",'hile, paradoxically, the cbanges in the 
functional design of fifth-generation computers may render 
the 'recognition' strategy more efficient for the computer. 
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